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BELÜGYI SZEMLE

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PREFACE

Dear Reader,

It is a fantastic thing that science is limitless and with today's IT capabilities, thanks to the digital world, this infinity is becoming even more perceptible. It is now the third time that we are publishing our English special edition, which content is now available all over the world, for all interested. As in all our previous publications, as well as in this special issue, we have tried to select scientific works of high quality on selected topics. Thanks to our network of professional reviewers, the articles received by our editorship go through a multi-round filter, for that reason we can ensure excellent quality. Science is not only unlimited, but also is an inexhaustible field. The results of research in various fields and disciplines have always served and continue to serve practical life, and as life is constantly changing and moving, more and more new phenomena, tasks to be solved and obstacles to be removed come into the perspective of scientists and specialists. Thanks to this, we can be confident that in the future we will be able to fill countless special editions with more and more interesting studies and professional reports.

We hope that the first English-language special issue of 2021 will once again win the favor of your interest. We tried to compile a variety of content, to collect colorful articles in several scientific and professional fields, to which we wish you a lot of fun to read.

Editorship

Lívia Horgos

Thoughts about the Definition of Ius Puniendi in Legal Theory

Abstract

In my paper I deal with the jurisprudential interpretation of ius puniendi by providing a historical overview of theories concerning this notion in a time span of almost 6000 years until it became a state monopoly and the humanization of criminal law. The interpretation of ius puniendi as the legal ground of punishment is based on different principles in different ages. The jurisprudential interpretation becomes less relevant with the birth of the legal state, when ius puniendi is a state monopoly. Nowadays the meaning of ius puniendi has been modified and broadened with new, different elements, since the principle of opportunity plays a more decisive role in the criminal law systems of modern states. In my study I interpret and examine ius puniendi unlike the classical authors of criminal law, i.e. a notion referring to the legal ground of punishment, but in its original meaning, i.e. the right of punishment, because of its modern function. With my work my aim is to answer the question whether the dogmatically elaborated category of ius puniendi has to be incorporated into the substantive and procedural jurisprudence of the 21st century.

Keywords: ius puniendi, interpretation of the right of punishment, interpretation of ius puniendi in a legal state

Introduction

The history of criminal law has been intertwined with the history of philosophy and especially the theory of punishment has been greatly influenced by philosophy (Irk, 1915, 71.). According to conclusion of András Szabó the most important elements of criminal law are sanctioning, and punishment (Szabó, 1989, 172.). Hungarian criminal law science unanimously agrees on the principle that the genus proximum of punishment is sanctioning (Blaskó, 2016, 434.). In the

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course of history those philosophers of law who examined the legal ground of punishment – earlier philosophers, later legal experts - tried to find the answer to the question; who, – especially the state (or the ruler) – on what basis and according to what law has legitimacy, i.e. where his right to sentence perpetrators is derived from, with special regard to the fact that the right of punishment is considered the natural conditions of the power by the representatives of legal science and its other fields. *The one who punishes has to be legitimized to punish properly.'* (Grotius, 1999, 21.)

The origins of ius puniendi and the birth of punitive power

The punitive power of states was formed in the course of history. In prehistoric societies, in tribal communities, individual people took revenge of any injuries, the perpetrator and the injured party stood face to face with each other. The origins of the institution of punishment were the primitive forms of compulsion – personal revenge and vendetta (Horváth, 1981, 15.). The community intervened on behalf of the injured party for amends and compensation only in a later phase. After the dissolution of tribal communities, the institute of talio (ius taliones), which is the right of equal retaliation, the principle of 'eye for an eye', became universal in classical slave states. The institute of redemption (compositio) evolved in classical slave states and became universal in the early Middle Ages. The principle of redemption laid the constitutional foundations of criminal law as it made possible for the perpetrator to compensate financially the injured party or the community in order to avoid being revenged: the injured party did not take revenge for the sake of ransom or blood money, some of which and later the whole amount was due to the tribal leader, the prince or the king. *'Redemption evolved gradually and existed parallel with vendetta and talio and later it became less widespread and finally as the claim of punishment of states were stronger – when both the perpetrator and the injured party were obliged to accept the offered peaceful settlement of disputes as courts could help and really did help those seeking remedy - it transformed, became exceptional or was used only in private law in the majority of states.'* (Blaskó, 2011, 52.). Talio and composition are forms of punishment but reflect the old concept according to which it is primarily the injured party that has to be remedied, which was provided by the state only as a last resort (Horváth, 1981, 15.). The legal ground of punishment was the retaliation of detriment and injury, which was authorized by the judgement of the society. The institute of vendetta, talio

and composition became less general as the executive power strengthened and sentencing and execution of punishment became gradually the duty of the state with relapses and sometimes decline (Blaskó, 2016, 24.). In the era of feudal absolutism, the unlimited power of rulers resulted in a more or less arbitrary practice of punitive power. Since the High Middle Ages criminal law has become more and more constitutional. Since the beginning of Modern Age states have practiced the right of punishment over perpetrators. The obligation of the enforcement of the punitive power of states was and is based on legality during criminal procedures, which means an obligation for law enforcement authorities, primarily for public prosecutors and the Prosecutor's Office to enforce claims and apply the statute of criminal procedure (Nagy, 2012, 26-27.).

A historical overview of theories concerning ius puniendi

The right of punishment in the Middle Ages

A new era started when states began to exercise their punitive power directly. *'In this way self-defence transformed into the defence of the society, revenge into retaliation, and punishment into repression of anti-social activities.'* (Friedman, 1912, 158.). In the Middle Ages theories concerning the legal grounds of punishment could be found in the works of philosophers and theologians. The punitive power of states (rulers) i.e. their right for punishment was derived from God according to canon law and theology (Blaskó, 2016, 418.). According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) crime is an offence against the earthly order created by God and punishment is the manifestation of divine justice on the earth (Heller, 1924, 14-15.).

The right of punishment according to natural law

Philosophers of natural law – Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in the Netherlands, John Locke (1632-1704) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in England, Charles-Louis Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Jean- Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) in France – examined primarily the legal ground of the punitive power of states. Natural law philosophers of the Modern Age derived the inalienable and permanent rights of man from eternal nature. According to natural law theories the legal ground of punishment is the connection between criminals and the state and, as consequence, theories connected to God became less relevant. Punishment is considered necessary and useful by them. The punitive power of states is based

on justice as a superhuman law and usefulness by them and punishment is considered just by them if it is lawful regarding the individual. According to natural law theories the essence of punishment is retaliation. Different political and legal systems are derived from human nature by Grotius, Locke and Hobbes, from the human mind by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and from necessity by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) (Horváth, 1981, 38-39.). As Grotius wrote, the legality of punishment is based on human nature (Grotius, 1999, 22.). As people convey all rights to the state for the sake of practicability, the right of punishment devolves on states themselves. Natural law did not define who has to be punished and how by the state, it only stated that crime has to be punished. The rebirth of criminal law is connected with Italy and France, as they did not accept the cruel punishment of their age and struggled for the reform of criminal law based on humanitarian ideas. The forerunners of the reform were philosophers (e.g. Locke, Montesquieu). This time the most important question was not the legal ground of punishment but the practicable and just limits of it (Blaskó, 2016, 419.). As states became consolidated and established institutes in the Age of Enlightenment, the social contract based on natural law defined the legal ground of punishment, i.e. citizens entered into a contract with the state for the sake of their safety. Those who breach the contract were punished by the state based on the conveyed rights (Tóth, 2012, 371.). According to Locke individuals transfer the right of punishment to the state (Locke, 1964, 173-174.). Montesquieu also defined the right of punishment as a voluntarily transferred right (Montesquieu, 2000. 48.). Montesquieu basically agreed with the views of Grotius and Locke, he emphasized the proportionality between crime and punishment and opposed cruel punishment (Horváth, 1981, 4.). Rousseau – similarly to Montesquieu - regard social contract as the legal ground of punishment and derived the justice of punishment from the idea of state treaty, in as much as its goal is to guarantee the survivor of individuals (Horváth, 1980, 45.). Karl Anton von Martini (1726-1800) was a representative of the natural law school, whose ideas represented the general law philosophy of the era of enlightened absolutism. According to his opinion the contract of the ruler is decisive, which implies unconditional subordination of the people under the ruler (Szabó, 1980, 44-48.). Ius puniendi is the right of the ruler that provides legal base for him to impose sentences in case of activities contradictory to the aim of the state, public law and order and the security of individuals (Martini, 1795, 47.). These ideas became comprehensive at the end of the 18th century when Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) laid the foundations for the reforms of criminal law. *'Only law can impose a sentence for a crime, and this power is the legal due of the legislative, who represents a whole society based on a contract. […]*

The ruler represents the society itself [...]' (Beccaria, 1989, 20-23.) By referring to written law Beccaria did not consider the foundation of the punitive power of a state that the perpetrator voluntarily submits himself to punishment (with respect to the social contract). He did not deal with the legal base of the punitive power of a state but examined the appropriate and just limits of punishment. In Beccaria's theory the cardinal principles of criminal law can be detected, i.e. nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege and equality before the law (Blaskó, 2016, 419.). Kant deduces the punitive power of a state from the absolute and unconditional unity of pure mind, which is a right due to the ruler over its subordinates. He emphasizes that the foundation of punishment can be exclusively retaliation, since violating the set of values of a society must meet violence (Horváth, 1981, 52-53.). Hegel derives ius puniendi from logical necessity. According to his views, perpetrators act according to their own absolute will when committing crime, which activity is unreasonable and occasional, while imposing a sentence is reasonable and inevitable (Horváth, 1981, 52-53.).

The legal foundations of punishment in utilitarian criminal law

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is a representative of utilitarian law philosophy while the philosophy of Johann Anselm Feuerbach (1775-1833) is related to the theory of psychological constraint. Bentham denies the theory of natural law and refuses the theory of social contract but accepts that states need the right of punishment. According to his views, without the punitive power of states no public or private authority can exist (Bentham, 1842, 111-257.). According to Feuerbach necessity is the foundation of punishment. In order to avoid breaches of law states need the right to threaten with punishment and legally demand from citizens not to commit crimes. Criminal activities must be inevitably followed by punishment (Feuerbach, 1799, 1-73.).

Conclusions referring to the legal foundations of punishment
in theories based on the necessity of punishment

In the 19th century Faustin Hélie (1799-1884) and Adolphe Chauveau (1802-1868) defined the legal ground of punishment in its indispensability, since states need punishment in order to survive. Punishment is justified by the society and the law of survival (Chauveanu & Hélie, 1837, 15.). In his theory of punishment Francesco Carrara (1805-1888) combined the theories of natural law and the principles of objective idealism (Carrara, 1878/1879). Social power has the right to do everything in order to protect law. It is the foundation of its

right to use physical pressure to prevent crime. The necessity of the protection of human rights is the limit of punishment, as states have to protect the right of not only the injured party but also that of the perpetrator (Horváth, 1981, 80.).

The foundations of punishment in the penal theory of the late 19th century

In criminal law theories at the late 19th century – due to anthropological and sociological trends – the perpetrator, the criminal individual became the focus of studies instead of the criminal act itself, since the scientific theories of classical criminal law did not meet the requirements of societies struggling with increasing crime. In penal theories the legal grounds of punishment were considered the most important issues until this period, and studies dealing with the aim of punishment were of secondary importance. At the end of the 19th century priorities changed, and penal theories were mainly concerned with the purpose of the punishment since punishment were logically justified by its usefulness thus the legal ground of punishment became less important (Horváth 1981, 82.). According to Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892), the first protagonist of purpose-theory, states have right only to punish if they are unable to reach their goals without it (Jhering, 1877, 480-481.). Franz von Liszt (1851-1919) – the founder of mediatory school – accepted and developed Jhering's theories. According to him punishment cannot be anything but purposeful, thus the legality of punishment is its purposefulness since the aim of the law is to protect human values (Liszt, 1882/1883, 53-54.).

Hungarian theories concerning the legal foundationsof punishment in the 18th and 19th and early 20th century

In Hungarian criminal law science, the theoretical classification of philosophical-ethical, social, political and legal approaches concerning punishment began in the 18th century but became more dominant in the first half of the 19th century. The legal-political generation of the 19th century - breaking up with the theories of university science - looked for the answers to the problems of punitive system following West European patterns. The main target of contemporary punitive theories was the establishment of the punitive system of civic state. Its philosophical ground was Bentham's civic society, utilitarianism and liberalism. Their approach to the theoretical, judicial and judicatural problems concerning punishment and punitive system was realistic (Horváth, 1981, 177.). According to Mihály Szibenliszt (1783-1834) states have a legal due to punitive judicial power and ius puniendi for the sake of their security (Szibenliszt,

1821, 115.). According to Bertalan Szemere (1812-1869) the legal ground of punishment is *'the committed crime [...] and safeguarding freedom and peace, together'*. (Szemere, 1841, 46.). As a matter of fact, it is the committed crime and safeguarding legal order, and according to his opinion punishment cannot exist without crime. Tivadar Pauler (1816-1886) developed the punitive theories of the Reform Age and forms a link to the concept of the Codex Csemegi. He believes that the foundations of punishment are the idea of justice and, as a consequence, only offenders can be punished. The principle of justice according to the requirements of the due process of law defines the limits of punitive power (Pauler, 1872, 36-61.). Later punitive theories focussed on criminal political ideas overshadowing the problem of legal ground since the justification of punishment is logically supported by its expediency and necessity. According to the punitive theory of Rusztem Vámbéry (1872-1948) punishment is justified because it is applied by the state and there is no need for extra legal grounds. The notion of state and its relationship to its citizens are the legal grounds themselves, *'since a state that renounces its right of punishment and does not fulfil its punitive obligations ceases to exist as a state'*. (Vámbéry, 1913, 39.). As Ferencz Finkey (1870-1949) wrote *'Punishment is always constitutional. It is always the state that is authorized to exercise punishment and the state can have it exercised by unique organizations, i.e. criminal courts. The individual authorized to punish is the state [...]'* (Finkey, 1902, 331.). According to Pál Angyal (1873-1949) ius puniendi is an equal definition to the subjective notion of criminal law, that is the power of states limited, insured and regulated by law, which is used against criminal activities in presence of defined conditions by applying codifies measures, through appropriate institutions following the defined methods (Angyal, 1920, 1.).

The birth of modern states and the role of constitutional state in defining ius puniendi

With the birth of modern states and the strengthening of authorities exercising the state power, ius puniendi became a state monopoly. In modern states there was no need to explain the punitive rights of states with a contractual relationship. According to statist theories, which accepted the absolute role of states, the punitive right of states derives from the paramount nature of states and to exercise this right in order to avoid anarchy is an obligation. In the next phase of development the usefulness of right punishment – becoming apparent in its practical feasibility and successfulness – is emphasised by pragmatical theories

and the legitimacy of the right of punishment became a mere legal philosophical problem of less importance (Tóth, 2012, 372.).

'Ius puniendi is the constitutionally defined, regulated and ensured punitive power of states.' (Blaskó, 2019, 17.). The Constitutional Court declared that *'in a democratic constitutional state punitive power is – constitutionally limited – executive authorization of states in order to call perpetrators to account. In this criminal law system criminal offences are defined as the breach of laws of the society and the right of punishment is a legal due of the state.'* (40/1993. (VI.30.) CC Resolution) Nowadays it is unanimously accepted that the punitive power of states is based on the actual power of states. *'In constitutional states the state does not have and cannot have unlimited punitive power, especially because executive power itself is not unlimited. Because of constitutional fundamental rights and constitutionally protected liberties, executive power is entitled to interfere in the rights and liberties of the individual only on the basis of constitutional authorization and constitutional grounds.'* (11/1992. (III.5.) CC Resolution).

The exercise of punitive power in a constitutional state is always limited and regulated by criminal law policy and punitive judicature policy thus determining the content of ius puniendi. For example, the codification guidelines resulting from the above-mentioned policies – effectiveness, promptness, simplicity, modernity, coherence and expediency – are typical of the resolutions of Act XC (Be.) of 2017 effective from 1st July 2018. In the 21st century the functional role of ius puniendi changed especially within the framework of the guarantees and requirements of a constitutional state. A reasonable transformation of the punitive power of the state and rethinking of its content are under way by realizing concessions and reaching compromises in constitutional states. Punitive power is exercised by constitutional states according to constitutional principles by enforcing the principle of opportunity. Based on legal political concerns – usefulness and expediency – the law may restrict the obligation of legality in a way that legislative power grants exemption from the fulfilment of obligation under certain conditions. Thus, states waiver the enforcement of penal claim in public prosecution cases. Constitutional states more often decide that perpetrators may have the opportunity to be totally or partially exempted from the legal consequences of committing crime – even by disregarding punishment - based on the conditions codified by the legislative power in legal resolutions. The exemptions from the exercise of punitive power of states are primarily based on the discretional authority of the public prosecutor authorized by the legislative.

The new resolutions of criminal procedures – such as the abandonment of independent indictment, the possibility of promising measures or resolutions in

case of confession, the agreement, and rethinking earlier introduced legal institutions (intermediary procedure and widening the scope of suspension by the public prosecutor) – follow the actual trend, that is the principle of opportunity gains more ground as the tasks of the public prosecutor increase. With respect to the above mentioned facts and with regard to ius puniendi the limits of the punitive power of states are examined with special respect to punitive claims, i.e. whether states are obliged to enforce their punitive claims in every case and the relationship between ius puniendi and obligatio puniendi. Can a constitutional state disclaim its punitive claim, its enforcement, does it have the right to do so, or is it disclaim at all? Furthermore, how do states punish, and under what conditions can be and should be legislative, judicature entitlement and punitive power, which embody ius puniendi, limited?

Closing remarks

I believe that ius puniendi is a right that is and has to be exercised based on the supra society nature of states, which is closely attached to obligatio puniendi, the obligatory fulfilment of functions. Ius puniendi – similar to the punitive power of constitutional states – is not absolute, but it fulfils its purpose according to constitutional requirements. The relevant conclusions concerning the fulfilment of the constitutional content of ius puniendi through constitutional requirements have to be drawn in accordance with the considerations of usefulness determined by legal policy. Exercising penal power and fulfilling penal claims are not only the right but the obligation of states as well. According to my view obligatio puniendi is a closely related key issue to the fulfilment of ius puniendi. It is an obligation of any state to maintain the basic set of values and contribute to the maintenance of social integration by criminalizing and sanctioning acts dangerous to society. By fulfilling these obligations states defend their citizens. As a result, criminal law has a value defending function by enforcing obligatio puniendi thus influencing the fulfilment of ius puniendi. The constitutional fulfilment of ius puniendi manifests itself by legislation in a way that a constitutional state decriminalizes, and the Constitutional Court annuls prohibitions or orders codified in criminal law, or provisions codified in the law of criminal procedure as unconstitutional. This fulfilment manifests itself in judicature in the struggle between legality-opportunity, the construction of officiality and private motion, and the epistemological relations of suspicion and certainty, and the legal conditions of accusation. According to my view a constitutional state does not renounce its legal right to punitive claim. But it

reaches its goal with other measures, as I have mentioned in a constitutional state the reasonable reassessment of the punitive right, rethinking of its content is under way by certain well-considered compromises and by emphasizing the principle of opportunity. As a result, the constitutionally restricted punitive power fulfils its purpose with its new institutions and by well-considered compromises. I firmly believe that an actual, valid, dogmatically well elaborated constitutional category of ius puniendi has to be part of the theory of criminal substantive and procedural law, because *'the quality of the performance of judicature and legislation depends on the solutions of dogmatic.'*(Farkas, 2002, 62.).

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Reference of the article according to APA regulation

Zoltán Prantner

The problem of the return
of the Islamic State's Balkan volunteers

Abstract

According estimates, the number of the men and their family members from the Western Balkan countries exceeded 1000 person who travelled to the territory of Iraq or Syria for supporting their Muslim comrades. Most of them joined the Islamic State there, while the minority enriched the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra or other smaller jihadist groups. However, hundreds of them have already returned from the Middle East to their country of origin in the recent years or months where they faced different treatment depending on their gender and age.

Keywords: Western Balkan, Islamic State, foreign fighters and volunteers, religious and violent extremism, anti-terrorism measures, reintegration

Introduction

Following the escalation of the Middle East conflict, there were approximately 42.900 foreigners who traveled to the region from about 120 countries around the world by 2017 to be a fighter for one of the insurgent groups or the Islamic State (ISIL) (Azinović & Bećirević, 2017, 12.). By the time the caliphate collapsed, about a third of the more than 5.000 European volunteers had returned to their countries of origin where their presence was assessed as a serious security risk. This trend has affected more than 1.000 people in the Western Balkans. At least 260 of them have lost their lives and about 475 persons - mostly women and children, many of whom have already been born there - are still in the area. In recent years, however, some 485 people have already returned or repatriated to their home state, where men have been arrested immediately by local authorities (URL1). However, detention can only be considered as a temporary crisis management. In the long run, rehabilitation and reintegration could

be an effective solution, which most affected states in the region have already begun to apply in the case of the returned women and children.

Historical background to the travel of Balkan volunteers

Throughout history, a moderate, tolerant trend in the Sunni branch of Islam has settled in the Western Balkans, based largely on the teachings of the Hanafi School of Religious Law. His followers, who have been culturally integrated in the area over the centuries, have interpreted religious precepts quite flexibly and have not been hostile to Shiites. However, the exercise of the faith was restricted in the former Yugoslavia and outright banned in Albania after World War II. Nevertheless, the Islamic religion could once again be lived freely and openly after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Albanian isolationist system, which was declared by each national government in its constitution. At the same time, three distinct groups of followers soon emerged within the Islamic communities in the region: 1) members of traditional Islamic communities and those with a liberal spirit (they formed the majority); 2) adherents of a conservative interpretation of Islam who rejected violence (the 'mainstream' of the Salafists); 3) members of the hard core sympathized with the conservative orientation of Islam, who also considered the use of violence acceptable and permissible in the spirit of Takfir ideology (rejecting Salafists) (Kursani, 2019, 11.; Qehaja, 2016, 79.).

The renewed daily life of the Islamic faith and the vulnerable situation of the war-torn regions may have simultaneously led to the emergence of various Persian Gulf aid organizations – and through them the militant Salafist trend – in the region, which then significantly intensified the radicalization process in the area. The ideology became particularly popular in states where:

- the domestic political structure proved fragile,
- corruption and nepotism abounded,
- unemployment was high,
- the economy and administrative governance were severely disrupted,
- serious, temporarily stifled ethnic and religious contradictions lurked in the background of the polarized society,
- it proved to be an unresolved issue the self-determination of the state and individual communities, as well as the definition of their relationship to each other (Azinovic, 2017, 12.).

The finding was particularly true for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, despite the lack of a unified Islamic community in the Balkan due to linguistic-cultural differences (Qehaja, 2016, 78.). In Bosnia's Muslim community, jihadist propaganda was relatively easy to influence enterprising young people who were willing to fight voluntarily for their faith in a foreign land at the height of the Syrian conflict. In addition, the Bosnian authorities estimated the number of Salafists in the country at about 3.000 in 2016 (URL2). With regard to the latter, it should be noted at the outset that this significant figure was not one of the consequences of the attack of 11 September 2001, in fact. The mosque construction, which was funded by the Saudi government to the tune of about $ 500 million, and the restrained-minded diversionary activity came to a halt as a result of attacks on the World Trade Center because Riyadh did not want to get into conflict with Washington. The attack on the Twin Towers also marked a turning point in minimizing contacts between young volunteers in the 2010s and foreign veterans who voluntarily fought on the Bosnian side in the El Mujahedeen detachment during the Yugoslav War. After the Dayton Peace Treaty, which ended the Yugoslav War, a significant number of corps members left the area and traveled to Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Tajikistan to continue their holy war there (Gammer, 2007, 159–160.). At the same time, it is also a fact that hundreds of mujahedeen may have remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the tacit support of the Bosnian authorities (URL3). Many of them married local Muslim women, and the number of those who received citizenship in recognition of their merits during the war was also respectable (URL4). However, nearly 30% of foreign militants integrated into local communities were believed to have maintained close ties to terrorist groups that planned assassinations against Western interests and peacekeeping forces stationed in the country. Years later, several of them also joined the Kosovo Liberation Army when clashes erupted between Serbs and Albanians. The new, fundamentally ethnic conflict was then seen by them as a war between Muslims and Christians. Despite all this, the al-Qaeda network was unable to establish itself in the territory of Bosnia, as the vast majority of locals grew up and lived in a more liberal spirit, thus professing a moderate conception of the Islamic faith. The Salafist doctrine was therefore completely foreign to them and they refused to follow it. Furthermore, the foreign warriors themselves did not form a homogeneous community either during or after the war. Their organization was not mature and well-structured, and its members were not only recruited by al-Qaeda, but also represented by a significant number of Arab-Afghan veterans independent of the terrorist organization, as well as young volunteers from the Gulf States (URL3). Their marginalization was accelerated by the

counter-terrorism operations in Bosnia since 9/11. Under Washington's growing pressure, the presence of former mujahedeen was no longer just a burden by this time, but it was downright necessary to take swift and effective official action against them to safeguard foreign relations. Therefore, ten former mujahedeen suspected of terrorism, at least five of whom were Algerians, were detained in Bosnia on charges of preparing attacks against SFOR bases in Tuzla and Bratunac in October 2001 (Lebl, 2014, 9). Bosnian authorities arrested six more Algerian individuals on suspicion of a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in January 2002. After the action, the detainees were soon extradited to the United States (URL5). An embarrassing precedent was set again in 2005 when preparations were detected in Croatia for an explosive assassination attempt. The perpetrators wanted to implement their purpose at the funeral of Pope John Paul II. Investigations later revealed that the attack was planned in Gornja Maoča, northern Bosnia, and that seized equipment and explosives originated from there. In the same year, Bosnian police stormed an apartment which was suspected of being housed by terrorists who wanted to blow up the British embassy in Sarajevo (Lebl, 2014, 9-10.). Later, a fundamentalist placed a bomb next to the police building in Bugojno, which killed a police officer and injured several on June 27, 2010. (URL6). Finally, another local follower of Wahhabi school of Islam opened fire with his machine gun at the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo on October 28, 2011, seriously injuring a police officer. Later investigation found that the perpetrator was radicalized at his former residence, Gornja Maoča (URL7). Due to the above, the Salafist communities in Bosnia, especially after the death of Jusuf Barčić in 2007, clustered around leaders who were in their 20s during the Yugoslav War and became committed believers of the religious trend in the 2000s. Such persons were among these foreign trained religious leaders as Nedžad Balkan (recorded as Abu Muhammed) and Mohamed Porča, or Bilal Bosnić, the recruiter of the Islamic State, and Nusret Imamović, who fully committed himself to al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra. Apart from radical imams in larger cities, adherents of the trend mostly lived in isolated mountain villages, such as Šišici, Bužim, Bosanska Bojna, Orašac and Dubovsko in the north of the country, or Gornja Maoča, Ošve, Gluha Bukovica and Mehurići in the central regions (URL3). The vast majority of them refused to use violence and only wanted to live their daily lives according to the strict standards of Islam. Of course, it should also be added that there were exceptions here. For example, Gornja Maoča, as well as other settlements, not only gave refuge to foreign fighters and recruiters, but in some places even openly hoisted jihadist flags as a clear sign of their commitment (URL2). The peaceful coexistence of the three dominant religions - the moderate trend of Islam, the Roman Catholic

and the Orthodox Christian - has long been looked back on in Albania, which was well known for its religious tolerance. In the spirit of this, the secular nature of the state was incorporated into the transitional constitution shortly after the fall of the communist dictatorship. At the same time, the right to religious freedom was recognized and the creation of conditions for religious practice was supported. Although a number of laws limited the increase in the influence of religion in political and educational life in the coming years, the relationship between the state and denominations deepened, as evidenced by the 1998 constitution, which defined the country as neutral instead of hitherto secular. Freedom of religion, like the other Balkan states, led to the growing prevalence of Arab states, which resulted in the formation of the first local Salafist and Wahhabi groups here in the 1990s. With their support, young men were able to pursue extensive religious studies at Middle Eastern universities and madrassas[1]. However, the different interpretations of the acquired knowledge, and especially of the Islamic religion, caused a kind of generational crisis with the leaders of the Muslim Community of Albania, who had no chance of pursuing higher religious studies in isolation from the Muslim world during decades of communist rule. However, in addition to the differences in religious identity, the emergence of radicalization was more significantly influenced by the more pronounced commitment of Muslim identity in political life, which was clearly aimed at obtaining foreign aid and subsidies. In this spirit, Albania became a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1992 as the first European and communist successor state. This event virtually institutionalized the political influence and financial support of the Gulf States in Albania, which turned into a transit country for arms shipments and jihadist militants to Bosnia[2] (Qirjazi, 2018, 47.). Many of the Bosnian war veterans later wanted to settle in Albania to establish Islamist bases there. However, like Bosnia, the attacks of 11 September 2001 put an end to the rise of fundamentalists. The operating Islamist individuals and organizations had become uncomfortable for the Albanian leadership, which had previously sought a balanced relationship with the United States, tried to follow a pro-Western foreign policy, and aspired to accession to the European Union. As a result, many people have been deported as well as the assets of foundations and individuals suspected of supporting extremist groups have been frozen since December 2004. In parallel, the government made an attempt to reduce the Arab presence in the country. However,

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1   Mohammedan Ecclesiastical College for the training of theologians and lawyers.
2   There were about six major Islamic NGOs operating in Albania between 1991 and 2005 that were linked to terrorist organizations.

hopes for a greater Turkish role soon proved disappointing, as it failed to break the dominance of the Gulf States on the one hand, but at the same time resulted in further polarization within Muslim communities.[3] (Dyrmishi, 2017, 27.). Despite strong official actions and reforms in the Muslim community in Albania, the state and the Muslim Community of Albania have gradually lost control over self-appointed imams and foreign-funded mosques, which gave growing popularity for religious extremists even before the rise of ISIL[4] (Dyrmishi, 2017, 22–23.; Spahiu, 2016, 66–69.).

In Kosovo, Islamist volunteers appeared in the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998. Following the fighting with Serb forces, private schools and mosques were built here with Saudi support, in which - or in addition to them - imams trained in Saudi Arabia spread their radical religious and political views from 1999. Among these religious leaders were such persons as Zekerija Qazimi and Lulzima Qabashi, who were later arrested for recruiting volunteers. Their rise was helped by the widespread frustration that prevailed after the declaration of independence in 2008 due to the economic downturn and the lack of hope for overall development. Following the Arab Spring and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the central leadership in Kosovo assured the Syrian opposition of its support, in agreement with several Western governments and trusted in the rapid fall of President Bassar el-Assad. Politicians have repeatedly called for resignation of the Syrian head of state, whose violent actions against the civilian population have been repeatedly paralleled by the massacres which was committed by the Milošević regime against the Kosovars in the late 1990s. In addition to the religious community and the negative image of the Assad regime, there were also pragmatic and promising perspectives in their manifestations: the Syrian Free Army, which was immediately supported by the West after its formation, was ready to open diplomatic relations with Pristina after its victory. Kosovo could also have gained Syrian recognition of its sovereignty after Egypt and Libya, which President Bassar el-Assad had previously denied him with regard to Serbia. Moreover, the country could also provide further evidence of his determination to stand up for Western interests and values. For all these reasons, Kosovo's Minister of Foreign Affairs Enver Hoxhaj received a delegation from the Syrian opposition

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3   The influence of the Arab states was well reflected in the fact that Arabic, which was expected of the preachers and leaders and several staff of the Ministry of Culture from 2002, was officially introduced in 2005 as the ceremonial language of the Muslim Community of Albania.

4   According to a poll, as early as 2011-2012, 12% of the Muslim population supported the introduction of sharia legislation, and 6% considered it justified to commit suicide bombings in defense of the Islamic faith.

forces in April 2012, which he assured of his country's financial support. One month later, it was announced that certain diplomatic relations had been established between the parties. At the time, the Kosovo leadership seemed to be hoping to gain a kind of leading role in foreign interventions in the Syrian conflict, while being able to apostrophize itself as a supporter of democratic transformation in the Middle East and North Africa (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 85–87.). At the same time, the open stance of Kosovo's state institutions in favor of the Syrian opposition ignored two aspects that seemed even less decisive at the time. First, they thought of a united opposition, as each of the insurgent groups committed itself to overthrowing the Assad regime. However, this superficial approach ignored that only the main goal was the common in these armed clusters. Otherwise, fundamental differences were between them about their proclaimed program and the values they professed, as well as in their foreign relations, allies, and enemies. Second, for the above reasons, no particular importance has been attached to the emergence and spread of Islamism among the Syrian insurgents. As a result, Pristina did not attach much significance to the presence of Kosovar volunteers in Syria in the early stages of the civil war, despite the fact that 191 persons traveled there until the end of 2013 (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 87–88.). In addition to the highest level of state support, the Islamic Community of Kosovo has also openly supported Syrian civilians and refugees. Beyond the official position, it condemned the terrorist nature of the Assad regime, commemorated the bloodbaths of the Milošević regime and the tribulations of the civilian population as well as commended the values of Levant. In addition to this, it has already given a kind of religious dimension to the conflict, as the imams also voiced in their sermons the negatives of the Alawite trend, their relations with Shia Iran, and their brutal and oppressive rule over the Sunni majority (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 89–90.). In addition to state and religious leadership, the press also played an active role in shaping public awareness when the first dead were portrayed as a kind of hero who sacrificed their lives in the fight against the dictator. In addition, radio and media channels featured experts who praised Kosovar volunteers fighting on the Syrian front with unwavering pride (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 92.). However, there has been a sharp turnaround in the standpoint of Kosovo's central leadership so far by early 2014, as a result of the events and changes that have taken place in the meantime. The first and perhaps most important development in the rewording of the position so far took place in early autumn 2013, when a Kosovar and an Albanian volunteer's call for the accession to fight against infidels was first time published in Albanian language. In November, Kosovo's security forces detained six al-Qaeda-linked individuals suspected of preparing

for a terrorist attack.[5] In the first months of 2014, additional videos appeared on the Internet, in which Kosovar volunteers posing with ISIL symbols called again in their native language their potential sympathizers to join their struggle. In their communication, those who stayed at home were declared traitors to their faith and the leaders of coalition forces were threatened with beheading (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 93–94.). In addition, terrorist activities involving foreign warriors have become more frequent in the West, and especially in the European Union, since 2013. These violent incidents, coupled with the threats associated with them, appeared almost daily in media reports. Most Western governments have therefore declared a number of Syrian opposition gatherings with militant Islamist ties as terrorist group. For all these reasons, the imams of the local Islamic Community gradually distanced themselves from the events in Syria and Iraq. In addition, Kosovar state institutions have also been forced to reconsider their previous position and assess the domestic presence of their citizens returning from the Middle East, as well as the activities of foreign Islamist organizations in Kosovo, now a serious security risk. Accordingly, four individuals were arrested on 26 June 2014, 47 alleged Islamist militiamen on 11 August and 15 individuals on 17 September, including several well-known conservative imams, on suspicion of having previously fought on the side of insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the national authorities revoked the operating licenses of 16 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the year, which were suspected of supporting terrorist activities (Jakupi & Kraja, 2018, 7.; Kursani, 2015, 29.).

In northern Macedonia, with a population of about 2.1 million, almost all of the volunteers came from Muslim Albanians, who make up approximately 25% of society. The reason for this was basically along ethnic and religious fault lines, i.e. it was most evident in the long-standing tensions between the dominant Orthodox Christian community and the Muslim Albanians. Conflicts of interest and segregation of the Albanian minority culminated in a short, open clash in 2001 between security forces and the Albanian National Liberation Army, who were supported by a number of veteran volunteers from the neighbouring Kosovo. The fighting was ended by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which gave more rights to members of the Macedonian Albanian ethnic group, and formally provided for a political division of power between Macedonians and Albanians at the same time. Despite forward-looking efforts, differences have not only persisted since then, but have deepened further in the interests of individual policy circles. All of these created adequate conditions for radicalization and the functioning

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5   Later the investigation revealed that one of the detainees had previously been in the Syrian crisis zone.

of extremist groups on both sides[6] (Qehaja & Perteshi, 2018, 23–24., 26.). In northern Macedonia, we can also speak of Salafist communities. The fellowships centred around various charismatic leaders, who operated independently from the Islamic Community. As a result, a unified Salafist movement did not develop either inside or outside the country. Like several Balkan states, this conservative trend in Islam was able to settle in the country through humanitarian aid organizations funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These associations gained enormous influence during the Kosovo war of 1998-1999, when hundreds of thousands of refugees sought housing there. Most of the fundamentalists lived peacefully. They withdrew from the world, thus received little attention. They were fundamentally aware of the idea of jihadism and the essence of its global support from which they were mostly distanced in the early 2010s, apart from the manifestation of a few extreme imams. Proponents of the religious trend were therefore not seen as a security risk until the Syrian conflict escalated, and religious radicalism was reported quite rarely in the media. Moreover, the Islamic Community of Macedonia repeatedly expressed its sympathy for opposition forces in the early stages of the fighting in Syria when its imams were repeatedly calling on believers in the mosques to support Syrian citizens and refugees. Although, it was essentially concerned with humanitarian aid according to their interpretation of the latter, it indirectly inspired many to take an active part in the armed struggle. The case of Sami Abdullahu, a Skopje originated imam who fell in Syria in 2014, had a similar effect and proved to be a role model for dozens of his compatriots (Qehaja & Perteshi, 2018, 33–34.). Like the other Balkan states, the departure of the volunteers could therefore be divided into three main stages:

- 1) the initial period of the Syrian conflict when they joined one of the opposition groups out of solidarity with Muslim countrymen due to the retaliation of the Assad regime;
- 2) the period following the proclamation of the Islamic State when a significant proportion of them settled in the territory controlled by the terrorist organization;
- 3) criminalization and official sanctioning of the activities of those involved in the Middle East conflict which has radically reduced the number of trips (Šutarov, 2017, 104.).

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6   The case of the killing of five young Macedonians of Albanian descent at Lake Smilkovci on 12 April 2012 also warned of growing ethnic tensions. The shooting that broke out between police officers and members of the National Liberation Army on 9 May 2015 was also a cause for concern. At the end of the firefight, which claimed a total of 18 lives, 28 Albanians were arrested. It also showed well the discrimination and segregation of Albanians in 2017, that while they accounted for only a quarter of total Macedonian society, their proportion reached 60% among detainees and prisoners.

In Montenegro, with a population of nearly 680.000, the proportion of Muslims is also 20% who have lived peacefully with Christians for many centuries as followers of the Sunni trend. Here the Yugoslav War was also the milestone in the conflict-free relationship between the denominations in the first half of the 1990s. Some border guards illegally detained dozens of Bosnian refugees in 1992 who were then deported to the Serb-majority part of Bosnia. Almost all of the captives were executed later. Although the Montenegrin government apologized for the incident and promised financial compensation to the victims' families in 2008, the case was a serious break for many local Muslims. At the same time, foreign Islamist groups have already started operating in the country, especially in the Sandzak region bordering Serbia. However, the dissemination of extremist doctrines has not proved as successful here as it has in Kosovo or Bosnia. Security authorities considered the Wahhabi trend to be a serious national security risk that is why Serbian and Bosnian supporters were expelled from the country on several occasions. Nevertheless, no special importance was given to the trips starting from 2012, as politicians were distracted by the growing domestic political crisis and there was no religiously motivated terrorist attack in the country. Decision-makers only recognized the importance of the problem when the first Montenegrin citizen fell in Syria and the news of his death spread and then the first fighters start to return from the crisis zone (Bećirević, Šuković & Zuković, 2018, 6.).

The tribulations of the predominantly Bosnian Muslim population in the Sandžak region began with the declaration of the autonomy in 1991 and the proclamation of an independent government. Belgrade tried to prevent the secession, so it declared the events as a coup and virtually excluded the countryside from political decision-making. The problems culminated in the fact that the region suffered from serious economic and social problems after the end of the war, due to the sanctions imposed on Serbia, which could not be remedied in the absence of political advocacy. In addition, the region was practically divided between Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro following the creation of the new states. War crimes were committed, the population suffered heavy losses, the economy and infrastructure lay in ruins, and poverty was exceptionally high in the area which remained under Belgrade's control. Serbian nationalist central leadership isolated native Bosnian inhabitants, local politicians represented their personal interests instead of the community, hate speeches and statements were made in the media, as well as young Bosnians and Muslims were often discriminated on ethnic grounds in education. In summary, all the conditions were given for radicalization (Ćorović, 2017, 126.). The first Wahhabi and Salafist groups are believed to have come from

Sarajevo and first appeared in Novi Pazar in 1997. The extremist trend of Islam soon became popular among members of the disenfranchised Muslim community. In addition to the Prophet's call, the religious deepening was helped by the fact that the accession was financially worthwhile, because the poor were supported with significant sums in the economically underdeveloped region as they entered and possibly even increased the size of the community with new members. Moreover, many were closely linked to neighbouring Bosnia on ethnic and religious grounds, where several of them secretly learned the basics of Takfir ideology and warfare in the extremist camps operating there. As a result of the latter, extremist interpretations of Islam became more frequent in violent manifestations from the mid-2000s. Due to a series of incidents in mosques, the official Islamic community banned Wahhabis from places of worship under its control and several have been arrested by Serbian authorities on national security grounds[7] (Qehaja, 2016, 88–89.). In response, Wahhabi groups distanced themselves from other Muslims and majority societies and gathered in informal spaces, avoiding the horizons of the Islamic community and official bodies. They gathered at unofficial places and avoided the horizons of the Islamic community and official bodies. In addition to the actions of the security forces, the concerns of Serbian Muslims were heightened by the open celebration of Serbian war criminals and the vehement denial of their horrors, as well as the demonstrative military marches of the extremist nationalist groups and their violent actions which were then only slightly or not sanctioned. All of this reinforced the fears of local Muslims about a repeat of the ethnic cleansing of the 1990s while easing the situation of radical preachers at the same time, who preached the danger of continued Serbian aggression (Ćorović, 2017, 126–129.).

The conditions of departure

Like the Yugoslav War, many Sunni Muslims around the world felt the urge to travel to the scene as the Syrian conflict deepened to help their comrades against the Shia Assad regime which was considered secular and anti-religious. Their numbers peaked at the time of the proclamation of the caliphate in 2014, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdad called on them to join. The number of people from the Western Balkans, who often traveled to the conflict zone with the support and

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7 The most significant, high-profile armed clash took place in Zabren, near Sjenica, where a training camp was suspected by Serbian authorities. During a police raid, the leader of the Salafist community lost his life and two people were arrested.

mediation of local fundamentalist communities, was estimated more than 1,000 individuals by 2018. Due to their relatively high number, they formed a separate unit within the ISIL armed forces which was called Balkan Battalion.[8] (URL8; URL9). The distribution of volunteers for each state was as follows (Table 1).

Table 1: *The number of citizens of the Western Balkans in Iraq or Syria until mid-2018*

Country	Total Affiliates	Female Affiliates	Minor Affiliates (includes travelled and born in theatre)	Died
Albania	157–163	29–35	38–41	26
Bosnia and Herzegovina	500	70	230	71 (3 females and 4 minors among them)
Kosovo	446	55	98	74 men, 1 female and 1 minor
North Macedonia	161	15	6	30
Serbia	59	12–15	15	11
Montenegro	27	5	4	5

Note. Cook & Vale, 2019, 19.; Shtuni, 2019, 18.

According to statistics, about 80% of the volunteers joined one of the Syrian insurgent groups between 2012 and 2014, and the Islamic State only became attractive to them after the proclamation of the caliphate. In connection with the trend, it could also be said that trips decreased significantly in 2015 and were almost completely abolished from the beginning of 2016 due to the arrest of recruiters, the Islamic State's repression in Iraq and Syria and the stricter controls at the Turkish border. In addition to all this, presumably, the desire of the leaders of the terrorist organization was also a consideration for fanatics who were called upon to stay and operate in their place of residence (Azinovic, 2017, 11.). A significant proportion of volunteers (67%) were single young men between the ages of 20 and 35. They were followed by married couples with wives and children. The lowest proportion were persons who joined a terrorist organization with another relative or friend[9] (URL10; URL11). It could also be said about the men that although there were veterans of the Yugoslav War among them, most of them did not have

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8   Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo ranked among the top five European emitting countries in terms of the proportion of volunteers in the total population.

9   Among the Kosovo volunteers, the Demolli family was particularly represented: 19 of them - women, men and children - were living in a camp near Raqqa, Syria, in January 2018. At least two of their male relatives had already died by then. One of the widows was able to return to her homeland in April 2019 with her five children, after six years presence in Syria. The youngest child was born in her second forced marriage with another ISIL fighter.

any combat experience before they left[10] (Šutarov, 2017, 107.). For the latter, the mortality rate of Balkan volunteers was almost twice that of other European originated fighters[11] (Azinović & Jusić, 2016, 31.). With regard to women, it can also be stated that their proportion was high, especially within the Bosnian contingent[12] (Azinović & Jusić, 2016, 28.). The vast majority of them were married women in their 20s or early 30s who followed their husbands or children to the Middle East rather of duty than of religious belief. The other part left their relatives behind and traveled to the civil war zone to start a new family there[13] (Azinović & Jusić, 2016, 27–28.). They also had in common that they came mostly from a similar, geographically, socially and economically marginalized environment, as well as from a traditional patriarchal environment[14] (Jakupi & Kelmendi, 2017, 13.). Due to traditional, more conservative values, they were clearly subordinated to the male-female relationship and faced a higher rate of domestic violence than female volunteers in Western Europe[15] (Kelmendi, 2019, 22.). They were discriminated in the local labour market, had no independent and stable income, and had no private property. With few exceptions, they had a low level of education and minimal work experience as a housekeeper (Azinović & Jusić, 2016, 44–45.). During their stay outside, they did backyard work and did not actively engage in armed conflict. Albanian native speakers, regardless of their country of origin, tried to group together because of their linguistic identity. It was also observed that Albanian and Kosovar widows remarried, preferably with a Macedonian, Kosovar or Albanian jihadist, after the death of their first husband (Kelmendi, 2019, 23.). Mostly single men traveled to Syria or Iraq in the first half of the conflict. Entire families settled in significant numbers mainly after the proclamation of the Islamic State and the start of state-building. Among the children, 5 months old was the youngest and 17 years old the oldest. Determining their exact number was made more difficult by the fact that several of them were not registered by the authorities of their home

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10 For example, the vast majority of senior Macedonian war veterans traveled specifically with the intention of dying as a martyr.

11 For example, the mortality rate of Bosnian volunteers was estimated at 25%, while an average of 14% of warriors from other countries on the European continent were lost.

12 The proportion of women among volunteers was estimated at 30-36%. By comparison, the proportion of women was 20-22% for France and Germany, 12% for Kosovars and 9-19% for Albanians.

13 For Bosnians, the proportion of women who were already married or married at the time of their arrival in Syria / Iraq was 93%. In addition, their average age of 30 was seven years higher than their female counterparts' age from Kosovo and nine years higher than the other female volunteers' age from Western Europe.

14 Previous research has already shown that women from the patriarchal environment were much more involved in terrorist acts or in supporting them than those raised in a less father- and male-centered environment.

15 According to a poll conducted by the Kosovo Statistics Agency and UNICEF, about 33% of Kosovo women it was legitimate for a husband to abuse his spouse if the wife neglected their children, had an extramarital affair, denied sexual intercourse with her husband, or simply burn food there.

country even during their stay in their country of origin. Many also entered adulthood during their absence for several years, while others were born far away from their homeland, under the rule of the terrorist organization. Only rough estimates of the number of the latter were published, as their parents could not or did not want to keep in touch with their relatives. Their family members could only find out about their birth on the basis of photographs published on the social network. With regard to children raised in the territory of ISIL, it was also found that about a quarter of them lost at least one parent during their stay. In addition, the boys underwent military training between the ages of 13 and 14, after which many were assigned to combat units. Armed clashes and air strikes also claimed the lives of several of them (Azinović & Jusić, 2016, 29.). There was a fundamental difference compared to Western Europe that while radicalization in the West was marked by a high proportion of the second-generation, economically and socially marginalized immigrants who were unable to integrate successfully, the idea of extreme violence has been able to spread within local communities dating back centuries in the Western Balkans. Based on identified individuals, it was well defined in which districts and cities was ISIL popular among the inhabitants.

Table 2: *The issuing regions*

Country	Settlement
Albania	Tirana, Elbasan, Librazhd, Leshnicë e Poshtme, Zagoraçan, Rrëmenj, Pogradec
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Travnik, Bihac
Kosovo	Prizren, Prishtina, Hani i Elezit, Kacanik, Mitrovice, Gjilan, Viti
North Macedonia	Skopje (Cair and Gazi Baba), Aračinovo, Saraj, Kumanovo, Gosztivar
Montenegro	Podgorica, Plav, Gusinje, Rozaje, Bijelo Polje, Bar
Serbia	Sandzak region of Novi Pazar, Smederevo, Zemun

Note. URL12.

Volunteers often lived in single-parent or unhappy families. They were lonely people who struggled with post-war trauma, mistrust and prejudice, accumulated debt, privacy and identity crisis as well as mental health problems[16] (Azinović

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16 According to research, many of the men and women who traveled secretly complained to their family or friends that they had been possessed by a genie. Others suffered from severe drug and alcohol dependence. Because mental illness and addiction were publicly stigmatized in traditional communities, they could not openly talk about their problem and hope for help in addressing it in the local health care system. According to police records, this is why Bosnian Salafist leaders were approached, who executed the so-called ruk in the spirit of the Qur'an to drive out evil spirits. Almost immediately after the procedure, they went abroad, where the men lost their lives within a few months.

& Jusić, 2016, 62–65.). Most of them received secondary education at most[17] (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2018, 84.). They grew up in a secular spirit or in a family in which they did not practice their religious beliefs. They had only superficial religious knowledge for this reason[18] (URL13). They considered the state and the leaders of their community to be politically and morally corrupt. They mostly did not have a permanent job[19] (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2018, 91; URL13; URL14). They considered their future hopeless in their homeland and the proportion of public law offenders was high among them[20] (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 84.). In the economically more backward regions, they tried to make a living from farming, animal husbandry or seasonal work in one of the neighboring countries[21] (Speckhard, Yayla & Shajkovci, 2018, 30.). At the same time, it can be said that many of them had high education and used to live a secular life. Moreover, several of them have lived and worked in a Member State of the European Union for years. However, they were forced to return home after the unfolding of the economic crisis, where they could not assert themselves and settle, which made them susceptible to extremist ideologies. In the often marginalized Muslim communities in the Orthodox Christian-majority of the Balkan states, many have also given up their daily lives. They were attracted by the fact that they could freely practice their religious beliefs under the auspices of the Islamic State as required by Sharia law. In addition, they no longer had to fear anti-Islamic manifestations and the observation or intervention of national governments[22] (URL13). It was also crucial for the Macedonian warriors that most of them were of Albanian descent. Therefore, they joined Kosovar or Albanian groups in the battle zone due to their common linguistic and ethnic

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17 About 80-85% of Kosovo volunteers had a high school education and 10% had a college degree.

18 For example, experts estimated that the Islamic faith was novelty for 70% of young Kosovo people who fought in Syria and Iraq under the teachings of radical orators because they grew up in a family where they did not practice their religion.

19 According to a World Bank survey, the unemployment rate was 25.6% of the adult Bosnian population in 2017. This ratio showed an even more shocking result for young people: in the starting age group, only one in three people worked in a declared job. In the case of Kosovo, the rates were even higher: official state statistics registered 65% of young people and 35% of the total population as unemployed in 2016. In Novi Pazar, Serbia, the 2011 census officially showed a 37% unemployment rate similar to that of Kosovo. In reality, however, 50% of the population, including 75% of those under 30, did not have a secure source of livelihood.

20 For example, 40% of Kosovo volunteers had a Prius.

21 Due to the above, a particularly attractive alternative for them was the high monthly fixed income offered by the Islamic State, as well as free housing and car use. In addition to financial stability, their compatriots who appeared in ISIL's propaganda materials in their mother tongue promised arranged marriage and sex slaves for single men in addition to public esteem, rising to the social ranks, conservative Islamic living, and martyrdom.

22 For example, many of the volunteers who often left the territory of Serbia as family members were Muslim Roma discriminated by the majority society, while others were members of the Bosnian community.

identity (Šutarov, 2017, 106.). Finally, there were those who were merely driven by a desire for adventure to engage in armed struggle on the side of one of the opposing parties. It was also found that, especially in the case of Bosnians, many of the volunteers had been in online contact with jihadist recruiters on the Internet in media and social forums prior to their departure. Others lived in well-known Salafists communities for a longer or shorter period of time, or at least visited them regularly, or made personal acquaintances with extremist religious organizations and mosques. Most of their families were unaware of their radicalization. Their relatives found out about their departure only afterwards, surprisingly. Others, especially before 2014, were motivated by childhood traumas, humanitarian goals, and a community of destiny with Syrian commoners rather than fundamentalist ideologies. They wanted to help the Syrian people in their own way in their fight against the Assad regime[23] (Kursani & Fetiu, 2017, 98–99.; Speckhard, Yayla & Shajkovci, 2018, 30.). However, some of them spent barely a few months away from their homeland. Many were disillusioned with the struggle when the militias began to confront each other therefore they returned to their country of origin. After their arrival, they were arrested by the law enforcement forces and treated as criminals for their actions, stigmatized by the public, and their kinship severed all contacts with them, which was noted with sincere shock and outrage. The official action intended as a deterrent had the opposite effect and many of them preferred to return to the area with their wives and children to continue living together under the auspices of the Islamic State (Speckhard, Yayla & Shajkovci, 2018, 36–37.).

The security risk of returning 'warriors'

A significant number of Balkan volunteers have resettled during the caliphate's existence who previously have sworn allegiance to the Islamic State[24] (Barrett,

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23 In the consciousness of many members of the Muslim communities in the Balkans have left an indelible memory the indiscriminate attacks from the 1990s and foreign volunteers who came to help them from religious solidarity. In the initial period of the outbreak of the armed conflict, volunteers traveling to the Middle East therefore felt obliged to now, out of gratitude, protect the Syrians from the atrocities of the Assad regime. In addition, detained Kosovo volunteers said they initially traveled out to fight on the side of opposition groups with the conviction that, according to official statements, their country would also support it.

24 About 30% of European volunteers traveling to Syria or Iraq returned to their countries of origin by mid-2017. The picture is nuanced by the fact that for some countries this proportion has approached 50%. By comparison, President Putin announced that 10% of the approximately 9,000 volunteers from the territory of the former Soviet republics had returned to their homeland while only a few jihadists had returned in Southeast Asia.

2017, 10.). Their decision was often motivated by a variety of reasons in addition to family reasons. It was influenced by their opposition to ISIL's ideology and methods, their frustration with the failure of their previous expectations, ethnic and racial discrimination against volunteers of different origins, deteriorating living conditions, war injuries, as well as the growing number of defeats and increasing losses suffered by the terrorist organization. However, the number of voluntary repatriations from the conflict zone almost completely disappeared at the same time as the expulsions, due to the austerity measures introduced by national governments from 2016 onwards. In addition, escalating clashes have also made it more difficult to enter or leave the crisis area.

Table 3: *The number of volunteers returning to the Western Balkans till April 2018*

Country	Number of returnees	Number of individuals who remained in the combat zone
Albania	45 persons	18 men and 55 relatives
Bosnia and Herzegovina	48 men, 6 females and 2 minors	102 persons
Kosovo	123 men, 7 females and 3 minors	59 men, 41 females and 95 minors (at least 41 children were born in the theatre)
North Macedonia	72–86 persons	30 persons
Montenegro	8 men, 1 female and 1 minor	–
Serbia	7 persons	–

Note. Cook & Vale, 2018, 16.; Shtuni, 2019, 18.

Returning volunteers can endanger the security of the home state in several possible ways. The most obvious, but also the least frequent is the case of veteran fundamentalists attempting to commit an assassination, which has already occurred in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016. The existence of a security risk in the Balkans was demonstrated by the fact that ISIL's self-appointed caliph promised to send jihadists to the area to slaughter unbelievers following the introduction of counter-terrorism measures in Kosovo. This was followed by a video from the ISIL Media Center published in June 2015. In the recording, Kosovar, Montenegrin, Albanian and Bosnian militants from the region now jointly called on their compatriots to immigrate to the territory of the Islamic State, and the remaining ones were threatened with terrorist attacks. Barely a month later, another video was released declaring the states of the Western Balkans to be the territory of the Islamic State (Šutarov, 2017, 113–114.). The Kosovo counterterrorism arrested five men in the same month on suspicion of poisoning Pristina's water network on behalf of ISIL (Bytyqi & Mullins, 2019, 26.). A year later, Albanian and Kosovar security forces jointly

prevented an attempted attack on the Israeli football team in Shkodër. The assassination attempt was directed and funded by ISIL's Balkan leaders in Syria.[25] (URL15; URL16). Furthermore, the lonely action against the Zvornik police station on 27 April 2015 as well as the incident on the outskirts of Sarajevo on 18 November 2015, which resulted in the deaths of two military officers and the detonation of the perpetrator, were also declared terrorist attacks in Bosnia.[26] (URL17; URL18). An attempt to assassinate NATO peacekeepers stationed in the country was successfully thwarted in June 2018, according to Kosovo authorities. A few months later, the Macedonian authorities detained 20 alleged ISIL supporters on 15 February 2019. (Shtuni, 2019, 23.). In addition, the June 2017 article in the Bosnian fundamentalist Rumija was also thought-provoking. The author clearly threatened Croatians, Serbs and traitor Muslims with bloody retaliation for their role during the Yugoslav War (URL19). Finally, it should be added that many of the emigrants had dual citizenship and diversified links in Europe's diaspora communities.[27] (Azinović & Jusić, 2016, 38.; Perteshi, 2018, 30.; URL20). Returnees thus pose a security risk not only to their own country but also to Western states, which remain a key target for ISIL. [28] (Šutarov, 2017, 116–117.; URL21).

Despite the examples mentioned above, former volunteers, although they do not commit acts of violence, may use their combat experience and charisma to integrate into a network of existing cells, where they form and lead another group to support and finance terrorist acts as well as recruit potential activists.

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25 As a result of the action, a total of 19 people were arrested in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia in November 2016. During the investigation, the six Kosovo detainees were also suspected of attempting to carry out assassinations in France and Belgium, as well as blowing up temples in Gracanica, Mitrovica, Pei and Prizren during Orthodox Christmas. The latter ultimately failed only because no volunteers were found to carry out the suicide mission. Following the incident, several key figures in the radical trend lost their lives within a year. These events with the emerging power vacuum within the leadership noticeably reduced the popularity of fundamentalists in the region.

26 All of the perpetrators were found to be local residents who had not been to the Middle East before.

27 For example, the parents of Austrian teenagers Sabina Selimovic and Samra Kesinovic, who left for Syria in 2014 and became known as the '*Poster Girls of the Islamic State*', fled Bosnia during the Yugoslav War and settled in Austria. In addition, more than 20% of Bosnian volunteers were thought to have similar connections and acquaintances across Europe. In the case of Kosovo volunteers, the proportion of young people who were already born and raised in the West as children of emigrant parents is also 20%.

28 For example, five people, including a Swedish national, were detained in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2015. The perpetrators were suspected of making a homemade bomb which they then tried to smuggle into Scandinavia to commit a terrorist act there. Two Kosovo-born brothers were arrested in Duisburg by German authorities on suspicion of preparing to attack one of the shopping malls in Oberhausen in December 2016. In Austria, an Albanian was arrested in January 2017 who was planning to carry out a terrorist attack in Vienna. Back in the same month, the Austrian authorities carried out a widespread raid on the Balkan diaspora communities in Graz and Vienna which resulted the arrest of 14 people. All of the detainees were to be linked to Mirsad Omerović, a notoriously radical preacher who had already imprisoned for 20 years for recruiting foreign volunteers by that time.

Their motivation in this regard, in addition to their fundamentalist attitude, is heightened by the fact that the Islamic State refused to acknowledge its defeat despite its collapse. Terrorist groups sworn to loyalty to al-Baghdad continued to be loyal to their leader and to his successor after the caliph's death in late October 2019. Due to the modest economic and social situation of the states in the region, their extreme views may be more likely to motivate sympathizers living in local poverty, often unemployed with minimal education, to join a cell or even commit a terrorist act in their home country as a lone wolf[29] (Spahiu, 2016, 60.). The latter finding is particularly true of persons who have tried to join the terrorist organization in recent years in which they have been prevented by the national authorities of their home country or one of the transit states. In their case, their frustration over failure is not coupled with negative experiences gained under the rule of the caliphate and a sense of facing death. Their determination and condemnation of the authorities can increase their impatience, aggression and reinforce their propensity for extreme violence. All of this can encourage them to make their original idea a reality in another way. On the other hand, it may inspire them to follow the extremist guidelines of a fundamentalist who has returned from the Middle East or to commit extreme action (Barrett, 2017, 15–16.). Beside them are not less dangerous those who did not try to get out of the conflict zone but took allegiance to al-Baghdad and considered themselves soldiers of the caliphate. They are the ones who have virtually embraced the call made by Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the official spokesman for ISIL, in September 2014 to attack enemies of the Islamic State wherever and whenever they can, without receiving any instructions. Although the vast majority of these individuals have refrained from extreme actions despite their ideological commitment, they can still easily give up their hesitant position under the influence of a veteran who has visited the conflict zone (Barrett, 2017, 16.). Finally, the most common danger could be that volunteers may further fuel social contradictions through their home presence (URL22). It can help to assess the danger of an individual if the authorities are aware of the reasons for which he or she traveled back to his or her place of origin. Some were forced to leave the area by disappointment due to frustration, poverty, and the brutality they experienced. Others, who were previously motivated by financial gain, lost their livelihoods after the failure of the caliphate. There are also

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29 For example, Albanian authorities struck a supposed Islamist recruitment network centred around the Unaza e Re and Mëzez mosques on the outskirts of Tirana as early as March 2014. Two self-appointed imams, Bujar Hysa and Genci Balla, were among the thirteen people arrested on charges of supporting terrorism and inciting religious antagonism. It was a proven fact that the religious leaders had demonstrably used religious doctrines to radicalize their followers and promote jihad.

fanatics who have escaped or have been captured by coalition forces. Many of them see what has happened as just a temporary setback. They still firmly believe in the ultimate victory. In their view, they can do more to make this happen in their country than in Syria or Iraq. Finally, we must also mention the people who were sent back to their country of origin by ISIL specifically for the purpose of setting up a local network and carrying out terrorist attacks on behalf of the terrorist organization (URL23). It can also help assess the threat posed by former volunteers if the authorities are aware of the date of leaving the territory of the Islamic State. For many of them were unable to accept the principles and precepts of ISIL, so after a short stay there they left the caliphate behind when its star was still in its ascending stage. Others returned later, in the period of decline, because of their disillusionment with the leaders of the caliphate and the methods they used[30] (URL16). Later several of the frustrated fighters became actively involved in destroying the image built around the Syrian war and detaining sympathizers when they reported their negative experiences to a large community.[31] (Speckhard, Shajkovci & Bodo, 2018, 6–9.). It was therefore vital to win over these people who were willing to work together, which proved to be an extraordinary challenge in the absence of adequate rehabilitation and integration opportunities. Indeed, local authorities have so far taken indiscriminate austerity and punitive measures against returnees in the vast majority of cases. This coupled with social isolation, lack of education and employment opportunities, as well as traumatic experiences, can exponentially increase frustration and propensity for violence among them (Spahiu, 2016, 77–78.). Finally, the issue of foreign volunteers is also closely linked to the migration crisis, as there is a serious chance that foreign jihadists will mingle with refugees and try to come back to the European continent among them[32] (Shtuni, 2019, 21.). Regarding the reality of the threat, Bosnian prosecutors have already drawn attention to the fact that the Salafists, donated by Qatari charity funds and private persons, bought several hectares of land from local Serbs near Bosanska Bojna, not far from the municipalities of Šišici and Bužim on the Croatian border, where it was possible to cross the nearby border section practically unnoticed due to

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30 For example, national authorities considered just 15 people' presence as a security risk among the 40 fighters who returned to Albania.

31 For example, the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism conducted a number of interviews with returned and imprisoned ISIL activists as well as their relatives. In addition to reporting on their experiences, the speakers unanimously condemned the terrorist organization at the end of the videos and warned potential sympathizers about the dangers of joining.

32 For example, a recruiter of ISIL from Kosovo secretly returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2017. He hid with fake passports in Sarajevo for nearly six months until his arrest. In another case, another jihadist Kosovo citizen was detained in February 2019 when he tried to enter Italy by boat with a fake Macedonian passport.

lack of control[33] (URL3). The security services of the Balkan states, aware of the seriousness of the threat, initially argued that their limited resources did not allow them to monitor refugees, returning volunteers, fundamentalist recruiters and those susceptible to radical ideologies at the same time (URL13). However, effective border control with the help of Frontex and the relevant counterparts in the region will become a vital issue following Croatia's accession to the Schengen area, as the extremists who circumvent it now pose a security risk to the European Union as a whole.

Reception of returning volunteers

At the time of writing this study, experts have estimated the number of Balkan volunteers and family members in Syria at around 475. (URL1). Two-thirds of them were women and children, held mainly in overcrowded al-Hol, al-Roj and Ain Issa refugee camps controlled by Kurdish forces. However, Turkey's intervention in Syria has brought decisive changes in the situation of many of them. The fighting affected several areas where ISIL supporters were detained. Due to the intensity of the clashes, the Kurdish authorities were forced to reinforce the fighting forces with the camp guards, allowing more detainees to escape. Thousands have also been taken as prisoners by Turkish troops, whose return to their country of origin is currently one of Ankara's main goals[34] (URL24). At the same time, their country reacted reluctantly against their return in most cases. They argued that members of the terrorist organization had only sporadically appeared in the past. However, if the Turkish demand were met, fanatical adherents of ISIL's fundamentalist ideology would return in a concentrated and significant number, whose determination, network and abilities would pose an extremely serious security risk (Dworkin, 2019, 6–7.). Alongside them, some of the men who escaped captivity supported the struggle of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib province. Within this Sunni Islamist militant group, the Albanians formed a separate unit with their own command structure. In addition, the number of people returning from the conflict zone to their country of origin has been estimated at around 485 in recent years (URL1).

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33 Low or no level of security measures were also observed at Jovića Most, Dugopolje, Vaganj / Bili Brigne and Una National Park on the Dalmatian section of the Croatian border.

34 Turkey has neutralized 3.500 people and arrested 5.500 people during its counter-terrorism operations against ISIL. About 780 of the captured foreign volunteers were deported back to their country of origin in 2019.

In the Balkans, official action against extremist believers, recruiters and adult men returning from the Middle East fighting zone has not been the subject of any particular debate, but has been seen as a legitimate criminal justice claim, in line with the vast majority of issuing countries[35] (Kelmendi, 2018, 10–16.). However, the prosecution of perpetrators has been hampered by the fact that new, tightened legislative changes[36] were introduced only in 2014-2015, after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178. For this reason, it was not officially possible to apply the restrictions retroactively to persons who had already returned to their home country before the new legal regulations entered into force. Another problem with the changed legal environment was that it treated all returnees as non-discriminatory terrorists, despite the fact that in most cases there was no clear evidence of the person's activities in the conflict zone. Nevertheless, 25 people were found guilty of recruiting, inciting, traveling to, or attempting to travel to the fighting zone in 16 cases in Bosnia. They were sentenced to a total of 47 years and two months in prison until April 2019[37] (Shutarov, 2019, 2.; URL25).

In northern Macedonia, 25 people were arrested in three major counter-terrorism operations ('Cell 1' in August 2015, 'Cell 2' in July 2016 and 'Cell 3' in cooperation with the Turkish police in August 2018). A total of 13 of them, including an imam, were sentenced to between five and nine years in prison in two criminal suits, and only 6 of the suspects were released (Comission Staff Working Document, 2019, 39-40.; URL26). In Kosovo, 119 people have been indicted on the same charges and another 156 have been investigated since September 2014 (URL27). In Serbia, the Special Court in Belgrade found seven people guilty of collaborating with terrorism and jihadist groups in April 2018, and a man was arrested in Novi Pazar in January 2019, who were suspected of planning terrorist attack in the name of ISIL (URL28).

At the same time, it poses an additional security risk if detained and convicted jihadists are locked up with civilian criminals in overcrowded prisons. Extremists can easily radicalize their fellow prisoners, from whom they can learn crime techniques that they can later use to plan or execute more elaborate, spectacular, and devastating acts of terrorism (URL29).

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35   According to a 2017 poll in Kosovo, 74% of respondents considered religious extremism as a threat and 71% of respondents rated returned volunteers as a risk to national security. In addition, 62% did not want to live with them in their neighborhood or even in a community and only 11% said they did not find their presence problematic.

36   The criminal courts of the Western Balkan states can sanction terrorist offenses with up to 6 months to 20 years in prison. In Kosovo, convicts may also lose their citizenship as an ancillary punishment.

37   In the legal environment changed in 2014, most returning volunteers were sentenced to about one year in prison. However, the judgement could be triggered by the payment of a fine by some. The most severe sentence - 7 years in prison - was given to the aforementioned radical preacher, Bilal Bosnić.

Finally, it should be noted that in the case of several of the Balkan states, e.g. Serbia or Montenegro, a kind of double standard can be observed in the assessment of foreign volunteers. Pro-Russian far-right extremists who have returned from the Ukrainian front are being subjected to much milder sanctions than Middle Eastern volunteers who have been declared terrorists. In addition to undermining the belief in the impartiality of the judiciary and the principle of equality before the law, this may also fuel the ethnic and religious differences that have already emerged (URL8).

In addition to the jihadists, we must not forget their family members, namely their wives and the widows of the fallen, as well as their children, who were trapped in a refugee camp controlled by Kurdish forces after the collapse of the Islamic State. The most obvious question is whether they want to return to Europe or whether they want to stay in place despite the harsh conditions, trusting in the favorable turn[38] (URL30). A key consideration in judging those wishing to return could be the level of commitment to ISIL's ideology, the extent to which they have been afflicted and retaliated by the grief over the loss of their spouse / child, as well as their radicalization during the months they spent in Kurdish-controlled camps. Their situation was complicated because the vast majority of them did not commit a crime under the law because they did not swear allegiance to the terrorist organization and did not take an active part in the operation and / or support of the terrorist organization[39] (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2017, 25.). For this reason, they do not have to fear that if they return home, they will be found guilty by a court in their home country and sentenced to a custodial sentence[40] (URL31). In addition, a significant proportion of children were born in the Middle East, making them stateless in the Balkan states. In their case, it is also questionable whether they were only victims of violence or participants in it due to their age. It is also unclear how their personality development was influenced by fundamentalist ideologies, war experiences and the effects of a foreign cultural environment during the months / years they

38 For example, Dora Bilić was one of the seven ISIL volunteers with Croatian citizenship - 2 men and 5 women. According to eyewitness accounts, the lady, who was ideologically radicalized to extremes, was in the Syrian al-Hol refugee camp in February 2019. The fanatical woman severed all contact with the Balkan women and did not appear to want to leave Syria even though Croatia had not been banned from participating in the foreign war, so she should not have feared being prosecuted if she returned home.

39 However, it should be added that some women were members of the religious police al-Hisba. In addition to this, some of them were proven to be involved in online recruiting or even to assist the terrorist organization as a teacher, health worker, or administrator.

40 At the same time, it is thought-provoking that there has been a demonstrable increase in the participation of women in conspiracies to commit various terrorist acts across Europe. Their proportion was around 23% among exposed organizers in the first half of 2017.

have spent in the (anti) socialization milieu of the region. Their further fate is therefore currently not clear enough. In the absence of a uniform practice, it depends crucially on the judgment of each state, despite the fact that the issue practically affects hundreds of minors[41] (URL32; URL33).

The Balkan states are trying to find a different approach to tackling and solving the phenomenon. Although no reintegration and rehabilitation program has been introduced in Albania, the new curriculum introduced in January 2017 in ten selected schools is encouraging to increase religious tolerance and displace extremism from religious education. An action plan to implement the National Strategy against Violent Extremism was also adopted in October 2017. (Kursani, 2019, 22.). At the same time, the local judiciary imposed extremely severe penalties on those involved in the recruitment of jihadist volunteers when they sentenced nine individuals, including two self-appointed imams, to a total of 126 years in prison in May 2016. (Lamallari, 2016, 5.). In addition, the central leadership has consistently distanced itself from the readmission of ISIL fighters and their families[42] (URL34). Northern Macedonia was one of the first European states to formally consent to the repatriation of its captured citizens in the Middle East in 2018 with American assistance. In addition to readmission, the legislature adopted two developed concepts - *'Prevention of Violent Extremism'* and an updated *'Counter-Terrorism Strategy'* - on 6 March 2018 and signed the EU-Western Balkans Joint Counter-Terrorism Action Plan to prevent radicalization and to curb the extreme views and groups that have already emerged (URL35). In parallel, Kosovo has adopted a counter-terrorism strategy that has seen ISIL fighters returning from the Middle East as one of the country's biggest security risks. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj has announced his readiness to take full responsibility for their citizens, who, however, will be answerable for their actions before the law upon their return (URL10). In the spirit of the latter, 110 were able to return with U.S.

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41 The gravity of the problem is well illustrated by the fact that about 20 Serbian women were in one of the camps controlled by Kurdish militants in April 2019.
   The Belgrade government did not take concrete steps for their readmission despite repeated requests from relatives. Furthermore, according to a report by the Bosnian intelligence agency, SIPA, about 70 children had been born in Syria by early 2019. One or both of their parents were Bosnian citizens. Twelve of the minors lost their lives in the clashes. Next to them, the number of Albanian, Kosovar and North Macedonian children is set at 85 who were born in the area.

42 Only an 11-year-old Albanian boy could return from the Kurdish-controlled al-Hol camp. However, he was transported to Italy (and not to Albania!) because he was already born and raised there until his mother - without his father's knowledge - took him to the Middle East.

assistance on April 19, 2019[43] (URL36). The double standards and security risk reservations naturally had an impact, as 32 of the returnees were women and 74 were children, nine of whom were orphans. The four men were detained by the authorities immediately upon their arrival, while the women and children were transported to one of the centers of the asylum authority to carry out the administrative tasks and necessary medical examinations. The latter were able to return home to their homes after 72 hours of observation, where the women were placed under house arrest[44] (Shtuni, 2019, 19.; URL27). Of these, 11 women were prosecuted by the Kosovo judiciary and the first judgement was announced in January 2020 [45] (URL38). At the same time, Kosovo has already negotiated with Ankara to repatriate another 100 citizens from Syria (URL39). A similar trend has emerged in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the meantime. The Bosnian presidency gave up its initial aloof stance and first allowed one person to return home from Syria in April 2019 and then a group of 25 people - 7 men, 6 women and 12 children - at the end of the year. Measures were also taken to repatriate an estimated 235 people trapped in camps in the Middle East. As in the Kosovo proceedings, men were still detained at Sarajevo airport, while women and children were taken to a reception center (URL40). Finally, it should be noted that Serbia has maintained its previous rejection position and has still not taken any measures to allow the return of 20 Serbian women detained in camps in northern Syria (URL41).

Conditions for providing a reintegration background

In addition to assessing the security risks inherent in readmitted persons and addressing potential threats, there is a difference in how much attention each national authority pays to the emergence of politicized Islam in their local communities. However, the importance of the latter is justified by the fact that it

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43 In addition to the returnees, a further 108 citizens of three Balkan nations - 10 women and 38 children from Kosovo, 14 of whom were born in Syria; 11 women and 41 children from Albania, 13 of whom were born in Syria; 2 women and 6 children from North Macedonia - stayed only in al-Hol camp in Syria.

44 In addition to the returnees, 30 other suspected ISIL fighters and 39 women and 8 children were still in the Syrian conflict zone, according to Kosovo police. Alongside them, a Kosovar citizen and a Macedonian person were sentenced to life imprisonment in Turkey.

45 Qendresa Sfidhta was sentenced by a Pristina court to two years suspended imprisonment for involvement in a terrorist organization in the first instance.

can significantly deepen the conflict not only between individual states[46], but also among the inhabitants of ethnically and religiously highly heterogeneous areas, as well as increase the chances of extremist nationalist, neo-fascist and anti-Islamic tendencies against minority groups[47] (Ćorović, 2017, 131.; Šutarov, 2017, 120–121.; URL17). It is not negligible that the readmitted persons most often returned to a medium where conditions had practically not improved or did not change at all during their absence[48] (Jakupi & Kelmendi, 2017, 11–12.). The conditions for radicalization therefore continued to exist, especially when returnees sought more contact with each other and like-minded people because of the rejection of the domestic collective and tried to distance themselves from the outside world. Involving religious congregations, especially imams, relevant relatives, leaders and members of local communities, doctors and mental health professionals, and educational institutions in reintegration processes is therefore crucial[49] (Bytyqi & Mullins, 2019, 27.).

Most of the Balkan states concerned also attach increasing importance of monitoring the family background of returnees, as many of the volunteers' conservative relatives have also been susceptible to violent extremism. They were proud of their war-torn family members, whose deeds were glorified and considered duty, and those who fell were reputed as heroic martyrs. As a result, those persons, who were previously detained / sentenced to imprisonment, actually returned to the same radicalization medium after their release. These distrustful and aloof families, often living in deep poverty and insecurity, have so far been in contact almost exclusively with religious organizations, unofficial

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46 For example, Serbian politicians have repeatedly accused Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo of operating al-Qaeda camps on their territory. At the same time, the leaders of the two states indicted Belgrade for hiding war criminals and state-sponsored terrorism.

47 In retaliation for the Zvorniki attack mentioned above, Serbs detained more than 30 Bosnians on suspicion of arms smuggling, which caused serious outrage on the part of Bosnians. The overreacted Serbian action, which was considered unnecessary, was seen as repression, as they said the arrests were directed against former Bosnian refugees who returned to their homes after the Yugoslav War. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, almost all of the Macedonian volunteers were of Albanian descent. The Macedonian authorities, including law enforcement agencies, have therefore paid particular attention to ensuring that their actions do not appear to be directed against the Albanian minority as a whole. In addition, the legislature and the media have been careful to avoid any statements that could imply condemnation and / or discrimination against any ethnic group. In contrast, discrimination against Serb Muslims in the Sandzak region would not only have eased but intensified. The latter carries the danger that Muslims who have hitherto rejected extremist interpretations of Islam will also be radicalized over time due to the condemnatory attitude of the Serbian public, frequent hate speeches and growing social segregation.

48 For example, many of the women who returned to Kosovo were left without a head of family in the past. Therefore, they were forced to remarry due to a lack of state support.

49 We can consider as a positive development the establishment of Prevention and Rehabilitation Department in Kosovo, which can widely support the returning women and children. A separate school class has also been set up for children to catch up and women are being helped with food, clothing and other everyday items offered by international NGOs.

religious groups, and individuals professing similar principles. It is therefore an urgent task for local communities and public authorities to work effectively with them to resolve the problem as soon as possible (Perteshi, 2018, 33–34.). As a result of the brutality experienced, several of those who returned showed symptoms of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). Measures have also been taken for the psychological treatment of these mentally (also) disabled people. In addition, initiatives have been taken in Kosovo since 2018 to launch effective socialization programs for persons deprived of their liberty, with the assistance of sociologists, psychologists, psychotherapists, other health professionals and other highly qualified experts[50] (Shutarov, 2019, 5.). The authorities also sought to isolate the most vulnerable persons as effectively as possible from fanatics and recruiters held within the penitentiary[51] (Azinović & Bećirević, 2017, 37.).

Finally, individual intelligence and police agencies appear to be trying to communicate more effectively with each other in order to share information more quickly[52] (URL13). They are seeking to involve agencies in their cooperation such as Europol, Frontex, Interpol or relevant US institutions and departments more closely than before.[53] However, in order to implement ambitious initiatives, each state must create a stable social background - which presupposes a more effective fight against poverty, unemployment, corruption, organized crime - and the development of the education system.

Summary

Most Balkan fighters who have left for the Middle East have not yet returned to their countries of origin. Nevertheless, efforts to prevent potential terrorist attacks and jihadist infiltrations are now a top priority. In this regard, the main task lies with the intelligence services of each of the Balkan states, which must

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50 In Kosovo, imams from the local Islamic Community have joined the prison rehabilitation program, giving lectures to detained extremists. In addition, libraries in nine prisons were reviewed and religious literature of questionable content / origin was replaced with books translated / published by the Islamic Community.

51 For example, 95% of prisoners convicted of terrorism charges are held in the heavily guarded Podueva penitentiary in Kosovo.

52 The withholding of information, often under political pressure, has been a serious problem not only among the Balkan states but also among law enforcement agencies in individual countries. The latter finding is particularly true in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the state-building entities - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska - have their own legislative powers and police institutional systems that treat each other in a spirit of mutual distrust.

53 In terms of information sharing, the formation of a joint coordination center is an evolutionary development which was set up between 30 countries as well as 8 agencies and international organizations at Europol's headquarters in The Hague on 5-8 September 2019.

clearly identify among returnees those who have been disappointed and offended by what has happened and who continue to pose a threat to the state and public security. This would also be particularly important as it would increase the discretion of the local judiciary and allow courts to impose more selective, but much harsher, penalties on those who pose a threat to a given society. At the same time, it could be the other side of the coin and also be considered, that in this case it would not be necessary to imprison all returnees indiscriminately. Of course, the latter would not call into question the legitimate criminal claims of local judicial institutions. Following a number of Asian and European examples, it would also be thought-provoking that overcrowded prisons, as a deterrent, do not necessarily help de-radicalization processes but, on the contrary, often force those who do not want to return there to take extreme action. Based on experience to date, we should also not forget that, in the absence of appropriate and effective precautions, prisons have often proved to be an ideal place for fundamentalists to spread their extreme ideology and recruit potential believers / volunteers. In addition, each national government urgently needs to develop an action plan for the effectively reintegration of spouses and children most at risk of radicalization and discrimination into local societies. The challenge is exacerbated, especially in Bosnia, by ethnic divisions and nationalist sentiments, which can be a breeding ground for violent extremism and terrorist acts in the area in the absence of a successful regional cooperation policy. For this reason, it would be particularly important above all, to extend control over all mosques of the state-sponsored Islamic communities and to close unofficial spaces for practicing the Islamic faith. The above considerations are of vital importance not only for the maintenance of regional stability but also for the process of accession of the states of the region to the EU. Securing the borders of the European Union is closely linked to European integration and enlargement. Accession negotiations have therefore been hampered from the outset by concerns that the entry of the Balkan states will bring Islamic majority states within the Union's borders with flourishing religious extremism and high levels of violence. Doubts, anti-Muslim sentiments and far-right populist manifestations in the union were further heightened by the news of the departure of Balkan volunteers and their return. For this reason, the arrests in Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina simultaneously served as a beheading of extremist local communities, a demonstrative stand for EU directives, alienation from the radical lines of the wider Muslim world, and an emphasis on the presence of secularized Islam. As a result, more effective action against local fundamentalists, effective reintegration of returned volunteers and their families, and further deepening cooperation with EU security bodies are also key issues for the

Balkan states in gaining EU membership. This is because some members of the community may consider several candidate countries to be a security risk in the absence of expedient de-radicalization. They do not want to risk the entry of radical Islamic communities within the borders of the Union, which could serve as a kind of advanced base for anti-Western fundamentalists outside the community. They also fear that by breaking down national borders and exercising their right to free movement, extremists will be able to keep in contact more easily with second- and third-generation members of Islamic communities in the EU who are susceptible to extremism. In view of the above, compliance with the EU's security policy criteria is particularly important for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two largest jihadist emitters in the region. This is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that Northern Macedonia and Albania have already been approved to start accession negotiations at the end of March 2020. In addition to the rule of law reforms, the EU's decision was based, among other things, on more effective action against organized crime and the renewal of intelligence agencies.

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Radoslav Ivančík

A Treatise on the Theoretical Basis of Research on the Organizational Culture of a Police Organization

Abstract

In recent years, we can meet more and more often in various professional publications, magazines, conferences, but also in various reports in the media the term organizational culture. The fact is that gradually more and more organizations are dealing with issues of organizational culture because they have understood that organizational culture plays an important role in the life of organizations. And not only in formulating organizational strategy, setting goals, or making decisions, but also in fulfilling their mission, creating their image and overall functioning in today's dynamic times affected by deepening globalization. That is also why the author, in his research, deals with organizational culture, specifically, in the presented article he examines police culture. The author characterizes police culture as a specific type of organizational culture that fulfils important functions and missions in terms of police functioning. By analogy with other types of organizations, the author defines police culture as a set of socially typical views, attitudes, norms, and values that determine models of police behaviour, relations to society and the police organization. He points out that despite the generally similar characteristics with other cultures of the organization, there are certain specifics that distinguish the police culture from other organizations. It gives it uniqueness. It should be a priority for every organization to have a good organizational culture aimed at maximum efficiency and success. For this reason, it is important to know its current state by research and to evaluate its positive and negative aspects. The article deals with the theoretical basis of understanding key concepts such as organization, culture, subculture, and organizational culture. At the same time, it presents the theoretical basis for the study of this phenomenon in the environment of the Police Force.

Keywords: organization, culture, police organization, police culture

Introduction

The problem – how to manage people successfully and effectively so that they achieve the best possible work results and participate in achieving common goals – is almost as old as mankind itself. In a certain sense it could be said that rulers, dukes, commanders, or builders had essentially the same problems in building castles, chateaux, temples, roads, or building armies and organizing troops as today's managers. Their main tasks include, as in the past, setting goals, formulating strategies, tactics, planning, organizing, coordinating, guiding, commanding, leading people, controlling, decision-making, ensuring the best possible working conditions, recruiting quality and qualified employees, their motivation, the correct setting of the system of rewards and sanctions and many other obligations. These attributes are considered as key to the successful and efficient functioning of organizations and have therefore become the subject of research and solution proposals by many practitioners and theorists of various scientific disciplines and practice. Their research, studies, methods, and procedures reflect efforts to find answers how to ensure that organizations are viable and efficient. Several pieces of the researches confirmed that one of the key factors is in the success and effectiveness of an organization, regardless of the type of organization, the organizational culture. Most definitions associate organizational culture with the existence of common organizational values, attitudes, and norms of behaviour that are not written down anywhere but are followed by people in the organization. For managers, organizational culture is often something that obviously exists, but it cannot be controlled or explained. However, experience shows that organizational culture, often described as an elusive and difficult to define multidimensional phenomenon, can be named by the elements that make up organizational culture – even defined in measurable dimensions – and manage its development. However, in order to actively influence the formation of organizational culture, it is necessary to know its current state and evaluate its positive and negative aspects. Organizational culture can be researched in any organization and targeted and developed based on research findings. For this reason, the primary goal of the author of the article, using relevant methods of interdisciplinary research, is to outline the theoretical basis for key concepts such as organization, police organization, organizational culture of the police organization and to determine the theoretical and methodological basis for researching this phenomenon in the police organization.

Definition of basic terms

The origin of the word organization can be found in the Greek word organon, which originally expressed a tool, especially a tool of research or thinking. For example, in the work of F. Bacon (1620) Novum Organum (new instrument of science), the organon is understood as a tool for cognition, a tool for the realization of the goal, the path to the goal. Similarly, it can be said that the organization is also not a goal, but a tool to achieve the set goal effectively.

   The term organization has several meanings, it can be interpreted in a material sense as an institution, unit, or object (as one of the examples of socio-economic system), which has interactions with the environment and is internally structured. It can also be interpreted in the form of the internal organization of a particular institution or unit, or as an ongoing activity. This article emphasizes the institutional significance of this term, because management as a process takes place in institutions called organizations. Human society at the beginning of the third millennium is a society of organizations, because during the last century all developed countries have become not only organized societies, but also societies of organizations. The functioning (running) of companies is thus ensured through institutions in the form of various organizations. Based on the above, it is possible to imagine an '*organized formal group of people who have common goals and motivation*' (Belan et al., 2018, 22.) under the term organization. An organization can also be defined as a '*structured group of people created to achieve specific objectives*' (Majtán, 2016, 22.) or as a '*society of people involved (associated) in a systematically targeted effort, such as producing goods, providing services, promoting certain views, or things, realization of hobby, sports, cultural activities, etc.*' (Míka, 2013, 9.). To date, many theories have emerged in connection with research and interpretation of what an organization is. Among the first ones were the so-called classical theories that originated in the early 20th century. They tried to reveal the principles that ensured the success of the organization. Other theories, referred to as the sociological-human approach, defined organizations as mechanical, rational, and impersonal entities embodying strict command and hierarchical distribution, specialization of work, rules, and procedures (human relations theory), or as an open system (systems theory), or as social communities that are significantly influenced by the human factor (randomness theory). Current theories perceive the organization as a pluralistic system that can take several forms at the same time. One of the interesting angles of view is the cultural view, respectively cultural metaphor. This theory states that an organization and its mechanical properties, such as structure, rules, internal policies, and systems, are the product of

culture or cultural artifacts. The power of cultural metaphor was introduced by G. Morgan in his works in 1986 and 1996 (Brooks, 2003, 122.) and thus drew attention to the human side of the organization. Organizational theories are constantly enriched with new knowledge, which shifts the understanding of the organization into a more modern context. Although approaches and definitions change, arise and disappear over time, the essence remains:

- The organization is an open system, meaning that it is in constant interaction with the environment, receiving people, raw materials, energy, information and transforming them into products and services that forwards them to the environment.
- An organization is a system with many goals and functions, including many interactions between the organization and the environment.
- The organization contains many subsystems that are in dynamic interaction with each other. They are interdependent, changes in one subsystem affect the behaviour of other subsystems.
- The organization exists in a dynamic environment that includes systems other than the organization. They impose different requirements and limit it in different ways. The overall operation of an organization cannot be properly understood without considering these external requirements and limitations.

The phenomenon of organization is the subject of interest of various scientific disciplines and is therefore an interdisciplinary concept. It can be viewed from different angles, which can be as follows:

- The economic view presents the organization as a production system (inputs, outputs, efficiency).
- Sociological view perceives the organization as a social system (social structures and interactions).
- Psychological view defines a person in the organization (thinking, emotions, psyche, and behaviour of people).
- Cultural - anthropological view characterizes the organization as a cultural system (artifacts, values, ideas, institutions).
- The biological (evolutionist) view presents the organization as an organism (survival and adaptation to the environment).
- The mechanical view views the organization as a machine (optimal operation).
- The information view perceives organizations as a comprehensive social and technical information system.

Thus, organization is a certain system, whether productive, social, psychological, or cultural, which is created with a specific purpose. The selection of a

suitable type of organization, the definition of the structure, the determination of the place, scope and relations with other organizations are also subordinated to this. In this sense each organization can be considered in the institutional sense as a special purpose unit, which is oriented to achieve some goals, is organized and hierarchical according to certain pre-thought models, with the structure and differentiation of roles in which people carry out joint activities to achieve these objectives (Váňa, 2007, 9.).

  Regarding the second key term in this article, the origin of the word culture can be found in the Latin words colo and colere, which originally referred to soil cultivation, and the word cultura, which means to cultivate. Later, in a figurative sense, the term began to be used to cultivate people. In this context, Marcus Tullius Cicero, a very famous Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher, was one of the first to use it to denote an individual's education (spirit culture). Culture plays an irreplaceable place in the existence of humanity and its attention is paid to several scientific disciplines, especially in the field of sociology, psychology, and anthropology. Culture is usually defined as a set of customs, relationships, institutions, arts, and other traits that characterize a society or a social group (URL1). UNESCO defines culture as '*a complex of specific spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of a society or a social group, which includes, together with art and literature, a common way of life, lifestyle, value system, traditions and faith*' (URL2). Under the term culture, we can also imagine the accumulation of intellectual property, which allows the individual to cultivate. At the same time, according to its internal and more modern content, culture can be perceived as a set of traditions, behaviours, and lifestyles (Horváth, 2009, 21.). Culture is part of the social relations of society. It is the sum of everything created by human hands and brains. Tylor describes it as *'a complex whole that includes knowledge, faith, art, law, morality, customs, and all the other abilities and customs that man has acquired as a member of society.'* (Tylor, 2016, 85.). Striеženec (2006, 28.) defines culture as *'the sum of the results of human education, material and spiritual values, social values and processes, social relations formed during the existence of human society.'* According to Farkas (2005, 6), culture includes the general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development of people, or it can be perceived as a specific way of life of a group of people. Culture can also be defined as the sum of meanings and values discovered or evoked by a certain community and communicated in that community (and with other communities). In this sense, culture is also formed by activities and institutions that led to the creation of meanings and values and by communication itself as a basic precondition for the origin and existence of culture. This aspect of culture can be further concretized as a

functional structure of institutions enabling the creation, reproduction, diffusion / distribution, and reception / consumption of meanings and values. Other specifications will present culture as a system of codified / non-codified standards, a system of institutions / organizations, a set of tools (material and spiritual) to influence / manage certain activities (Gažová, 2009, 52.).

One of the characteristic features of culture is that culture is socially conditioned, it is a manifestation of human existence, it is not innate, it is above-individual, it means that it is usually a continuous group product, that retains a certain continuity of time, maintains traditions but is also adaptive, able to adapt and change. As a result of human activity, culture is differentiated, it is a complex of several subcultures. Among the various social subcultures, it is possible to find many typically professional cultures (for example, subcultures of doctors, pilots, teachers, but also police officers or professional soldiers) as well as numerous subcultures of interest (for example, sports, music, art, etc.) (Murdza, 2009, 38.). To supplement the information in question, it should be noted that subculture is a term that refers to any partial cultures that are part of a larger culture with they have some features in common but others different. Subculture can also be defined as '*a set of cultural elements typical of culturally less distinct social groups or communities, distinct from the dominant (official, main) culture*' (Smolík, 2010, 18.). In some perspective, it can be said that it is a culture within a culture. Culture exists in every type of society, in its systems and subsystems, social organizations, institutions and social and professional groups. Especially in connection with the promotion of trends in modern management of social organizations, the organizational culture is increasingly emphasized, which reflects the basic philosophy, ideas, opinions, traditions and especially the values dominating in the organizational environment. Following this, organizational culture is defined as *'a comprehensive set of values, norms, patterns of action and behaviour, and institutions that determine the manner and forms of behaviour of an organization's employees, their relationships within the organization, and relationships outside*' (Nový & Surynek, 2006, 122.). Organizational culture also represents *'a system of values, rules, norms, and habits interpreted, accepted, or rejected by members of an organization that manifests itself in people's behaviours and reactions and characterizes them over the long term.'* (Horváth, 2009, 21.). According to Schein, '*organizational culture has a pattern of basic and decisive ideas that a group has found or created, discovered and developed, learned to deal with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and which have proven to be perceived as universal. The new members of the organization should, as far as possible, manage them, identify with them and act on them*' (Pajpachová & Baričičová,

2016, 40.). Similarly, Kachaňáková characterizes the term organizational culture as *'a system of assumptions, ideas, values, and norms that have been adopted and developed in the organization and have a great influence on the actions, thinking and behaviour of employees. Outwardly, it manifests itself as a form of social contact of employees, in social customs, clothing, material equipment, etc. Basic behaviours are becoming a model for new employees'* (Kachaňáková, 2010, 76.). The presented characteristics lead us to believe that organizational culture in general and the organizational culture of the police organization, which is the subject of our research, is a phenomenon that has become the subject of interest and research of several authors from the Slovak, Hungarian and wider international scientific community, such as Baričičová (2011, 2016), Váňa (2007), Murdza (2009), Finszter (2009); Horváth (2009); Pirger (2017); Farkas, Kovács and Krauzer (2018); Farkas, Sallai and Krauzer (2020); resp. Bayley (1977, 1990, 1996), Skolnick (2008, 2010, 2011), Loftus (2012), Cockcroft (2013), Bradford (2013, 2014), Paoline (2014), Coady (2000), and other authors. Organizational culture consists of several aspects intervening in different scientific disciplines, that provides opportunities to distinguish between different categories of people. However, this is possible only if there is a rational and empirical knowledge of organizational culture, which will contribute to its improvement (Pajpachová & Baričičová, 2016, 41.). A separate chapter deals with organizational culture further.

Police organization in the context of organizational theories

If we start from the premise that organizations are created with a certain purpose and have a certain mission, then human society has created and is creating special organizations in order to ensure security, internal order, compliance with the law and the protection of society from crime. One of them is the police. The police, together with human society, have travelled a difficult and complicated path, and its historical roots go back to the 17th - 18th centuries. Some historians look for its origin even deeper in human history. However, from historical research, it is clear that modern police organizations, as we know them today, began to emerge 200-300 years ago (Slušný, 2002, 5.). Since then, the police have undergone an interesting and complex development, either as a kind of human activity or as a term denoting the bodies for protection of law, life, property, and other values. In the Slovak environment, from a historical point of view, it was mainly the transition from an authoritarian form to a democratically oriented service to citizens, operating within the rules of the law, subject

to the law and the control mechanism. In the Hungarian environment, it is similar. As stated by Ferenc Krémer (2003, 116.), in order to understand the development of changes faced by the Hungarian police in the 21st century, it is necessary to focus in particular on the process of transition from communism to more democratic structures that occur throughout society. From the point of view of organizational theories, the police organization, which is in Slovakia the Police Force of the Slovak Republic, does not deviate from the general definitions. Although it has its own specifics, which distinguish it from other organizations, we can understand it as an open system, because it is in constant interaction with the environment in the form of receiving people, material, information, which transforms into services to society and its citizens in the form of protection of law, life, assets and other values. We can speak of it as a system with many goals and functions, containing many interactions between the organization and the environment. In this regard, the police force performs functions that bring clear benefits to:

- society in the form of the protection of life, health and property, the detection and prevention of crime, the maintenance of public order, the fight against terrorism and organized crime, the protection of state borders and objects of special importance, but also the supervision of road safety and traffic,
- police organization in the form of development, increasing work efficiency, building a good reputation,
- police officers in the form of social acceptance, self-realization, tangible and intangible valuation, and others.

Like any organization, the Police Force contains many subsystems that interact with each other. These are, for example, the technical, technological, social, cultural, personnel, or economic subsystems. At the same time, the police force exists in a dynamic environment and responds to the requirements of other systems, such as the family, the state and its bodies, economic institutions, political-administrative, political-legal institutions, and others. In addition, the police service, as a specific profession, requires the daily contact of police officers with citizens at interpersonal, perceptual, communicative, and interactive level. Such contact brings with it a higher probability of occurrence of problematic, conflict and risky situations and events, because the purpose, and at the same time the mission of the police, is to supervise, control, direct and also restrict and coerce (Baričičová, 2011, 5.).

The differences that distinguish a police organization from others lie primarily in its mission, legal definition, and management. The police force is an organized and hierarchical unit, which has an important position in the state due to

its mission. Its role in the area of helping citizens, organizing social life, protecting the state and its political, social and economic interests is precisely defined by law (URL3). The existence and functioning of the Police Force are also legally defined. '*In its activities, the Police Force is governed by the Constitution, constitutional laws, laws and other generally binding legal regulations and international treaties by which the Slovak Republic is bound*' (URL3). Unlike other civil organizations that can do anything under the law that is not forbidden by law, the Police Force can only do what the law allows. The management of the Police Force, which is directly subordinate to the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, is also specific; it is managed by the President of the Police Force, who is responsible to the Minister of the Interior for the performance of his function. As mentioned above, the organization can be viewed from a different perspective. In this article, an organization is seen as a system that combines many elements. These include values, symbols, myths, ceremonies, rituals, technologies and other material resources, statements, organizational goals, and norms. The organization also includes decision-making, evaluation, remuneration and control systems, various communication patterns, managerial and leadership styles, human resources, organizational policies, and expectations. The development of the organization is focused on learning, innovation, adaptation to constant changes of various kinds. And all these elements are combined into one coherent system by organizational culture.

Basic principles of the research of organizational culture

The foundations of the current understanding of organizational culture were laid in the 1970s and became popular especially in the 1980s. The general discourse on organizational culture was influenced by the works of Ouchi (1981), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Pascal and Athos (1981), Peters and Waterman (1982) and Hofstede (1991). The work of Schein entitled Organizational Culture and Leadership in 1985 marked a fundamental shift in the study of the phenomenon of organizational culture. To define the concept of organizational culture in the literature, we find a relative difference of opinion on this issue. It can be said that there is no uniform, unified, and generally accepted definition of organizational culture. However, in terms of the temporal development of the definition of this concept, it is possible to capture certain common features of the understanding of organizational culture and thus indicate the same developmental tendencies. In the 1980s, organizational culture was understood almost exclusively as an intra-organizational concept that reflected its internal

environment, employee behaviour and expression, as well as the organization's responses to certain internal circumstances (Sulkowski, 2009, 12.). In the 90's, organizational culture began to gain in importance and gradually became one of the strategic tools of organizational management. It is understood as a complex of certain common rules, norms, and values, which are manifested inside and outside the organization. The works of the authors published in this period develop the original understanding of organizational culture and enrich the view of organizational culture with its importance for the strategy and management of the organization. The current perception of organizational culture is shifted even further. The latest concepts perceive organizational culture both as a set of elements of which it is formed, as well as a certain system that has a significant impact on the overall functioning of the organization. Thus, organizational culture is currently identified not only as a managerial-economic tool used to improve, enrich, or enhance the organization. It is perceived, also as a result of cooperation and communication, common learning and the past of the members of the organization, while it includes various elements, structurally arranged on individual levels. The foundations of organizational culture understood in this way can be found in the work of E. H. Schein (1985, 1992), who divided the structure of organizational culture into three interacting levels, the essence of which resulted from the connection of social and cultural anthropology, social psychology and sociology of organizations. By this, however, the view of organizational culture is far from exhausted. Since the constant diversification of studies is one of the reasons why the concept of organizational culture is not uniformly defined within organizational theory, some authors have set out to divide approaches and views on this concept. In 1983, L. Smircich identified two main approaches to defining organizational culture in her article, namely the interpretive and the objectivist approach (Smircich, 1983). The interpretive approach, which has its roots primarily in cultural anthropology, looks at organizational culture as something that the organization is. All features of the organization are considered elements of culture. The key meaning here is not objective reality but interpreted meaning (Lukášová & Nový, 2004, 20.).[1] The interpretive approach enriches the traditional understanding of organization as a machine and organization as a biological system with a new metaphor, namely the understanding of organization as culture.

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1   The term meaning can be understood in three different ways, interconnected:
 - meaning as importance (if something has meaning, it is important),
 - meaning as purpose (if something has meaning, it has reason to exist),
 - meaning as content (if something is significant, it can be understood and interpreted).

Within the objectivist approach, organizational culture is considered as part of the organization, i.e. something that the organization has. It is considered as an objective entity, a certain subsystem that affects the performance and functionality of the organization. It can be purposefully shaped and changed.

An alternative to these approaches is offered by M. Schultz, who distinguishes three approaches – rationalist, functionalist and symbolic. The rationalist approach considers organizational culture to be a tool for effectively achieving goals. This view is derived from the metaphor of the machine because it understands culture as a tool. In this sense, representatives of this approach are T. J. Peters and R. H. Waterman (1982) and T. E. Deal and A. A. Kenedy (1982). Functionalism, on the other hand, perceives organization as a social system. He views culture in terms of the functions it has in the organization. The functionalist approach is based primarily on the work of E. H. Shein (1985, 1992) and his understanding of culture as a result of collective learning in the process of problem solving in order to survive the organization. Symbolism perceives organizations as human systems. The basic question that symbolists ask themselves is how important an organization is to members. The approach that has prevailed on the basis of the study of published literature in the recent period is the objectivist approach. In this context, the organizational culture of a police organization is understood as a subsystem of the organization and one of the organizational variables which, in addition to other variables such as structure and systems, affects the functioning and performance of the police organization.

Definition of organizational culture of a police organization

Organizational culture is generally a difficult concept to define because we cannot observe it. It is difficult to grasp even in the case of a police organization, because we rather see its manifestations, such as a service uniform with the national emblem and the name Police, equipment and armament of police officers, marking police motor vehicles, slogan 'Help and protect', hand greetings, so-called saluting, briefing before the performance of the service and others. This difficulty stems primarily from the general concept of culture, which comes from anthropology. Police officers do not have to be aware of any organizational culture, because they are influenced and soaked by it in their behaviour and actions. Some of the key elements of organizational culture are values. Value is what plays a vital role in our lives, thinking, living, and making decisions, what we consider important and what we attach importance to in decision-making. While individual values express an individual's personal preferences, organizational

values are an expression of what is emphasized in the organization as a whole. According to most authors, for example Fuller (2015) or Brown (1998), values represent the core of organizational culture and an important indicator of the content of culture. The key organizational values of a police organizations are mostly expressed in the internal regulations of police organizations and codes of ethics, in which, in addition to the rules of conduct of police officers inside and outside the police, service behaviour and courtesy are also declared values, missions and goals of the police. If the culture of the organization is in line with the values, missions, and internal standards of police officers, it increases the emotional well-being and job satisfaction of police officers. It promotes a sense of coherence and belonging, strengthens self-confidence and supports the identification of the police officer with the organization. At the same time, the organizational culture coordinates action on common values and standards through agreement in the perception of generally accepted standards. The greater is the agreement between declared and real values, the more the organizational culture helps to ensure the desired behaviour, action, and discipline of police officers. The understanding of organizational culture in this article is based on Schein's concept[2] of organizational culture. It is based on an objectivist approach. In this context, the organizational culture of a police organization, in this case the organizational culture of the Police Force, is understood as a picture of everyday organizational life in the police, where organizational culture functions as a tool for managing, effective regulation and control of workplace relations, as well as a means of improving the working environment. At the same time, it can be defined as the core that police officers must acquire during socialization to the police. Otherwise, they become unsocialized individuals whose practices and their results, as foreign cultural elements, can disrupt organizational culture. The given core represents the paradigm of organizational culture, which expresses in a simplified form the basic organizational beliefs representing the essence of organizational everyday life and the focus of organizational socialization and organizational learning. Simultaneously, it is an important indicator of the content of culture and a tool for shaping organizational culture. Organizational beliefs, which form the paradigm of organizational culture, influence the daily lives of police officers, and characterize the barriers of behaviour. The paradigm expresses the essence of organizational culture, expresses its character in the most concentrated form, and therefore the results of research have great

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2   Schein's model, which specifies three levels in the structure of organizational culture: artifacts, revealed values, and beliefs, is significant for its focus on beliefs that, as central, implicit elements, condition what happens in an organization.

informative value. In close connection with the definition of the organizational culture of a police organization, in order to supplement the above information, it is necessary to mention at least briefly the relationship between the organizational culture and the organizational climate. In this case, it is true that in the professional literature there is no agreement in the definition of the relationship between organizational culture and organizational climate. Some authors consider the organizational climate to be synonymous with the term organizational culture. According to other authors, this is not the case and the organizational climate is part of the organizational culture. Organizational climate is defined as a relatively less stable layer that is perceived by members of the organization and influences their behaviour. It is an internal atmosphere in the organization, which relates to the perception of the work environment, or the perception of the situation in the workplace, and is relatively easily influenced by immediate measures. In contrast, organizational culture is characterized by a relatively large and usually long-term resistance to external influences (Lanzer, 2018).

Application of the model of organizational culture of the organization to the environment of the police organization

The structure of the organizational culture of a police organization is understood as certain levels of it, which are formed by interconnected and influencing elements. The most well-known and most used model of the structure of organizational culture is currently Schein's model,[3] which recognizes three levels of culture depending on the degree of their external expression and visibility. These are the level of explicit elements of organizational culture – artifacts and revealed values, the level of implicit elements of organizational culture – organizational beliefs and hidden values, and the level of partly explicit and partly implicit – symbols, norms, and goals.

The implicit level contains organizational beliefs and hidden organizational values. These are the basic ideas of police officers, which include, for example, relationships with the outside world, ideas about the nature and character of man, his wishes, unfulfilled goals. These are reflections on the causes of people's actions, on stimuli for various actions and on the nature of interpersonal relationships. This level of organizational culture remains in an unconscious, spontaneous form. It is, in fact, a vast conglomeration of views, adopted from

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3   Models of the structure of organizational culture have also been formulated by other authors, for example J. P. Kotter a J. L. Heskett (1991), G. Hofstede (1991), W. Hall (1995), C. Lundberg (1985) etc.

an early age and shaped by the family, the school and the immediate environment. It can include various philosophical or ethical contexts, such as what is the source and bearer of truth, justice, morality, or social feeling. The second level of organizational culture consists of the emerging social norms and standards of conduct and organizational symbols. These are the product of organizational ideology, established principles, rules and lines of action. They are conscious and to some extent influenced by police management. They may be more or only partially visible to the outside observer.

According to Schein, the third level of organizational culture is a system of artifacts and revealed organizational values. This system consists of, for example, verbal and nonverbal components of speech, social intercourse, ceremonies, rituals, clothing, and logo. These artifacts are conscious, purposefully influenced. They are visible, but sometimes it is necessary to explain their meaning to an outside observer. Schein's model of organizational culture is also a guide on how to study organizational culture. The implicit level has the nature of predetermined starting points for the thinking and actions of the members of the organization. It contains hidden organizational values and beliefs, elements that are not visible to the outside observer. They can only be identified through certain methods of empirical research. The task of research at this level is not only to identify the same organizational beliefs and organizational values, but also to analyse the practical consequences of their application. In other words, the diagnosis of this level will show us how hidden the organizational beliefs and values are in line with the declared values of the organization and thus determine their real contribution to the formation of organizational culture. At the same time, the degree of identification of police officers with values that are key to the police organization should be revealed. Qualitative methods of participatory observation and unstructured or partially structured interview are offered for the research grasp of this level. Qualitative research through a questionnaire can be complementary. The partly explicit and partly implicit level contains organizational symbols, norms, and goals, it means elements that are partly visible to the outside observer and partly invisible. Organizational symbols are artifacts processed by organizational culture. It is a process in which a new meaning is assigned to a new artifact, which is understandable only to members of the organization and which differs from the original literal meaning of the artifact, which has been culturally processed (Lašáková, 2008, 14.). The symbols are also not visible to the outside observer. Organizational norms, i.e. rules and principles defining acceptable and unacceptable ways of behaving in a police organization, have the same position in the model. These are explicit and implicit elements of organizational culture. Rules and principles defining

the rules of conduct of police officers are contained e.g. in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, constitutional laws, laws and other generally binding legal regulations and internal acts and regulations of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and in international treaties by which the Slovak Republic is bound.[4] Organizational goals define the goals that the police organization wants to achieve. They are determined officially as explicit elements of organizational culture and unofficially as implicit elements of organizational culture. In addition to official, formally set objectives, such as the reduction of road accidents, there are also objectives that cannot be detected as an external observer. An example is the setting of maximum limits for the collection of fines for non-compliance with road traffic regulations. In the case of second-level research, various questions can be asked about norms and standards of conduct. Such questions include, for example, who is the initiator of these standards, who monitors compliance, in what contexts and situations it is possible to encounter the application of standards, under what circumstances it is permissible not to comply, what is the connection of standards to other rules of communication and interaction and others. A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods appears to be useful for examining this area. From a quantitative point of view we can compile, for example, a questionnaire that comprehensively captures various work, interaction and communication standards and habits of police officers and police management. By analysing the data, we identify certain general tendencies in the actions and thinking of police officers. In qualitative research, we should focus on the issue of the existence of norms and standards of conduct within the organization. The researcher should focus on the gradual identification and clarification of the standards that exist in a police organization. In this way, it is possible to identify norms and standards of conduct that have been forgotten in quantitative research and to clarify the specific meaning of quantitatively identified norms and tendencies of conduct.

In the third level, it is mostly a relatively clear and seemingly easy to understand the area of organizational culture. These are visible phenomena where

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4   For example, these are the following legal regulations: Act no. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force, as amended, Act no. 73/1998 Coll. on the civil service of members of the Police Force, the Slovak Information Service, the Prison and Judicial Guard Corps of the Slovak Republic and the Railway Police, as amended, Regulation of the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic no. 62/2003 on the scope of competence of superior members of the Police Force (personnel competence), Regulation of the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic no. 22/2009 on the scope of disciplinary authority of superiors (disciplinary authority), Regulation of the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic no. 52/1998 on the introduction and use of the badge of the criminal police service and the badge of the financial police, Regulation of the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic no. 39/2009 on the rules of wearing the service uniform of the Police Corps, the uniform of the music of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and the uniform of the pilot and others.

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social and material values, values of work orientation, social or moral values can predict much of what is observable at the level of artifacts. For example, the designation of company cars with the words 'Help and protect' emphasizes the link to the declared mission of the police, as a credible institution that helps and protects the citizens of the Slovak Republic. In this case, it is the materialization of moral value into an artifact - a slogan. Whether it is only the value with which the members of the organization lived, can only be determined by a thorough analysis of organizational culture, which must take into account how well the declared values are in line with the deepest level, i.e. with hidden organizational values and beliefs. However, here it is not enough either to simply identify and describe the existing symbol system. It is necessary to deal with their current and potential, respectively superfluous significance and their connection with the other two levels of organizational culture. Using the method of standardized observation, we can identify the system of organizational symbolism and then subject it to content analysis and then describe the areas of basic topics that should be shaped and expressed. In order to understand the deeper essence of organizational symbolism, its interconnectedness with the other two levels, but also possible contradictions with the philosophy and policy of the police organization, it is necessary to subject them to analysis. The combination of the above-mentioned research methods and procedures makes it possible not only to describe the individual levels of the organizational culture of a police organization, but also to identify possible discrepancies and mutual contradictions. Schein's model of organizational culture is an irreplaceable tool for capturing such a complex and multidimensional phenomenon as organizational culture certainly is. This concept assumes that the basis of all cultures is a simple, limited set of deeply hidden, basic starting points and ideas, on the basis of which it is possible to classify each organization. It should then result in the main determinants of organizational culture - content and strength, which are important indicators of the functionality of organizational culture. The content of the organization's culture is formed by basic beliefs, hidden, and revealed values and common norms of organizational behaviour, which are externally manifested through the behaviour of members of the organization, symbols, and artifacts. The strength of organizational culture is the extent to which basic beliefs, values, and norms affect patterns of behaviour in an organization. If their influence is intense enough, the organizational culture is strong and significantly affects the functioning of the organization in either a positive or a negative direction. If the organizational culture is weak, it means that the members of the organization identify only to a small extent with common assumptions, values, and standards of behaviour. In the environment of a police organization, this means

that the actions of police officers are more influenced by individual characteristics that do not contribute to the successful functioning of the organization. In this case, we can also talk about a poor or unhealthy organizational culture, which leads to unproductive behaviour and actions of police officers, so it begins to work against the organization and its goals. Therefore, it should be an important role for police managers to design and maintain a positive and strong culture. Its influence will ensure the personal identification of police officers with the values and goals of the police organization, which ultimately leads to the desired performance and the spread of good reputation.

Conclusion

Interest in organizational culture is currently growing due to its significant impact on the success and performance of the organization. This is a phenomenon that has no clear definition in the professional literature. Many textbook definitions associate organizational culture with the existence of common organizational values, attitudes, and norms of behaviour that are not written anywhere, but are followed by people in the organization. To date, several influential models of organizational culture have emerged, which make it possible to name organizational culture, even define it in measurable dimensions, and manage its development. Such models include the concept formulated by E. H. Schein, who arranged the various elements that make up the structure of organizational culture into three levels. The first level consists of a summary of hidden organizational values and beliefs, the second level consists of organizational norms, standards of conduct and organizational symbols, and the third level consists of organizational artifacts and revealed organizational values. Several researchers and authors agree that Schein's levels are among the irreplaceable research tools to grasp organizational culture. It is a method which, on the one hand, allows the individual levels of culture in the organization to be described, but also to identify possible contradictions and mutual contradictions. For this reason, a model formulated by E. H. Schein is proposed for learning about the organizational culture of a police organization. In the context of this approach, the examination of the organizational culture of a police organization should take place at all three levels, as all the elements that make up the structure of an organizational culture are equally important. The results of such a research should result in the main determinants of organizational culture, which are content and strength. These belong to the important indicators of the functionality of the organizational culture and at the same time to the indicators of possible

organizational contradictions and mutual contradictions. Based on the discovery of the discrepancy between the individual levels of organizational culture, it is possible to outline the starting points for a possible change in organizational culture towards successful and effective functioning.

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Radoslav Ivančík: A Treatise on the Theoretical Basis of Research
on the Organizational Culture of a Police Organization

András László Szabó

Analysis of Lone Offenders with an Immigrant Background and a Prevention Model

Abstract

Lone offences are becoming more common across Europe among people with an immigrant background. In Hungary, the number of crimes related to migration and people with an immigrant background is small. The appearance of migration in the media, on the other hand, generates serious emotions. It can create groupings and trigger emotions in individuals to commit acts of wrongdoing. The phenomenon of migration has both positive and negative effects. One of the most frightening of the negative effects is the way it reshapes our thinking. This can be observed in the relationship between people with an immigrant background and the inhabitants of the host country. In my study I examine a lone perpetrator who emerges as a result of migration, focusing on the issue of prevention. I show how criminal policy and prevention models work, or do not work. At the end of the study, I outline a possible prevention model.

Keywords: lone offender, immigrant background, prevention, deterrence, predictive analytics

Introduction

Nowadays, the lone mode of committing an offense shows an increase, which is also due to the increased interest of the media. Traditional crime prevention and identification techniques do not always work reliably. In my study, after clarifying the concept of the lone offender, I present what prevention models are and how they work or why they do not work. The aim of the study is to describe a possible prevention model and the possibility of identifying a lone perpetrator through preventive profiling and predictive analytics. The problem of identifying the lone perpetrator is constantly present in the work of law enforcement agencies and defense agencies. I will first review the conceptual background.

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Crime and Lone Offences

The term 'lone actor' has been used recently, for example, by Gill (2015) in his large-scale summary work, or in the latest Europol (2016) study. *'He commits attacks alone, is not affiliated with any organized terrorist organization or network, plans and carries out the modus operandi alone, without any direct external instruction or control.'* (Nijboer, 2012, 34.). Spaaij (2012) defines lone attackers as follows: '*terrorist attacks carried out by persons who (a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy*'. In this paper I am going to use Connor's (2015) definition, who added certain ideological connotations to Spaaij's definition. This is the stance accepted by most experts today. One can be an extremist, but such person is not necessarily a terrorist. In simple terms, extremism can be defined as a process of accepting an extremist ideology aiming to change the social system (Kis-Benedek, 2016). The terminology is defined by Johanna Farkas, who also elaborates on the difficulties of the definition. The definition of the phenomenon of terrorism is essentially problematic, no scientific consensus regarding this terminology has been made so far (Spaaji, 2012, 856.). This problem is also associated with the definition of lone attackers. Many people, for example, confuse lone attackers with jihadist attackers. In other words, the English term 'lone attacker' implies a sense of diversion that is further deflected in the world of terminology, because governments, private organizations, the media and researchers all have their own interpretation of the term and use different terminologies (Feldman, 2013, 1–17.). In Joosse's (2007) sociological approach, leaderless resistance is a particular strategy of a right-wing extremist resistance carried out through the acts of individuals or smaller groups, where such acts are clearly politically motivated. The term is associated with Louis Beam, an American neo-Nazi leader, who called on his followers in an essay published in 1992. In case their leaders are taken into custody, they should abandon the traditional, pyramid schemed organization structure, and carry out attacks in small groups or alone against the government and its representatives (Beam, 1992). The most commonly used term is 'lone wolf terrorism' (Dickinson, 2015). A synonym for this term is 'solo-actor terrorism', used by, for example, the Center for Terror Analysis (2011). Accordingly, a lone attacker is a person who commits an act of violence alone, motivated by an ideology (political or religious), or by an individual goal, without external support, i.e. without the support of organized terrorist organizations or global networks (Connor & Flynn, 2015, 9.).

According to a common theory of lone-actor offences, there are four types of attackers

The creation of this typification is attributed to Pantucci (2011). Loner – This type is not linked to any extremist organization but legitimizes his conduct with extremist ideology when planning and carrying out the act. Loners are usually passive observers of the networking activities and propaganda materials of the group they sympathize with, but do not contact any of the members. In the case of this type, genuine commitment to extremist ideologies is hard to establish, because underlying psychological or social problems (e.g. poverty, solitude) are (very) common. Radicalization and planning plots also serve to cover up such circumstances. Experiences show that these people openly proclaim their ideas, even their intention to attack, therefore can be easily noticed by authorities. However, mainly due to the likelihood of one having some kind of mental illness, it is difficult to estimate the probability of such planned attacks.

Lone wolf pack –A term meaning a loose organization of lone wolves. People of this type operate in small groups and share extremist views of larger organizations, but they do not form part any of those. Members of such groups usually connect to carry out acts of terrorism together, thus their cooperation is not long-term. Several indications suggest that members communicate with other organizations but similarly to the previous type they reach out to each other on the Internet, too.

Lone attacker – Attackers who carry out attacks alone but are prepared to enjoy the physical and financial support of a larger terrorist organization. Weapons, money, and instructions (e.g. choice of location) for the attack are usually provided by the leader of the given organization.

Lone wolf – Lone wolves carry out acts of terrorism alone, without any visible external influence but their link to at least one radical group can be evidenced. They primarily contact terrorist organizations or other lone offenders on the internet. Usually, no information is available on the personal relations of a lone wolf, or whether they participate in any training or terrorist boot camps. Generally terrorist acts committed by lone wolves are backed by an extremist organization, influencing the given person by exhortation or possibly by indirect control. According to the most common theory of modelling terrorist acts committed by lone offenders, four dimensions characterize this method of attack: the extent of radicalization, motivation, execution, and risk awareness (Bates, 2012).

The Theory of Deterrence

In order to understand the theory of deterrence, we have to go back to the theorem in which it was born. This is how Andrea Borbíró puts it: '*The classic paradigm is based on the theorem of free will. It regards man as a rational and freely acting individual whose behaviour and decisions are only influenced by its own best interest. According to the classic paradigm, criminality does not have a peculiar reason for that matter, in excess of the individuals' decision to commit crimes by following their interest, because this is good for them for some reason, and it is worth it (this is why the theories in criminology belonging to this category are called decision theories or intention theories)*' (Borbíró et al., 2017, 36.). The inevitability of punishment gives its deterring effect. These principles are laid out in Cesare Beccaria's work On Crimes and Punishment (Beccaria, 2012). This was the formation of the so-called classic paradigm. This criminal policy had been neglected for a long time, and then from the 1970s on, it gradually came into view once again after the crisis and crash of welfare states. This is what we call the turning point of the neoclassical criminal policy, that dates back to 1984. The order-making or order-maintaining state appeared, and deterrence also came into focus once again at that time from a dogmatical point of view. It is typically referred to in pair with the concept of neutralization, i.e. the neutralization of the person or the act. The question arises as to what deterrence itself it is based on. The sudden change of the extent of a phenomenon, such as criminality, with which the number of investigations cannot keep pace. In Hungary, the number of registered criminal acts quadrupled between 1985 and 1992, and the socio-economic changes also transformed the causal processes substantially. Criminologist András Szabó wrote about this in his book Fairly or smartly? in 1992, in which the fifth chapter is dedicated to a thorough analysis of deterrence. Szabó deducted the theory of deterrence consisting of the following parts: Threat - Carrying out the threat - Option and responsibility - Balance of advantages and disadvantages - Certainty and rigor (inevitability) (Szabó, 1993, 99-100.). Every punishment has a general and special deterrent impact. Here, the recipients of the general punishment are the potential criminal offenders. The special punishment affects the person already punished. Szabó's interpretation shows clearly that the number of police officers and the number of investigations cannot keep pace with the increase of the number of registered offenses, however society's expectations put great pressure on law enforcement bodies. This means that the state's urge to act appears, which paves the way for a paradigm shift. This is the most important amongst the features of deterrence: offense-based punishment, which is also prorated to the offense at the same time. Crime and punishment.

It does not take into consideration the psychological, sociological or cultural aspects of the criminal offense. It can certainly be applied quite well to the management of suddenly increasing phenomena, such as criminality or migration. It provides general prevention; it is applicable to everyone in the same way, it is fast, and it results in a visible output. It is relatively inexpensive, as it does not require in-depth organizational development, only a one-time technical investment is needed. It has some dissuasive force from the perspective of criminal law, and it has a crime preventing impact, although not in the sense of the classic three-way split of crime prevention. The most popular form of deterrence is detention. '*Detentions reduce criminality as they represent the direct and instant efficiency of investigations or social reactions*' (Szabó, 1993, 98-125.). The question arises whether migration should be interpreted as a criminal act or migrants should be regarded as criminals.

Among means of deterrence, punishment based on acts – which is proportionate to the acts – is the most important one. Crime and punishment. It ignores the psychological, sociological and cultural circumstances of both the offender and the offence. Clearly it is effective in handling a surge in crime or migration, for example. It provides for general prevention, is universally applicable to all, and produces rapid and visible results. It is relatively cheap, as it does not require any significant organizational development, only a one-off technical investment. In terms of criminal law, it ensures a certain level of deterrence and crime prevention, but not in the sense of classic threefold crime prevention. The most common form of deterrence is detainment. *'The number of detainments decreases crime, because it shows direct and immediate crime solving results or social response'* (Szabó, 1993, 98-125.). In the theory of deterrence, the act of crime is punished. The (neo)classic paradigm, however, no longer only punishes the act, but with the development of technical and environmental tools and methods, it makes committing the crime more difficult or prevents it. This is called environmental criminology or situational crime prevention. The theory was developed by the American criminologist Ronald W. Clarke. Many scientists in the field of criminology, including Clarke, do not consider this to be criminology or science, as it does not analyze the causal links of crime or provides any explanation of these. He considers it as a mere set of technical solutions.

Interpretation of Profiling

According to a study of the University of Maryland, (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009, 1-44.) psychological analyses are applied on three levels in combating terrorism:

Organizational-level. 1. analyses focused on training; 2. logistical and financial characteristics that indicate future acts of terrorism. These include strategic and tactical briefings, the setting of goals, decision-making methods, tools of deterrence and methods of planning and carrying out attacks. Organization-level analyses also identify group hierarchy and political goals. These results help in determining terrorist groups' means of attack and possible targets to enable authorities to take the appropriate security measures. Group-level analyses focus research on social influence aimed at the recruitment of new members, the spread of terrorist ideologies and means of education under such, and language reinforcing the legitimacy of terrorist norms. Social-psychological findings pertaining to the topic demonstrate the group dynamics and the characteristics of interactions between the individual and the group in the profile of terrorist organizations. In the analysis of individual characteristics, researchers aim to identify personality or psychopathological traits associated with the expression of terrorist behavior. As noted in the first chapter, certain personal traits and social circumstances determine why some people become terrorists; mental and personality disorders, unfavorable social, economic and political circumstances will jointly increase the influence of terrorist groups over both individuals and society. The profiling of underlying motivation, a propensity to susceptibility and the general psychological profile of a terrorist may support counter-intelligence in the detection of individuals who may be members of terrorist groups or may be plotting an attack. Creation of a profile also plays an important role in the preparation of deradicalization plans.

Identification of Lone Offenders

The problem is that the penal system aims to cover the widest spectrum possible, allowing individual perpetrators to remain invisible. This may be inferred from the concept that punishment should be inevitable. This will not deter lone offenders, radicalized ones or those motivated in any other way, to commit crimes. They do not want to get away with crime, nor do they want to escape. Their only goal is to carry on causing as many damage as possible. For the time being the (neo)classic criminal policy – based on the principle of crime and punishment – serves as the basis for crime prevention and is correlated with the above noted theory of deterrence. Below I provide an interpretation of the theory with a focus on the lone offender: Threat: the perpetrator is completely indifferent to it. Fulfilling the threat: he does not fear punishment because he will no longer be alive, or will commit suicide, or he will be taken care by the police. Choice

and responsibility: to consider and plan his act sufficiently. The responsibility always falls on others. On the government, the society, and the victims. Balance of advantages and disadvantages: this is a crucial factor. The goal is to cause as much destruction as possible in the shortest time possible. Certainty and stringency. (inevitability): unfortunately, the attacker is completely unaffected. The lone offender's only concern is to be found early and prevented from committing his act. All punishments have a general and a specific deterring effect. In this case general punishment is aimed at potential future offenders, who are in fact not even offenders in a classic sense. No information is available as to the number of prevented acts of terrorism, therefore deterrence in this sense is ineffective. We do not know how many potential lone offenders are found before committing any crimes. The media cover successful or attempted attacks. Such coverage tends to harden potential future lone offenders in their conviction that they would be much better in executing crimes. Specific punishment is aimed at already punished people, who are unconcerned, or punishment is not enforced. In other words, the above noted theory of crime and punishment is compromised, not to mention the pain caused to victims, the victims' families and the whole of society. The victims are not provided any explanation or compensation. Perpetrators often leave a manifesto behind, in which they explain their actions. Only victims will never get an answer to the question: why me? Thus, there are two reasons why prevention does not work. The first reason: it was not envisaged for such type of crime. The second reason: the offender's personality is unique to the extent that it remains invisible and undetectable under the radar.

Predictive Analytics as a Method

Predictive analytics is a complex procedure in which we identify already known results based on known factors and yet to be identified other results based on such factors. It involves the prediction (modelling) of expected future behavior using the largest amount of past data possible. It is the sum of mathematical, statistical, and econometric methods that identify correlations within databases and help us to make better decisions. Data mining and big data are often associated with predictive analytics. Predictive analytics (or forecasting) is a method of data science. Essentially, we estimate the probability of, or predict future behavior under the given circumstances on the basis of data categorized according to special characteristics and past behavior (Tessényi & Kazár, 2012, 7-8, 77-695.).

Defined Two Components of Predictive Analytics

Empirical predictive models (statistical models and other methods, such as data mining algorithms) that base forecasts on observations, evaluation of the methods, the model's predictive power, i.e. predictive accuracy are most often used. Only models with the ability to allow also the interpretation of the 'new' in time – i.e. at a future point of observations in time – can generate accurate forecasts (Shmueli & Koppius, 2010). Key behavioral characteristics that determine the probability of a given conversion are called predictors. Predictors can be for example, times, durations, locations etc. The more predictors are available, the more accurate the predictive analysis will be. To enhance success, predictors must be combined within a given model, for example, physical proximity can be a predictor. In practice, three types of models support predictive analysis.

Descriptive model

This is the predictive analytics model most commonly used in business. Essentially, our customers and products are classified (described – hence the model's name) by way of data analytics. Unlike the predictive model, the element is not analyzed according to aspects of a single event (consequence or conversion) but is classified on the basis of several aspects and correlations.

Predictive model

Probability of a future event is determined by analysis of data from the past. The predictive model is used when we want to determine the probability of a given consequence for an element with one or more known characteristics. The method essentially involves the consideration of the behavior of an element with known characteristics under the given circumstances and establishing the probability of the behavior of a different element with similar characteristics under similar but yet unknown circumstances.

Prescriptive model (or decision model)

This model serves forecasting of the expected results of given decisions, i.e. it analyzes all possible outcomes of the given decisions and their probability in consideration of different factors. It gives us the option to analyze and optimize changes in outcomes by changing different factors (e.g. before a business expansion, it helps estimate the rise and fall in demand for different products).

The model's second name suggests that it commonly serves a setup of decision mechanisms and sets of rules. The starting point is the definition of the lone attacker: *'He commits attacks alone, is not affiliated with any organized terrorist organization or network, plans and carries out the modus operandi alone, without any direct external instruction or control.'*(Nijboer et al. 2012). The emphasis is on predictors, i.e. he acts alone and plans his activities without external influence. Examination of these two factors with a statistical method; with the technique based on statistical data it has become possible to use the tools of psychology to identify potentially dangerous groups and lone offenders based on activities taking place in virtual space (Szijártó, 2014, 19.). The method of predictive analytics to the direction of the filter, i.e. potentially dangerous individuals (Tessényi & Kazár, 2012, 7-8, 677-695.). The results of the analysis are predictions, the method will yield the identity of perpetrators of probable acts of terrorism, i.e. the psychological traits of perpetrators of planned acts, committed alone, without external influence. Based on the risk assessment, the final assessment must be carried out by a group of experts. Criminal acts can be compared to unexpected lightning strikes. This raises the question of whether lightning strikes can be predicted or not. The answer is yes, they can be predicted and human behavior is also predictable. Long, calm periods are interrupted by such flashes (Barabási, 2010). (Flashes are sudden, unexpected acts or events of extraordinary importance exceeding the average level of ordinary life situations.) Human behavior is unpredictable and random. But if it is random, it is also predictable (Barabási, 2010). The filtering of large samples of data is possible by summarising the above theories and converting the sociological, psychological, and criminal characteristics of perpetrators of past attacks into algorithms. This is possible only if the potential attacker has a so-called virtual footprint. If this is not the case, the responsibility to detect potential lone offenders falls on actors of the above noted threefold crime prevention system. Flashes, i.e. acts violating norms, can occur in both cases, but their prevention requires different capabilities. In the first case, filtering is performed in virtual space; in the second case, detection is up to the human factors of the system. People without a virtual footprint can be filtered as well, because together with other factors, this may suggest a potential offender. Of course, potential violations of norms should be ranked; more serious ones require immediate action, while monitoring may suffice for less serious ones. The assumption of the predictability of human behavior needs clarification. Predictive forecasting is not always possible because human actions are influenced by external and internal factors, with a pronounced effect of momentary psychological, emotional, and mental states. In some cases, under certain circumstances the potential future

actions of individuals may be predicted on the basis of their attitudes and relationships to these, and in similar other cases prediction is not possible.

Use of Predictive Profiling for Identification Purposes

While profiling basically supports the identification of unidentified perpetrators of crimes already committed, the predictive profiling of lone offenders attempts to provide points of reference suitable for the identification of possible future offenders based on their personality traits, detecting potential radicalized lone offenders, by summarizing the individual psychological, sociological, anthropological and criminological traits of perpetrators of crimes or acts of terrorism already committed. It is important to note that such screening will not work without a warning system at national level, where teachers, family care staff, probation officers, policemen, school psychologists, youth mentors active on the appropriate levels can assess possible future attackers based on provided criteria. Subsequent steps are determined by the extent of deviance and the analysis of their behavior. The life of a merely rebellious or deviant person, however, should not be ruined. The presumption of innocence must be observed under these circumstances as well. In addition to identification, profiling can support the creation of a proactive strategy. If experts, namely, have sufficient information on the type of criminal behavior associated with the given personality type, they can screen potentially dangerous individuals in advance (Beauregard, 2007, 16-17.) Lívia Szíjártó observed the following: '*Preventive measures can also be supported by victimology, as the examination of the probability of becoming a victim may help build a better security system*.' (Szijártó, 2019, 97.). The targets of aggression and the underlying motivation is completely irrelevant. Prevention is in everybody's interest. Security is a common cause and a common system or product. Also, artificial intelligence is the way of the future, as it supports the filtering of large samples of data, relieving the workload of staff. Intentional recognition of artificial intelligence replaces human work, but humans have the last word: artificial intelligence cannot substitute human expertise and empathy.

The Theory of Deterrence and Migration

In the theory of deterrence, crime is punished; however, the (neo)classical paradigm not only punishes the crime, but also prevents or makes committing the

crime more difficult with the development of technical and environmental means. This is called environmental criminology or situational crime prevention. The theory was elaborated by the American criminologist Ronald W. Clarke (Clarke, 1983, 225-256.). It is not regarded as criminology or as a science by many in the academic world of criminology, including Clarke himself, as it does not examine and does not explain the causal links of criminality; it is considered only as a totality of technical solutions. The principle manifests itself clearly in the operation of the temporary technical border barrier as a means of safety technology and the reinforced legal border barrier. In my opinion, citizens' sense of safety has been greatly increased by the construction of the fence itself. It is important to state once again that a migrant is not a criminal, and so they should not be stigmatized as such. Being a migrant is closer to the status of a victim, as anyone leaving their home for the sake of finding a better place to live or in order to escape persecution is a victim, in whichever way one looks at it. As I have already mentioned before, my notion of migrants includes both legal and non-legal categories. It is important to establish that the phenomenon of migration and the intention of migrants, i.e. immigration, is different from the behavior of criminals (escaping the crime scene).

A Prevention Model for Lone Offenders

First, I place the phenomenon in a triple system of crime prevention and then list the possible predictors with a focus on individual characteristics. The Triple Crime Prevention System: Primary Prevention Society-Wide Prevention (Social Policy) is what I am willing to use. This is an appropriate level of integration of people with an immigrant background and second-generation immigrants into society. This housing is the education of health in the labor market situation and socio-cultural foundations. Place for family communities and school. Overall, the right social policy. Integration is a two-way act because society must also make the host environment suitable for integration, otherwise the resistance of the host and immigrant side can lead to serious conflicts. This is the broadest spectrum of prevention levels. Therefore, it is the most difficult and important to conduct individualized procedures. At this level, the most important thing is screening based on the behavioral and personality traits that can predict the development of a later lonely offender attitude. Secondary prevention of vulnerable groups and individuals (migrants). The secondary level is already capable of identifying the narrower, mainly vulnerable individuals or individuals who pose a threat to society and of taking appropriate preventive

measures. The individual is already developing tension here because of his situation and at the same time aggression is appearing. Offenses come to the surface and become more serious in the event of a lack of control. Prevention is at the level of the signaling system such as family protection, youth protection and crime prevention. Place of school and society. The potential lone perpetrator comes to the attention of the authorities at this level. Government organizations can decide at this level what kind of action(s) they are willing to take. Tertiary prevention is the prevention of criminalization (criminal justice). This is not part of the study as the potential lone offender has already come into the hands of the authorities. Criminology examines the background of a criminal career. Crimes committed by an individual predict future criminal activity. Screening these people with an immigrant background is important to prevent the future possibility of loneliness. Developmental criminology is a tool of prison criminology and prison psychology that helps in early detection and early reintegration. In the following, I examine the lone perpetrator who is the subject of the study, for whom no antecedents indicate the occurrence of a crime or a terrorist offense. Neither his circumstances nor his individual characteristics at first glance suggest aggression, extreme behavior, or deviance. Forensic profiling and predictive analytics, I put all this in context with the help of predictors, focusing on the possible prevention of dangerous acts that occur as a result of migration. The concept of the lone assassin is the starting point. The assassination is carried out alone, it is not affiliated with an organized terrorist organization or network, the modus operandi is designed and carried out by itself, without any direct external instructions or directions. Highlighting the predictors, that is alone designed without external influence. Examining this triplet by the method of statistics. The essence of the technique based on statistical data is that the tools of psychology made it possible to identify potentially dangerous groups and lonely offenders on the basis of activities in cyberspace. Assigning the method of predictive analysis to the direction of screening, i.e. the individuals who pose a potential hazard. Predictive analysis (less commonly: forecasting) is a method of data science. The essence is that by classifying our data into categories based on special characteristics, based on past behavior, we are likely (predictive - hence the predictive name) to behave in a given situation. The method reveals the identity of the perpetrators of foreseeable terrorist acts. The final study should be performed by a team of experts based on a risk analysis. Lightning from a clear sky is as a criminal or terrorist act takes place. The question arises as to whether lightning deception can be predicted. The answer is yes. So is human behavior. The long dormant period is interrupted by flashes. Flashes are nothing more than unexpected occurrences of events or

events of several times above the average level in a normal life situation. Human behavior is unpredictable and random. However, if it is random then it can be calculated. From the summary of the above concepts and by transforming the sociological, psychological and forensic characteristics of the perpetrators of the solitary attacks that have already taken place into an algorithm, it is possible to perform a large-sample screening. This is true if the potential individual has a so-called virtual footprint. If this is not the case, then actors in the triple system of crime prevention already presented have a responsibility to identify potential lone perpetrators. Flashes can occur in both cases, only their prevention requires other abilities. In the first, the filtering takes place in the virtual space, in the second, the recognition depends on the human factors of the system. It is also possible to filter out who does not have a virtual footprint, because along with the presence of other characteristics, this may indicate a potential offending individual. Of course, among the possible violations of the norms, the more serious ones require an immediate procedure, while the lighter ones require a more preventive, observational procedure. The predictable statement of human behavior needs to be clarified. Predictive prediction is not always possible because human actions are influenced by external and internal influences and are strongly influenced by the current psychological, emotional, and mental state. In some situations, in relation to certain phenomena, the possible future actions of the individual can be predicted on the basis of the attitude towards them. Such is the phenomenon of migration, it evokes emotions, is sensitive and its judgment is very extreme. It has well-grasped characteristics, so the predictors are well defined. Several predictors in the study have been part of some kind of migration, however not all of them are represented. The phenomenon of integration is the most typical and well-known. The so-called integration paradox is related to this as well, which means that as integration into the host society is completed, the immigrant will turn away from the host country and instead of decrease, the willingness of aggressive perpetrators will also begin to grow. The phenomenon has also been examined in three different predictors; in relation with the increase in length of stay in the host country, in relation to second- and third-generation immigrants, and through the analysis of the effects of assimilation differences between parents and children. The general trend shows that: 1. the longer an immigrant stays in the host country, the more likely they are commit aggressive acts; 2. second- and third-generation immigrants commit more aggressive acts than first-generation immigrants; 3. socially well-integrated young people (whether they are first- or second-generation immigrants) are more likely to commit aggressive acts if their parents are less well integrated than young people with similar parents but

w   h   o
themselves are not well integrated into an inclusive society. Integration in this sense turns into assimilation. In József Haller's summary the phenomenon is: *'the more complete the integration of an immigrant is, the greater risk do they mean for the host country.'* Integration prediction can be used well in the preventive profiling of people with an immigrant background. The same predictors also appear on the side of the recipients where the so-called integration rejection appears. Time and number of arrivals are also typical predictions. A lone perpetrator who appears as a result of migration appears on both the immigrant and the receiving side at the same time. It is worth examining the two sets of predictors together and comparing their strength with a comparative method.

Conclusion

Lone offences are also becoming more common across Europe among people with an immigrant background. Coverage of the phenomenon in western and Hungarian media, however, stirs strong emotions, shifting focus on the issue of prevention. As shown above, criminal politics help us to understand the multi-faceted features. Nevertheless, criminal policy does not offer any solution either for the identification of lone offenders or for the prevention of lone-actor offences. The method of predictive profiling and predictive analytics offers a solution. Predictors noted in the study can be anything – causes such as fear, the feeling of social exclusion, rage, resentment, belonging to the majority or to the minority. For me, a key fundament of predictive profiling is the identification and the analysis of identity because traditional prevention methods – owing to their general applicability – are ineffective in relation with this modus operandi. The focus of attention should be shifted to unique features, involving competent experts and the setting up of a prediction system. Predictive profiling, as a method, is one of many alternatives. It may be effective precisely because of the unique nature of such crime. Law enforcement organizations need to manage their resources. They can be supported with predictive analytics, which replaces humans in the processing of large amounts of data, creating a basis for the focused analysis of the targeted person or phenomenon. The next step of predictive analytics will be the use of artificial intelligences in law enforcement and crime prevention. However, the final decision should always be made by competent humans. It is very difficult to identify a lone perpetrator and prevent an act because motivations and goals vary from individual to individual. Lone perpetrators with an immigrant background commit the act primarily for

religious reasons. This religious reason may be the basis for prevention as the range of sub-perpetrators can be well defined, and in our case of prevention the predictive analytical model can thus be well focused.

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Reference of the article according to APA regulation

Erzsébet Tőzsér

A Survey of the Organizational Situation of New Generations at a County Police Headquarters in Hungary

Abstract

Our organization is also affected by problems arising from the increasing presence of new generations in the labour market, such as differences in values, conflict situations and succession related difficulties. Therefore, a survey on the situation of new generations was carried out at the county police headquarters in the summer of 2020 (Tőzsér, 2020a). As part of this, an online questionnaire was conducted with the command staff (73 people) and the age group born from (after) 1 January 1990 (60 people). Both questionnaires included a structured interview part, but we also obtained quantifiable data - by evaluating 10 values from two perspectives. The results confirmed that there are large differences in terms of the perspective of the representatives of the older and younger generations. Young people are willing to meet only purposeful expectations that can be interpreted by them, and their loyalty is limited and based on reciprocity. Commander expectations for certain parameters, such as load capacity (resilience), may not prevail because they are not as important to young people. At the same time, leaders see the fast, efficient, and open-minded thinking of young people as an advantage. Overall, the study confirms the presence of a constant dynamic need for modernization within the organization.

Keywords: police, generation, organizational psychology, organizational development

Introduction

Representatives of Generation Z have appeared on the labour market alongside Generation Y and are gaining more and more ground. The differences between

these generations compared to their predecessors may not only be obvious to the average observer, but they also differ from previous generations based on sociological and psychological literature (Meretei, 2017). It is worth reviewing the characteristics of the new generations (Y and Z), as there are more and more of them in our organization as well (Tegyey, 2019). By Generation Y, we mean the generation born between 1980 and 1995 who are considered the first digital native age group because the computer appeared in their childhood, so its use is natural for them (Tari, 2010). Representatives of Generation Y born after 1990 are very similar in their values and characteristics to the representatives of Generation Z, therefore the literature recommends the name of Generation YZ (Steigervald, 2020).

Generation Z is the age group of those born between 1995 and 2010 who are already true digital natives (Prensky, 2001) since they were born into the world of the Internet. For them, technical devices are an essential part of their everyday life (Tari, 2011). The frontal method of education and Prussian leadership are not understood by them. Their way of thinking is strongly visual, and they are experience-seekers, but at the same time they are characterized by avoidance of failure (Steigervald, 2020). The conflict of young and old people in society has been present in civilization from the beginning, but the differences between the new generations (YZ and Z) and the older generations have never been so conspicuous and tense (Bencsik, Horváth-Csikós, & Juhász, 2016). Technological development and the acceleration of life have led to the intensification of differences, the separation of values and the sharpening of differences (Tőzsér, 2020b). Young people no longer want to continue the lifestyle that their parents and grandparents did, such as to do their job as a duty above everything else. They change jobs at any time if that job does not meet their needs. Everyone evaluates the behaviour of the other generation through the glasses of their own generation's values, so we sometimes judge young people along values which are irrelevant to them. Young people are also reluctant to deal with what older people would expect of them, and do not even want to adapt to expectations that are uninteresting to them, they rather prefer change as a solution (Steigervald, 2020).

Thus, it seems clear that conflicts arising from intergenerational differences in values can also be perceived within the organization of the police, which can also have an impact on the functioning of the organization. Therefore, we tried to map the thinking of the young executive and command staff with the following questions:

• How can young people integrate into the hierarchical organization of the police?

- How well the representatives of the new generation succeed? (according to their commanders and their own opinion)
- What tools can we have to increase and improve integration and proficiency? (educational, institutional, organizational)

Methodology

After interviewing a few managers, we decided to take an online questionnaire survey, also taking into account the pandemic situation. During the study, we planned to fill in two online questionnaires, one for the command staff, in order to get a picture of the organizational integration and 'success' of the new generation through the eyes of their leaders. The other online questionnaire was for the organizational representatives of Generations YZ and Z, i.e., those who were born from 1 January 1990. Google's free GoogleForms questionnaire module provided the technical background for the study.

Questionnaire 1 - Commanders Questionnaire

The questionnaire for the command staff consisted of three parts. In the first part, we asked 10 questions requiring text answers about their young colleagues born from 1 January 1990. Then, ten properties (accuracy, confidence, discipline, flexibility, camaraderie, reasonableness, loadability, patience, independence, responsibility) were evaluated as two types of statements using a 7-point Likert scale. The first statement states for each property that it is necessary for the police officer, and the second states that the particular property characterizes well the members of the new generation (born from 1990).

Questionnaire 2 - Questionnaire of Generations YZ and Z

The questionnaire to be completed by Generations YZ and Z consisted of three parts. In this case, we asked 15 questions requiring text answers to young colleagues born from 1 January 1990, about their studies and organizational experience, vision, and suggestions. We asked them to indicate which law enforcement degree they have (secondary or higher), whether they are civilians, so that we can group their answers based on this. Then, the ten properties included in the commander questionnaire evaluated as two types of statements using a 7-point Likert scale. For each property, the first statement says that the particular property is necessary for a police officer and the second statement says that

the particular property is important to the respondent. In both questionnaires, other data were included, such as age, field of expertise, etc., however, due to the length of the study, the study cannot cover them in detail, so we only use them to characterize the sample population.

The Study

Completion data of the questionnaire for the command staff

According to position, group leaders, heads of sub-department, heads of department, head officials, heads of police station, heads of service, or directors were all included in the group of commanders. In the one-month time interval, a total of 73 people completed the questionnaire, which is almost half of the requested commanders (sent to 152 email addresses).

The distribution of areas of expertise among the respondents is shown in the diagram below; 44% representing the law enforcement line, 30% representing the criminal specialization and 26% representing other).

Figure 1: *Areas of expertise of the responding commanders*

Criminal:	22	30%
Law enforcement:	32	44%
Other:	19	26%

Note. Created by the author.

The dates of birth of the commanders were also indicated in five-year time intervals, and a comparison was made based on the responses of the groups in the following breakdown. It is clear that more than half of the respondents, 55%,

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are commanders born in the 1970s. So, there is clearly an X-generation pre-dominance of the responding commanders.

Figure 2: *Age distribution of the responding commanders*

🔴 1980-1994:	18	25%
🔵 1970-1979:	40	55%
🟢 1960-1969:	15	20%

Note. Created by the author.

Completion data of the questionnaire for the generations YZ and Z

In the county, at the time of the investigation, 149 people have been born since 1 January 1990, and 114 of them are professionals (police officers). During the one month of the questionnaire completion period, a total of 60 people completed the questionnaire, which represents a completion rate of approx. 40%.

	Secondary law enforcement	Higher education law enforcement	Civic education	
1990-1994	23	6	5	34
1995-1999	15	7	3	25
2000-2004	1	0	0	1
	39	13	8	60

56% of respondents were born between 1990 and 1994, while 42% were born between 1995 and 1999, and only 2% were born after 1999.

Figure 3: *Age distribution of responding young people*

● 1990-1994:	24	56%
● 1995-1999:	25	42%
● 2000-200:	1	2%

Note. Created by the author.

The distribution among the specialties is the following: criminal 30%, law enforcement 53% and other 17%.

Figure 4: *Areas of expertise of the responding young people*

● Criminal:	18	30%
● Law enforcement:	32	53%
● Other:	10	17%

Note. Created by the author.

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Criminal: 18 30%
Law enforcement: 32 53%
Other: 10 17%

Note. Created by the author.

65% of the respondents have a secondary degree in law enforcement, 22% of the respondents have a higher education law enforcement degree, while 13% of the respondents were not police officers.

Results of the questionnaire of the command staff and their interpretation

We can see in the chart below that among the 10 properties, the command staff considered flexibility to be the least necessary, when they had to judge their need for a police officer (blue) - although the average scores varied within the range of 6.18 to 6.75 - while discipline, camaraderie, and responsibility were considered most important. When the command staff had to evaluate the 10 properties (red) as a characteristic of the new generation, averages between 4 and 5.5 were obtained with a larger standard deviation. According to their view, self-confidence, flexibility, and reasonableness are most characteristic of young people. And they are least characterized by responsibility, discipline, and patience.

Figure 6: *Average response values of commanders*

Note. Created by the author.

Comparing the average of the two responses, we can see that there is a big difference between what commanders expect from a police officer and how they see young people.

Figure 7: *Differences between commanders' average response values*

Note. Created by the author.

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
Thus, the biggest differences are experienced by leaders in terms of responsibility, discipline and loadability compared to the requirements they set. Interestingly, however, even in terms of flexibility, young people are lagging behind with almost one integer compared to their expectations. So, it is clear that there is a negative discrepancy between the values expected of police officers and the characteristics of young people, a pattern that applies to all properties in terms of commanders' responses.

Text responses of commanders and their interpretation

The commander's textual responses show well that they consider young people *ambivalent*. After all, openness and modernity are classified as benefits for young people, but at the same time they are described as impatient, easily distracted, and absentminded, and considered less loadable. However, most commanders also see that these generational differences are a complex social phenomenon, and that the organization does not offer ready-made solutions to deal with the situation, it still needs to be adapted to new or slightly different needs. There is also an ambivalent picture of young people's work attitudes based on command staff responses, as many of them have written about more reasonable, more flexible and faster problem-solving, but at the same time about the lack of perseverance and commitment. According to them, the difference of the new generation in the attitude at work can be well seen in their actions. The kind of willingness to comply that has resulted in uncritical loyalty among older generations does not characterize them. This is almost completely absent from most members of Generation Z or cannot be present with the same intensity as in case of previous generations. Many commanders have described that young people have an attitude of 'shifting towards weaker resistance', the process of which may be worth examining in the organisation. My hypothesis is that the advantage of the new generations is that, due to the accelerated development of information technology, they come to the organization with a 'system-recognizing' or 'pattern-recognizing' competence, which enables a much faster recognition and transparency of organizational processes and even 'utilization'. It can also be felt that most of them do not intend to get to know the organization in depth and detail, but they rather collect only the information that is important to them. Immediate feedback is also used for this purpose, in order to provide information and orientation in the given circumstances. On the other hand, the hierarchical and bureaucratic system gives them the experience of consequencelessness, since many times the given mistake or mission is so far in time from the consequence that they are not connected to them, and so can seem to be no connection between the two. (This is also true in positive cases,

as rewarding or promoting is also extremely bureaucratic and slow in our organization.) This violates the sense of justice for conscientious people, destroys their work ethic, while it can strengthen the choice of easier paths and work avoidance for the extremely 'ingenious' (and less inhibited) ones.

Commanders see that young people are following more democratic communication, authoritarian communications are not working for them, they need arguments, reasonableness to understand. They require constant feedback, so they can adjust accordingly. This, in turn, can be burdensome for the environment and can sometimes portray them as less independent. An important part of young people's communication is bidirectionality, reciprocity - not only do they need feedback, but they have questions and/or opinions on most things, which they are happy to share with the stakeholder if there is a relationship of trust or a need and curiosity to do so. The picture of young people's expectations and goals is also ambivalent, as they are seen as drifting, dreamy and consciously planning and self-assertive at the same time. There may be large individual differences, and the current organizational situation does not support the long-term planning of the younger generation within the organization. Commanders repeatedly mention the utilitarian approach of the younger ones, which means that they are dissatisfied with the energy and time they invest to achieve a particular goal - such as a higher position, more salary, more experience, expertise and so on. Probably this is also due to the kind of change in which our world has transformed, as we have become more comfortable, we are getting further with less energy, since smart solutions are like that. This may be reflected in the way young people think. Commanders believe that young people's expectations of the organization are realistic, but nonetheless may be unattainable under the current career model and pay conditions. So, there is a mismatch between expectations and the framework provided by the organization, this urges organizational renewal. Commanders see that young people do not really want to live up to unreasonable expectations. According to the commanders, when individual interests conflict with the interests of the community, young people show less humility and self-sacrifice. Respectively, they experience issues in problem solving and independent work among young people. An alternative explanation for the phenomena experienced may be that young people, socializing in the new 'smart world', do not know what to do with certain organizational characteristics that make it difficult to carry out their work efficiently. To illustrate the irrationalities of bureaucracy in the organisations, they say the following proverb: '*We pick up and carry the sphere. We roll the cube. But only until its edges wear off, then we pick it up and carry it!'*. Workers in the organization often struggle with these types of anomalies in bureaucracy during their day-to-day work and they develop strategies for these situations to get their

work done. But the representatives of the new generation can no longer interpret this workplace dynamics, since in a 'smart world' the shortest path between two points is straight, and it cannot be rewritten for them by any internal regulations or customary law. So, as we can read in the commanders' responses, it is worth thinking that they may be right about this, and that certain internal operations should be restructured, simplified, rationalized.

Commanders say their IT skills are much better, they can innovate the organization and at the same time they bring the need for modernization. They bring dynamics to the system that is prone to fossilization. The organizational retention of young people is, of course, primarily possible through settling the wages and financial benefits, as well as a predictable career path. The flexibility of the managerial attitude is also mentioned by several people, which can be manifested in the provision of benefits and works naturally and mutually. A lot of commanders also write about good community, good relationships and teams that are also essential to retaining the workforce. It is also important to develop a mission consciousness by emphasizing the common goal, raising awareness that their work contribute to the well-being of the community, to make the world a better place. Commanders also experience how important it is for young people to integrate well into the workplace community, to be useful members of the community, to look at them as partners, to be happy to work with them. And working together gives them the opportunity to gain experience, develop, and meet challenges. It was noted about the trainings that their most important expectation is to be practice oriented.

As we can see, the command staff is aware that the current situation requires adaptation, both from the organization and from them. We can say that all responding commanders are open to modernization, and that they not only passively expect it from the organization, but they also actively try to adapt their own behaviour in accordance with the new expectations.

Evaluation of questionnaire of the YZ and Z generations

When evaluating the 10 properties, we obtained the following averages regarding the opinion of young people for the '*… is required for a police officer*' statements (blue). It is clear that confidence, camaraderie, and responsibility are, in their view, the most necessary for a police officer, while flexibility and loadability are the least necessary. The personal importance of values (red) develops similarly, as camaraderie is followed by confidence, and then reasonableness gets on the podium. Flexibility and loadability are also considered as least important in this case.

Figure 8: *Average responses of young respondents*

Note. Created by the author.

It is worth comparing in which cases there are differences between the need for each property and the personal importance of that property, even if the young people's response averages, apart from a single case, are above 6 integers, which means that they do not show large differences. We can see that there is the biggest negative difference in terms of personal importance compared to the expected values of confidence, patience, and loadability. However, in the case of reasonableness (and flexibility), the judgment is reversed, its personal importance is given a higher value than is considered necessary for a police officer. Thus, it is worth thinking about whether we truly evaluate the representatives of the new generation along parameters that are important to them as well. In this case, for example, loadability seems to have lost the kind of significance it had 20-30 years earlier, as technology is evolving at a pace that makes our lives easier, we live in a 'smart world'. Thus, it is no longer certain today that load capacity is as important a criterion as it was for previous generations. Today, for example, to deliver a message to the other end of the world does not require endurance, tenacious walking, or above-average load-bearing capacity, but simply how to send our message, for which modern information technology that offers countless simple ways to do so. That is it, in this modern, globalized world, load tolerance was not necessary for new generations. Most of them were transported to school by their parents, they did not have to walk or travel by public transport.

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They have been looking for easier, smart solutions all their lives. In this world, bearing the load makes only sense for them when there is a challenge, and they want to prove this ability to themselves and/or their environment. Otherwise, if they do not have a specific purpose that is well understood by them, they will not tolerate it. Even when required by workplace factors (e.g., overtime due to staff shortages) because they believe that there should be a solution that handles the situation without compromising their interests.

Analysing the textual responses of generations YZ and Z

In terms of their career choice motivation, professionalism and willingness to help are typically dominant. The family example, or the appropriate role model as a motive, is also a common answer, just like the secure job. The variety of work and the fact that it is a challenge and an opportunity to prove also appears among many of them when choosing a career. Interestingly, early retirement was mentioned several times in the responses, and at the same time young people also complain about its abolition. The training period is mostly described as pleasant, positive, but most of the time it is because of the good company and a looser lifestyle compared to their current constraints. Training is often considered superficial or too theoretical. They want case presentations, interactive, situational tasks in education and training aimed at the practical application of the legislation. They want action tactical training, leadership training, and other practical trainings, even to help them how to use IT tools more effectively. In all cases, they lack the more practical knowledge, and they still want trainings, which provide knowledge that can be applied immediately (instantly) and develop their competencies (skills). In order to promote the career path among their contemporaries, they think it is essential to appear on social media. Almost all young people described that an increase in motivation for the career could be achieved by settling wages, especially non-commissioned officer wages, and everything else comes only after that. But administrative overload and the proliferation of bureaucracy were often mentioned in the responses too. Characterizing the Police as a workplace, most cited a secure income as an advantage, as they can expect their income to arrive every month. This was followed by responses to varied, exciting work, with many describing their love – their passion – for the profession. Many people value good company and atmosphere in their workplace community as an advantage. Many of them also see this job as an opportunity for development, which is also in a sense an opportunity for them to prove themselves. In terms of disadvantages, as expected, most mentioned salary, especially among the non-commissioned officer respondents. This was

followed by the responses about the unpredictability of working hours (overtime, stressful services), which make it difficult for them to have a balanced private life and family life. This was followed by the mention of organizational injustices, the obsolescence of the organization, the tension, burnout of colleagues and the administrative overload. The majority of responses to the development of the Police as a workplace included an increase in salaries. Modernization also appeared very often in the answers, including the material environment, tools, IT background, and the management attitude and organizational procedures (reduction and realization of administration). Here, too, some of them have raised the issue of restoring early retirement. For the most part, they find communication with them positive and they feel that the community in which they work is inclusive, while many of them describe that they had to work for the respect of their older co-workers. Overload is usually seen in the background of conflict situations and tensions. The answers to the question about the expectations of the organization show that here they experience a higher system of expectations, which is an opportunity for them to develop, in terms of independent work, responsibility and at the same time it is a great springboard to a well-paying, civic job or undertaking if they do not experience change. Young people have a basic need to develop, to expand their professional knowledge, to gain experience, but this is often hindered by the system itself. One such barrier is overload, which calls into question the effectiveness of any real training, because, as they write, after a while they were too tired to really profit from a training day.

   It would be worthwhile to exploit the self-education potential of young people, even by advertising online training opportunities and professional online competitions for them, which could provide them with development opportunities and challenges. Of course, the system could operate on a voluntary basis, so that the chances of completing the training should not depend on the current staffing situation of the group or the attitude of the leader. When asked about their plans, the answers again confront us with the impossible situation of non-commissioned officers, which makes it necessary to modernize their careers. At the same time, it can be seen that although they view their careers very consciously and self-assertively, they have a need for development, but understandably not with the waiting times that the career currently has.

Comparing the responses of commanders and young people

Both commanders and young people rated the 10 properties according how much they deemed it necessary for a police officer. Comparing the averages of the responses of the two groups, we can see that commanders in most cases

have higher expectations towards the imaginary police officer than young people. There is a difference in two properties - and the expectations of young people are higher than those of commanders – in patience and confidence. But we should also keep in mind that the response averages of both groups are above 6 integers, that is the differences are minimal, they are rather indicative only.

Figure 9: *Comparison of the responses of commanders and young people*

The … is required for a police officer.

	Commanders	Young respondents
Accuracy	6,68	6,55
Confidence	6,59	6,77
Discipline	6,75	6,42
Flexibility	6,18	6,17
Camaraderle	6,74	6,63
Reasonableness	6,60	6,42
Loadability	6,67	6,13
Patience	6,48	6,52
Independence	6,45	6,42
Responsibility	6,74	6,57

Note. Created by the author.

And regarding the values of loadability and discipline, we see the biggest difference between commander and youth responses. So again, it is worth thinking about how appropriate the selected parameters are. Are the properties of loadability or discipline still valid in this age? Or do these parameters represent organizational nostalgia? Maybe a young person who is confident, comradely (loyal to the goal and/or community) and takes responsibility, can be more successful and can live a more balanced life, even in our organization?

Summary

Overall, we can see that both commanders and young people want rationalization and modernization. Irrationalities are very badly tolerated by young people, as they have socialized in a changing world based on speed, efficiency (smart),

and it is not acceptable for them to have one thing to be manually administered in three places when it could be retrieved from an electronic system. So, rationalizing and modernizing the administration cannot be bypassed for the organization, if it wants to keep young people. In the field of vocational training, it must be borne in mind that they want practical, personalized training that provides them with knowledge that can be applied well and immediately in their everyday lives. So, it is worth thinking about a small interactive training, as well as courses that can be taken online, which can be continued by online professional competition, and it is their own independent decision and responsibility to do it, not controlled by the environment. It is also recommended to rethink the early retirement pension system, or to find an alternative to recharging and renewing the individuals after long decades of burdensome service. We did not come across any big surprises when answering our research questions. We have been confronted with large individual differences in the way the age groups view each other, and we can also see fundamental differences in the way the commanders and young staff characterize an ideal police officer.

How can young people integrate into the hierarchical organization of the police?

In their own special way. We clarified at the beginning of the study that the generations YZ and Z have special characteristics as they are the first digital native generations who came to the organization with a completely different socialization. Nevertheless, they can fit well into the life and work responsibilities of a workplace community. Their problems stem from the scarce opportunities provided by the organization, that is, as a novice police officer, they are unable to create and plan a proper existence for themselves, and at the same time, the environment offers them many tempting opportunities.

How well the representatives of the new generation succeed? (according to their commanders and their own opinion)

The above is also true to their success, it works in their own way, and there can be big differences between individuals as well. They only try to meet the expectations that can be interpreted for them, purposefully. They are no longer characterized by the kind of compliance compulsion and uncritical loyalty that accompanies the Baby Boomer and X generations for the rest of their lives.

What tools can we have to increase and improve integration and proficiency? (educational institutional, organizational)

The well-known organizational problems, the high fluctuation, the unpopularity of the career path basically call for many organizational changes. For

example, significant increases in non-commissioned wages are needed to enable young people to view their profession as a realistic livelihood. Rethinking the career model is also essential and realizing waiting times is essential for the requirements of modern society.

Modernization within an organization is also a perpetuating dynamic need that can no longer be reversed or eliminated. It permeates the entire organization, including the modernization of the material environment, tools, IT background, and management attitude, organizational procedures (administration). As the modernization of recruitment, it is necessary to combine new opportunities (online space) and our own organizational talents.

Opportunities must be created for employees to develop themselves, their professional knowledge, and expand their interest. All this should be done in accordance with the requirements of the modern age, strengthening independent working and decision-making.

Training needs to be made shorter and more effective. They need immediate, practical knowledge in an interactive environment.

Overload calls for immediate action. The current situation calls for the review and rationalization of the procedures within the organization and the reduction of unnecessary circles, administrative plus procedures, and the making of the procedures 'friendlier to the executor/employee'.

Although the scientific interpretation of the research is limited, as it was conducted with a small sample, only at a county police headquarters, with voluntary participation, the results still clearly confirm the statements of previous researches (URL1; Batts, Smoot & Scrivner, 2012; URL2), according to which younger generations come to traditional organizations with different needs and expectations, and to remain in the long-term, it is essential for them that the organization takes these generational characteristics into account when formulating human strategy.

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URL1: *Goodwin, W. R. (2010): Police Supervision: The Generational Differences*. https://shsu-ir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11875/1709/1332.pdf?sequence=1

URL2: Police Executive Research Forum (2019). *The Workforce Crisis, and What Police Agencies Are Doing About It.* Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. https://www.policeforum.org/assets/WorkforceCrisis.pdf

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Zita Veprik

The corruption risks of police tasks related to state border in connection with the handling of world pandemic COVID-19

Abstract

Preventing and decelerating the spread of COVID-19 epidemic required fast and special measures in many areas of life. This meant a lot of operative interventions in the police tasks, many times by specific measures, most of which contained general tasks. Enforcing these was based on the specific decisions of police officers. By all means, no general rules could be regulated, which eventuated that police work became almost without external control. This entailed that the preparedness and integrity of police officers taking actions got major role. Police tasks in connection with handling of pandemic-related to state border, further increased the already high level of corruption risks, principally of police officers executing border policing and traffic policing tasks. In the future similar unforeseen situations can anytime happen. In my study I am analysing corruption risks emerging in such extraordinary period, in order to be able to handle them more efficiently. The integrity of police officers must be increased, and the number of corruption situations must be decreased. Besides, particular attention must be paid to the regulation of the obvious processes in order that the police personnel considers the interests of the Hungarian Police and of Hungary essentially in any situation.

Keywords: law enforcement, corruption, COVID-19, state border, border police

Introduction

The disease COVID-19, caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus, was discovered in Wuhan, China in December 2019. Since the new pathogen spread among people easily and sustainably, it meant a new, unknown disease for the population,

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causing serious symptoms. Thus, WHO declared the disease as pandemic on 12 March 2020 and it went down in our minds as coronavirus. The virus spread on all continents of the Earth as quick as thoughts, causing serious diseases and shocking numbers of fatalities. In a short time, it became obvious for all countries that the medical science was not able to avoid the spreading due to the lack of vaccination, but it had to be slowed down. Otherwise people suffering from the disease would reach such a number that it would overload the healthcare. The patients would not get medical attendance and many of them would die of the disease just because they could not get hospital beds, life support systems, there would not be enough doctors and nurses for their healthcare. There was not any other solution to slow down the spread of the epidemic but to reduce the number of people getting in touch. This radically changed our accelerated and global world, of which main pillar was that people and goods could move fast and free, almost without any control in certain regions among countries, for example in the Schengen area. For the sake of preparing the health care system and reducing the number of people getting in touch, almost every country declared the state of danger, curfew or restriction on movement, furthermore closed their borders within a short period of time. In this stage of the pandemic, it was not only a healthcare issue to prevent the spread but also a serious police task and a challenge. In Hungary the government signed the declaration of state of danger[1] on 11 March 2020 and reintroduced border control at the borders of the Republic of Slovenia and at the Republic of Austria, forbade the foreigners coming from China, Italy, Republic of Korea and Iran to enter the territory of Hungary. The government obliged the Hungarian citizens travelling back home from these countries to have medical examination and institutional or home quarantine.[2] Beyond that the government forbade the workers who played major role in the prevention (healthcare, armed forces, government officials) to travel abroad. Visiting higher education institutions became forbidden and the number of participants at events got also limited. After this until the end of May 2020 213 government decrees were declared, which brought changes in connection with the coronavirus at all segments of our lives. The rules concerning travelling and free movement tightened suddenly and eased gradually. In March-April 2020 in almost every country of the world, more and more tough rules were introduced in order to mitigate the spread of the pandemic. After that from May 2020, as the spreading speed of epidemic eased, they

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1   Government Decree 40/2020 (11 March) on the declaration of state of danger.
2   Government Decree 41/2020 (11 March) on the measure to be taken during the state of danger declared for the prevention of the human epidemic endangering life and property and elimination of its consequences, and for the protection of the health and lives of Hungarian citizens.

tried to mitigate the restrictive rules in order to relax the harmful impacts on the economy. In order to be able to handle the epidemic efficiently, the legislators introduced quite different rules in relation with police tasks related to state border. The sudden changes in the tasks, the difficulties in the interpretation of new rules, the lack of established practice, the significant workload among the police officers in the field caused lack of transparency of service activity. These made significant difficulties for the senior police officers in implementing their control-tasks. Besides that, the vulnerability and uncertainty of subjects of a measure were increasing and getting through, the state border became more and more important for them. These together significantly increased the corruption risks of people taking part in the implementation. In this study I am examining the tasks related to state border in connection with the handling of world pandemic COVID-19, being given to the law enforcement field of police, and the new corruption risks linked to that.

Police corruption, corruption risks

Corruption is a worldwide known phenomenon. There are notes remained from the ancient Egypt concerning corruption. That is to say, 3000 years ago it existed, but it cannot be designated as congenital disposition of humans. The realisation of corruption – shall be ancient, medieval, modern, most recent – is helped by the excessive bureaucracy, the lack of transparency of processes, loopholes, imperfections of internal and external control systems, weakness of financial respect of colleagues (Ifi-Valde, Klotz, Váradi & Végh, 2015, 5.). Although – according to researches – there are significant differences in characters of some people, that is to say, how they take part in social interactions, so likely in corruption as well. This phenomenon does not have a congenital disposition. Corruption is generated by social-situational agents, such social environment (e.g. hierarchical dispersion, unequal allocation of sources, etc.) and group interests that exploit corruption (Bereczkei & Tóth 2008). Corruption – besides being a moral problem – is an act that has serious economic and social consequences. In case of this phenomenon confidence of citizens in state institutions is declining, ceasing, which ruins the democratic operational mechanisms (Borbíró, Gönczöl, Kerezsi & Lévay, 2016). In democratic states the most important basis of law enforcement is the confidence of citizens, to which the integrity of organisations must be ensured and strengthened. This is the only way to be able to have social function to defend the society from illegal human conducts, to which they have tools of government-regulated coercion as well (Finszter, 2008, 167.).

For the legal tasks of the police forces, it is indispensable that every member of the staff uniformly interprets and implements the expressed orders and commands being determined in rules and common standards for the whole body (Kardos, 2015, 31.). Rules can play their real roles if they are implementable, transparent, and controllable. Besides, in order to prevent corruption – inter alia – it is indispensable to decree and systematically check the administrative-legal rules concerning the strict corruption behaviour (Gecse, 2015, 20.). Thinking through the tasks at the state border concerning handling the world pandemic, the suddenly changed and difficult-to-see rules, the difficulty in implementing the senior and decoupled control, it seems obvious that in the future, in order to handle similar situations effectively and efficiently, the new police tasks and the relating corruption risks have to be analysed. Preventing corruption cannot be fulfilled without identifying the risks and analysing the circumstances of committed corruption acts that became known. These are the regular conditions of it. As Mariann Kránitz says: '*the aim of dealing with corruption is preventing this phenomenon and cannot be anything else.*' (Kránitz, 1986, 30.). On the basis of identification and analysis of corruption risks the proper tool can be selected and implemented at risky areas. Risk is such a possibly occurring unwanted act (with missing activities, failures, deficiency, irregularity, harm, loss), whose impact(s) somehow and someway endanger(s) reaching the organizational aims, the operation and activity of the organization, implementation of its tasks or a project (Domokos, Nyéki, Jakovác, Németh & Hatvani, 2015, 8.). The aim of handling the risk is to form our activity consciously in order to reduce the chance of that certain threatening event or the damage that could be caused before the risk emerges.[3] The risk management can only be effective if the organisation realizes the risks and can react effectively. This is the reason why it is needed to elaborate the possible solutions and methods for risk management beside an analysis. The risks of police corruption point beyond the general effects of the phenomenon. Measuring the risks of police tasks related to state border and the possible solutions given in order to handle the risk management have to be examined when being aware to them. The biggest risk of police officers having corruption behaviour while implementing tasks related to state border is – beside that the confidence of citizens in state institutions is declining and the discipline needed for law enforcement organisations to function, will suffer – that deficit in the confidence emerges. One of the basic needs of human existence is security, including public safety, in providing of which

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3   International Organization for Standardization (2009), ISO 31010:2009 Risk management-Risk Assessment Techniques.

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the border police officers must play a significant role (Mátyás, Németh & Ritecz, 2020, 568.). In order to prevent corruption, it is essential to identify corruption risks, apply the integrity approach and toolkit (Báger, 2017, 38.). Measuring and analysing corruption risks are necessary because this is the method to act against corruption behaviour specifically and effectively (Klotz, 2017, 92-134.).

Police tasks related to state border and handling COVID-19 world pandemic

In order to slow down the spread of the epidemic, during the state of danger the rules of crossing the state borders became significantly stricter. Keeping the rules first of all, was one of the police' tasks. This meant a significant change compared with the previous conditions. Since Hungary became a member of the Schengen area, in our internal borders there were not any border controls, at the external borders those were carried out according to the rules of the European Union legislation and the Schengen Borders Code,[4] which basically guaranteed the free movement of people and goods in the Schengen area. The right of free movement and residence are also entitled to citizens out of the Schengen area (citizens and family members of EEA[5] countries). The prime intention of every country was to abolish travelling between states or to reduce the number of border crossings. However, a tender balance had to be kept, since the measures introduced could not cause a disproportionately huge conflict of interest not only for the individuals but also for the characters of the economy. The border crossing had to be ensured with consideration of the health risks in a controlled way. In this continuously changing situation, the Hungarian Police had the following tasks related to state border:

- reintroduction of border control at the internal borders of the Schengen area: physically closing, guarding the smaller border crossing areas, establishing checkpoints at the main roads;
- sustaining the border control at the external Schengen borders: closing smaller BCPs[6], operating 1-2 BCPs per sections;
- restriction of entering traffic with the following exceptions:

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4   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
5   European Economic Area (EEA).
6   Border crossing points.

- Ensuring for Hungarian citizens coming home from abroad and for EEA citizens, having an address in Hungary, to enter the territory of Hungary;
- ensuring the smooth and controlled passing of international goods;
- judging special leniency applications, ensuring the border crossing at permitted entrance points;
- ensuring transit traffic between Western-Europe and the Balkan countries: passage of passengers at the designated BCPs, in designated time-limits, police ensuring corridors in the country in order that passengers in transit do not mean epidemiological danger for those living in Hungary. Later the transit traffic was spread for travellers to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport, entering the external borders as well;
- ensuring commute for those living in the border area and travelling in order to receive healthcare or work on the basis of an agreement with the neighbouring countries;
- foreigner students studying in Hungary taking part in school-leaving examination;
- clearance of enter for foreigners living abroad, working in agriculture with contract of employment and prior notification in order to address the labour needs of agroindustry.
- ensuring medical check-up for every entering passenger – carried out by colleagues and volunteers of the National Ambulance Service;
- ordering home, official or workplace quarantine for those who enter with Hungarian destination (except for commuters, school-leaving students or people with special permission);
- control of keeping quarantine rules;
- continuous relation with the neighbouring countries' border policing bodies, harmonisation of the restrictions and facilitations, operative interfere if waiting emerges.

As it can be seen, closing the borders did not automatically result in interrupting border traffic, moreover more thorough controls had to be implemented at the BCPs designated for transit traffic. The police officers working there had to make more decisions in more significant cases. Because of the world pandemic, the number of passengers reduced and the border crossing concentrated to bigger BCPs compared with the previous term. In order to have the numbers of entering passengers perceived, I am using the data of Nagylak Public Road BCP and Csanádpalota Highway BCP, both belong to Nagylak BPO. These two BCPs are situated 10 kilometres from each other. During the state of danger at Csanádpalota traffic of trucks and buses were permitted in prior, while passenger

traffic at Nagylak. In May 2020 at the two BCPs 326,619 persons crossed the border, which fell far behind (by 56,8%) from May 2019 but meant 10,500 passenger controls every day. The more shocking is that this month police officers implemented 124,914 truck controls (4029 trucks every day), which exceeded that data from previous year by 58%.

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The corruption risks indicate significant difference in certain fields of law enforcement (Báger, 2015, 6-15.). If the workers of the given service branch get in touch mainly with foreigners, special professional knowledge is needed for their work, the law, the public law regulatory instruments, which regulate their work, are difficult to comprehend or change quickly, it means greater risk. Besides these the workload, the maleficent working conditions and the difficulties of the completion of leader's or independent internal controls are also increasing the risks. According to the professional point of view the service branches of border and traffic policing include emphasized corruption risks, since the risk raising factors are present at regular, average service measures. These, already notable hazards have been raised further by tasks in relation to the handling of COVID-19 pandemic.

Police work during the handling of the pandemic means emphasized corruption and simultaneously security risk because of the following reasons:

- Remarkable intervention to the daily life unprecedented in the last decades. Restriction of entry of foreign travellers, which cause notable detriment of interest. As a result of the decision millions of Eastern European stayed away from their Western workplace, earlier existence, accidentally from relatives. Such important interest relates to the border crossing in several cases that it is still worth passengers paying a higher amount of bribe to reach their destination. In the meantime, appreciable interest can be attached to avoid 14-days quarantine.
- Uncertainty. The continuously changing entry and transit regulations have caused notable uncertainty among police officers and passengers as well. It often happened that the police officers themselves had been aware of the changes from the news in the first instance, then they were waiting for receiving the changes in prosecution regulations, directly in written form or in published, in order to be able to apply them.

- Lack of transparency. Right after the introduction of severe regulations, relaxations followed, more and more exemptions emerged who did not have to observe those regulations. Different restrictions were valid at the open border crossing points, however the entry clearance of passenger categories, destinations, time limits were continuously changing.
- The member states of the Schengen area have not been prepared for restrictions of the right of free movement ever. The European Union laid great emphasis on the controlled entry of citizens of third countries and their trackable travels in the last years. The data control of all EU citizens in Schengen Information System at Schengen external border entrances is required lately, so those who are dangerous for the public order of any country can be caught or their movement can be tracked. But this measure is effective only against those who are already in the scope of the authorities. During pandemic Covid-19 it is claimed that all countries let those people enter their territory who stayed for longer period of time at the territory of that certain country, who have address and workplace there. Before transit, the Hungarian police officers had to control these data in case of passengers arriving from Romania. A problem occurred because a residence permit is not issued for an EU citizen for the certification of a permanent residence in another EU state. The citizen's report and registration in the host country is enough. The regulations for permanent stay are controlled by the member states. In practice, all member states publish different certifications in order to verify that an EU citizen lawfully lives, works or studies at their territory. These certifications do not contain any security protection mostly, so the control of the documentation at the state border is quite difficult, it can be a basis for misuse.
- Difficulties of the controls of the police officers: The above-mentioned problems not only complicated the work of the police officers taking measures but their control too, since the correct or wrong decision during a measure is not differentiated sharply. The situation was further complicated because police officers who worked at the border crossing points were subject to increased hazards of infection because of the high number of crossing passengers, so their control needed much more prudence.

On the basis of police work sessions and the analysis of corruption risks I examined, which realistic situations are those, when the realization of corruption actions are expectable in practice:

- At the beginning of the state of danger after the reintroduction of the border control there were restrictions only for those foreigners who wanted to enter from China, Italy, Republic of Korea and Iran. Since we do not have land borders with these countries, the observation of this regulation was laid on the basis of the passenger's statement as it could not have been stated whether the passenger actually had been, for example, in Italy on the basis of the presented documents. It occurred that the police officer himself gave information the passenger what to state in order to avoid the quarantine. It could happen because of goodwill or avoiding the police work culminated from the quarantine or for profit (URL1).
- Another corruption risk source was the clearance to pass without permission at closed BCPs. Because of the lockdowns most of the passengers had to travel more than 100 km in order to try if the entry was permitted for them. At the operating BCPs the cross was possible in certain time limits for months and the waiting time was several hours long. All of these together have raised the corruption hazards at the closed BCPs.
- During the introduction of the most severe restrictive measures in passenger's traffic, the continuity of goods transport had to be ensured without any kind of restrictions. However, the separation of passengers' and goods' traffic was partly regulated, since goods could not only be transported by trucks determined by the highway code. Nowadays, 25-30% of goods transport is transacted by vehicles of 3,5 tonnes weight, which are considered as passenger's car. To establish whether the transport vehicle actually realizes transportation or the empty vehicle goes for goods caused serious work for police officers. Moreover, the control of the passengers of the vehicle (if they are only the staff of the transporting vehicle) was also important. The large scale of increase in the number of the trucks, due to the regulation, - that could be interpreted in several ways - also could be realized as a significant corruption risk.
- Besides the introduction of the severe regulations, it was necessary to deal with consideration of individual cases immediately. The relevant law[7] gave the issue of customized permissions, which claimed appreciation to the power of law-enforcement deputy of the leader of the national headquarters. This could mean the permission of border crossing of foreigners or the passing over of the quarantine in case of Hungarian citizens. The high number of permission claims handed in or the free interpretation of the concept of

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7 Government Decree 81/2020 (1 April) on extraordinary measures relating to the state of danger declared for the protection of health and lives and for the restoration of national economy 4. §.

particular appreciation could serve as a basis for misuse. This meant hazard not only during the permission procedure necessarily.

- The permission for humanitarian transit crossing meant an extreme corruption risk.[8] The quintessence of the regulation is that the transit of foreigners between Western and Eastern Europe was assured by Hungary if the person could verify the legality of his stay at the destination and the suspicion of COVID-19 infection had not emerged during medical examination at the state border. The transit crossing was only permitted at limited time periods and defined routes. The passengers had to leave the territory of Hungary on the shortest route and within the least time. The control and the observation of this regulation at the state borders and in the internal territory of the country was quite a challenge for police officers, though it meant corruption and security risks, too.

Picture 1: *Humanitarian routes in 18. March 2020.*

Note. URL2.

Problems have occurred at the state border control because earlier people with the right of free movement (EEA citizens and relatives) could cross freely the Schengen external borders by the presentation of their ID card or passport.

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8   Number 29000/9828/2020.ált decision of the Leader of the National Headquarters of the border crosssing, the stay of the territory of Hungary, the transit, the route, the stopping possibilities of citizens of neighbouring countries and humanitarian transit and the exceptional regulations concerning humanitarian traffic.

Before the introduction of the measures in whole Europe during COVID-19 pandemic there had been no need to certify the stay of an EEA citizen in another EEA member state, since it meant the restriction of a fundamental EU law. This regulation caused uncertainty among passengers and police officers as well. It often happened that Romanian citizens, who had been working in Germany legally for years and had dwellings there, could not verify with official documents (issued by governmental authorities) that they had the right for prolonged stay in Germany. The fact that the border controllers did not have a list of documents, which were defined as preconditions for further travel, was a severe base for malfeasance. The assurance of transit routes meant the biggest challenge in the internal territory of the country. It often occurred that the passengers, in order to avoid waiting, left the predetermined route. Taking advantage of the passengers' fears, the incomplete knowledge and the outage of coach transportation a whole industry emerged to transport passengers between Western and Eastern border sections, capitalizing and evading the weak points of the regulation of the humanitarian transit crossing, all of which has caused a bigger problem (URL3). The conveyors made a great profit of evading the regulations, the police action against them was not effective and also gave basis for several misuse.

- The observation of the 14-day-long home quarantine issued in Hungary was also controlled by the police. The essence of this regulation was that the competent police station had a registry of the people who were in quarantine in its territory and controlled regularly whether the residents were at their dwellings. This was also a basis for misuse since it occurred that police officers verified a control of a person who actually had not stayed at that given address.

Summary

The constitutional definition of police, which has to maintain the internal order of the state, is not regarded as basic requirement in every country (Hautzinger, 2011, 65.). However, the basic roles of the police, which is the protection of the order of the state border and taking part in the prevention of unlawful migration and others, are recorded in the Article 46. section (1) of the Fundamental Law in Hungary.[9] This direction pictures that the police roles in connection with the

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9   Section (1) Article 46. The Fundamental Law of Hungary (25. April 2011.).

state border and their proper execution are strategically important regarding the security of the country. The coherent rejection of corruption of the professional workers during service action is inevitable. The incidentally high corruption risks of the police officers executing border policing or traffic policing tasks were increased by those in connection with the handling of COVID-19. However, the handling of the pandemic created an unprecedented and unanticipated situation, we have to take notice of that similar extraordinary situations, tasks may emerge anytime in the future. Accordingly, the preparation in all fields of life, so as handling corruption is needed. The leader and the independent internal control staffs have to dispose up-to-date knowledge of the hazardous factors in the work circumstances as they can only execute such controls, which help to prevent corruption actions and decrease the supervention feasibility (Balla, 2019, 19.). In order to fight against corruption effectively, the detailed knowledge of service tasks, the survey, the analysis of risks through this knowledge and the selection of proper, specific tools and methods for handling these risks are inevitable. In order to prevent the spread of the pandemic, a plenty of operative interventions were introduced in the police proceedings in the form of discrete measures. Most of these measures contained general tasks and the enforcement based on the individual decision of the police officers. The system of proceedings became so complicated that general regulations could not rule every individual case, so the police procedures stayed almost without external control, the measure taking police officer's knowledge, commitment to the organization and integrity got emphasized role. During the preparation for similar situations the strengthening of these competences will need highlighted notice for the sake of the representation of the interests of the police and Hungary, at first place by police officers, in the fast changing and unregulated situations.

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declared for the prevention of the human epidemic endangering life and property and elimi-
nation of its consequences, and for the protection of the health and lives of Hungarian citizens

Government Decree 81/2020 (1 April) on extraordinary measures relating to the state of danger
declared for the protection of health and lives and for the restoration of national econ

Number 29000/9828/2020.ált decision of the Leader of the National Headquarters of the border
crossing, the stay of the territory of Hungary, the transit, the route, the stopping possibilities
of citizens of neighbouring countries and humanitarian transit and the exceptional regulations
concerning humanitarian traffic

Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the council of 9 March 2016 on
a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen
Borders Code)

Reference of the article according to APA regulation

Gábor Sinkó

Shifting the Battle to Social Media:
The Effectiveness of Boko Haram's Online
Strategy in Terms of its Recruitment[1]

Abstract

In 2015, after Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and became the Islamic State West Africa Province, online social media's dominance was nearly instantaneous. This paper analyzes whether Boko Haram's use of social media results in more effective recruitment and, if so, what trends can be observed in the former that contribute to the latter. I conclude that social media plays an instrumental role in the terrorist organization's online recruitment since Boko Haram can disseminate instant messages to large online audiences while also exercising control over their visual content. Additionally, Boko Haram's use of social media ties into recruitment as there is a link to radicalization, religious indoctrination, and sharing its narrative. Finally, the group uses social media to depict itself as the winning entity by representing strength, unity, and taking advantage of the country's anti-government sentiment. While online influences are undoubtedly crucial for recruitment, it must be emphasized that they are usually coupled with offline physical connections in the Nigerian context.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Nigeria, social media, recruitment, online messages

Introduction

The dominance of information and communication technology in Nigeria has both advantages and disadvantages since, on the one hand, it could promote

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1 My research is related to critical infrastructure protection. I presented my results at the ICCECIP 2020 conference, a written summary of which I will publish in this article.

development in the economic, political, and social spheres (United Nations General Assembly, 2013), while on the other hand, it has the potential to pave the way for the rapid growth of terrorists' use of social media. To illustrate the pace and importance of the latter, between 2000 and 2011, for instance, the number of mobile phone users has grown from 10 million to 647 million people in Africa (Carmody, 2013). Online platforms can provide terrorists with communication, coordination, and recruitment tools at relatively low costs. Furthermore, the use of online social media has contributed to the facilitation of sharing propaganda, enlisting potential recruits, and claiming or publicizing terrorist attacks (Cox, 2018).

Following its foundation in 2002, Boko Haram mostly conveyed information to intended audiences by more traditional types of media, such as newspapers, directly speaking to the press, giving open-air lectures, using pre-recorded videos, and distributing audio cassettes, fliers, and leaflets. However, in 2015, after pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and becoming the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the dominance of social media was nearly instantaneous[2] (Ibid, 22.). Owing to the large number of illiterate people in Nigeria, reaching out to desired audiences through graphic instead of written content was also facilitated. Besides their prompt circulation, social media messages were regarded to have a similar impact, although at significantly lower costs to a much larger audience.

Objectives of the study

Various aspects of Boko Haram have been studied extensively with the inclusion of the following areas: the strategies and tactics of the terrorist organization, the development, goals, and origins of the insurgency, Nigerian military campaigns waged against Boko Haram, the organization's threatening position for the stability and unity of Nigeria, and the positioning of the terrorist group within the context of Nigerian ethnic and religious violence. Some additional published material on Boko Haram has dealt with its characteristics as a terrorist organization, focusing on potential responses to Boko Haram by the Nigerian government, studying the connections between the group and other Islamic terrorist organizations, the effects of Boko Haram on civil-military affairs, and

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2   RAND Europe interview with Professor Isaac Olawale Robert, academic expert, 8 September 2017.

the development of the insurgency as a consequence of the failure and weaknesses of the Nigerian state.[3]

Scholarly research has predominantly concentrated on analyzing Boko Haram's military exploits. At the same time, less attention was devoted to scrutinizing the interconnectedness of its use of social media and recruitment through public messages and messaging techniques. Nevertheless, I would reason the terrorist organization sees the potential in social media's power and therefore allocates both time and resources to circulate its messages in the form of social media statements and video recordings. I believe a reliable analysis of Boko Haram's military approach coupled with its online media strategy is needed to extensively understand Boko Haram's nature and the consequence of its attacks.

Importance of the study

Analyzing the links between Boko Haram's use of social media and recruitment may lead to a more comprehensive understanding of policymakers in the governmental and institutional spheres of what the terrorist organization stands for and its operations. As a result, the formulation of their counter-terrorism policies can be steered in the right direction. International cooperation is required since Boko Haram can no longer be considered as a regional organization. Still, it is rather interwoven in global terror trends, attested by its relations to other terrorist groups. For instance, concerning the training and recruitment of female suicide bombers, a link could be discerned to Hezbollah (Besenyő & Keresztes, 2016), while creating the Media Office of the West Africa Province (MOWAP) is an obvious connection to ISIL. Mapping the minds of Boko Haram's leaders could be instrumental in the sense that the more knowledge we possess, the more fully we will understand the group's motivations behind committing acts of terrorism. Through careful analysis of Boko Haram's online media statements and video recordings, not only may we be able to predict upcoming attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa but also put an end to them at an early stage (Ogbondah & Agbese, 2018). Additionally, the study is destined to enrich the growing literature on terrorism and recruitment in the region. Understanding the potential

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[3] Some of the published materials are Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, edited by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, 2014; Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis, edited by Ioannis Mantzikos, 2013; Nigeria without Nigerians? Boko Haram and the Crisis in Nigeria's Nation-Building, written by Jideofor Adibe, 2012; Digital Activism and Cyberconflicts in Nigeria: Occupy Nigeria, Boko Haram and MEND, written by Shola A. Olabode, 2018; Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Guerrilla Insurgency or Strategic Terrorism? written by John Maszka, 2017.

linkages between Boko Haram's use of social media and the ways it recruits its members can help us formulate more efficient strategies to combat its influence.

Methodology, research questions, and hypotheses

The study adopts the qualitative research approach and is based on applying various research methods, including reports, former social media analyses, and previously-conducted key informant interviews, document content analyses of open-source, peer-reviewed academic works and journals.

Additionally, despite being fragmentary or politicized, media articles have been analyzed to paint a clearer image.

To scrutinize the effectiveness of Boko Haram's online strategy in terms of its recruitment, the study seeks to answer these research questions:

RQ1: Does Boko Haram's use of social media result in more effective recruitment?

RQ2: What trends can be observed in Boko Haram's use of social media that contribute to recruitment?

The next sections are organized around the following hypotheses that are destined to explore the connections between the potential role of social media and recruitment:

- Boko Haram uses social media to convey its messages to large online audiences.
- Boko Haram uses social media for radicalization, religious indoctrination, and sharing its narrative.
- Boko Haram uses social media to depict itself as the winning entity by representing strength, unity, and taking advantage of the country's anti-government sentiment.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Boko Haram uses social media to convey its messages to large online audiences.

In general, it can be stated that since its foundation, Boko Haram has taken advantage of different kinds of technologies to recruit members. At the beginning of the 21st century, audio cassettes' distribution was the most significant feature

of the group's recruitment strategy. The speeches of Mohammed Yusuf and his deputies at the time, Abubakar Shekau and Muhammad Nor could be found on these cassettes handed over to the followers, supporters, and sympathizers of the terrorist organization (Abubakar, 2016). A specific part of the Nigerian public also showed interest in the recordings' content due to the speeches mostly focused on the disapproval of injustice and corruption in the country. Before the use of YouTube for recording predications, CDs had been disseminated to the Nigerian population.

However, due to the swift expansion of Internet access in Nigeria since 2010, the general audience of Boko Haram has also undergone some fundamental changes. Possibly the most intriguing of these modifications was the terrorist group's ability to expand its geographic reach through reliance on the use of social media and the Internet. It has been reported that a threefold increase could be witnessed in terms of Internet usage in case we compared data in 2012 and 2015 (Kazeem, 2016). This significant difference could mostly be explained by the fact that mobile technology has been augmented in Nigeria by 2016, with 46 out of 100 active mobile phone users (Internet Live Stats, 2020). Due to the low economic indicators in the north, the rise in the audience could be justified by the increased use of the Internet to disseminate Boko Haram's online messages. The connection is especially intriguing, since only 13% of the terrorist group's statements were published on YouTube and Twitter in 2012 instead of as opposed to three years later, when all of them could be accessed online (Mahmood, 2017).

Internet growth in Nigeria also enabled the group to circulate information to a broader range of audiences. The distribution of audio cassettes and CDs complemented by fliers and local preachers' messages did undisputedly have an effect, albeit only locally. The most widely-read newspapers of the country reporting on Boko Haram are Daily Trust, Premium Times, Punch, and Vanguard (Campbell, 2016). They are mainly circulated in the capital, which is in Central Nigeria or Lagos, the economic hub and financial center of the south. It means distribution is relatively sparse in the north, where the terrorist organization is mostly active. Additionally, literacy constitutes another problem in the area, which is likely to restrict outreach to desired audiences[4] (UNESCO, 2012). Nevertheless, while press releases issued by the newspapers amplified Boko Haram's voice, they did that indirectly without giving actual control to the group to convey its messages with the use of visual content. On the contrary,

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4   For instance, a 2010 survey by Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics estimated literacy rate in Borno state to be 14.5%, compared to 92% in Lagos.

the extension of mobile technology and the rise in Internet access brought about significant changes, including sharing, viewing, and downloading photos and videos directly. Social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, can be used by terrorists in furthering their objectives, whatever it may be. According to a U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade, Facebook is rather used for sharing online images, but Twitter is still the preferred social media site for terror groups. The reason can be that the latter is '*far worse than the rest with regard to acting proactively to track and remove terrorist content*' (Ogunlana, 2019).

At the end of January 2015, Boko Haram created four distinct accounts on Twitter under the name of 'al-Urwah al-Wuthqa', which gained 4,000 followers in a matter of days. Although they were all suspended due to policy violation in March 2015, while being operational, the group shared photos of the military training of 'cub' soldiers wearing dark robes and holding AK-47 assault rifles. According to the caption, child soldiers were regarded as the *'generation of conquest and victory'* (Laing, 2015). Although the images could as well serve propaganda purposes, I would reason there is also a link to recruitment through Boko Haram's intention to influence the highest number of individuals by disseminating instant messages to them. Besides, a specific video link was tweeted by the same account that contained various members of the terrorist organization providing explanations on motivations to join Boko Haram in its fight (Ibid). As a consequence, I would argue that Twitter was used with the explicit purpose of recruitment with the help of the video. Although, the terrorist organization's social media use can be regarded as less overt than that of al-Shabaab or ISIL, for instance. However, this way, existing members of the group could convey their messages to large online audiences.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Boko Haram uses social media for radicalization, religious indoctrination, and sharing its narrative.

One of the most fundamental recruitment strategies conducted by Boko Haram is the negative instrumentalization of religion. With the intent of bolstering the group's membership, unscrupulous clerics radicalized the youth by spreading false teachings and misrepresenting Islam. According to recent research, by taking advantage of Northeastern Nigeria's cultural, economic, and social situation, these clerics were responsible for the indoctrination of individuals into concluding that their challenges were associated with Western influence (Onuoha, 2014; Olojo, 2019). A former Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) pointed out that the use of false narrative to attract members

should come as no surprise since the terrorist group had always had negative sentiment towards Western civilization and education believed to be anti-Muslim. Hence the teachings of Boko Haram's founding leader, Muhammed Yusuf, were able to win the hearts and minds of people, who were *'largely uneducated, unschooled, impressionable, poor, and frustrated by the status quo'*[5] (Maza, Koldas and Aksit, 2020, 7.). In that respect, the recruitment strategy of the terrorist organization has not undergone significant changes, with the sole exception of now shifting to social media.

This assertion is supported by a 2017 policy brief on the perspectives of peacebuilders, who were asked about the potential sources of recruitment by Boko Haram. According to the quantitative survey results, the terrorist group predominantly uses social media sites to attract new members (52%). However, online recruitment appears to be complemented by physical features through a network of friends (44%) and neighbors (36%). Peacebuilders also stressed the importance of religion in terms of Boko Haram's recruitment by arguing that upon joining the terrorist organization, individuals were often negatively influenced to believe they were *'adhering to true and pure Islam as prescribed by the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet'* (Salifu & Ewi, 2017, 5.). Indoctrination by destructive ideology as well as not possessing adequate knowledge about their religion can both be potential explanations for the recruits' manipulation. A 2015 report published by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) echoes the same message. It suggests the existence of a gap between Islamic values and some Muslim youth, implying their lack of religious knowledge (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2015). These people can be allured by the promise of paradise and can also be persuaded that their role in saving Islam from decadence is critical. A man from Yobe emphasized, *'they told us that it is the role of youth to protect the religion of God'* (Mercy Corps, 2016, 14.). Consequently, these impressionable and misinformed young people equipped with the reward of jihad and, more importantly, purpose, are an easy target for Boko Haram's recruitment, especially on the Internet.

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5   Phone interview with a former Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force, 6 November 2018.

Figure 1: *Peacebuilders' perception of where people are most likely
to be introduced to Boko Haram*

Note. Salifu & Ewi, 2017, 7.

Studying the choice of dominant languages in the online messaging of Boko
Haram might also pave the way for a better understanding of its recruitment.
In the beginning, the most often used language in disseminating messages was
Hausa, which can be explained by the terrorist organization's mostly local fo-
cus. However, as the group started to expand geographically and intended to be
exposed internationally, Arabic started to become more dominant[6] (Mahmood,
2017). According to a 2017 report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
there was only one Arabic language release between 2011 and 2012. Still, three
years later, the language appeared in 80% of all publications, albeit sometimes
not separately, since some of Boko Haram's messages have been circulated in
several languages (Ibid, 7.). The growing influence of Arabic can be witnessed
by materials containing a mix of languages and adding Arabic subtitles to them.
While Hausa was elementary used for propaganda and perhaps recruitment pur-
poses in the region, Arabic was taken advantage of because of strengthening ties
with the Islamic State and the possibility of reaching individuals who had com-
prehensive education in Islam. However, the continuous dominance of Hausa
in online messaging can be explained by the terrorist organization's desire to

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6   Phone interview with a Maiduguri-based local journalist, 25 October 2016.

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remain locally focused since Arabic productions had limited coverage due to the language barrier in the Nigerian press (Ibid, 23.).

Figure 2: *Percentage of dominant languages in Boko Haram messaging, by year*

Note. Mahmood, 2017, 8.

At times, Boko Haram regarded it as crucial to give a thorough explanation about its actions and way of thinking with the possible intent of deflecting blame for targeting civilians and/or recruiting members. There has been an ideological battle going on since the preaching of Mohammed Yusuf about the differentiation of a believer from a non-believer, with the latter including those who are either associated with Christians or the Nigerian government (Audu, 2014). However, the former category seems to be a lot more blurred, especially in light of the terrorist organization's growing number of Muslim casualties. As the leader of one of Boko Haram's wings, Abubakar Shekau emphasized that even the murder of Muslims can be justified if they lived together or worked towards establishing friendly relations with Christians. The former official spokesperson of Boko Haram, Abu Qaqa, also stressed the inadequate status of solely being a follower of Islam by arguing that *'even if you are a Muslim and do not abide by sharia, we will kill you'* (Mark, 2012).

The group's spokesman, Abu Zayd said that *'we as a group do not kill people who are innocent. If there are people who profess Islam and do not partake in government or Western education, their blood and wealth are sacred unless otherwise'* (Pointblank News, 2011). Nevertheless, the conceptual issue of what innocence actually stands for needs to be discussed at this point. It appears as if Boko Haram only believes in its own strict version of Islam, and those who fall outside its sphere of acceptance deserve to be killed. In a 2015

video, Shekau reasoned that the group would never *'engage in takfir [the practice of stating that a Muslim can be regarded as a non-believer] over a sin he did not commit'* (Mahmood, 2017, 19.), which further underpins the terrorist organization's idea that – in technical terms – they cannot be held responsible for bringing death to innocent people, since they have their own definitions for guilt and innocence. The Internet and social media sites provide an easily-accessible space. The group's recordings and publicly-disseminated messages may have the potential impact of persuading a larger number of individuals to assist them. Thus, providing explanations of Boko Haram's ideology and goals could be regarded as an avenue to convince potential recruits that it is worth joining the terrorist organization.

Additionally, recent studies on terrorist recruitment demonstrated the growing influence of social media for Boko Haram to recruit its members. It is in line with the statement given by the former Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, at the 10th Annual Ramadan lecture in Kaduna. He drew attention to the perception of social media as a driver of radicalization for children and teenagers as well as a tool to engage with the terrorist organization. He stressed the adverse effects social media has had on establishing firm ethical values as the youth were becoming largely exposed to and obsessed with social media sites, such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp. Due to Boko Haram's increased abilities in the online space to either manipulate or negatively indoctrinate them after formulating personal connections or even friendships (Madugba, 2015). In November 2015, the niece of a community leader in Jos decided to personally encounter her boyfriend – whom she had allegedly been in contact with via Facebook – in Maiduguri, Borno state. Sadly, despite extensive searches, she had not been seen or heard of since then, apart from the only piece of information according to which she had been married to one of Boko Haram's unit commanders. Many similar stories can be heard about people's misguidance on social media sites with the intention of subsequently recruiting them[7] (Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2020). The terrorist organization uses online media to win over individuals who could assist them in its fights against eliminating moral decadence in north-east Nigeria, which is considered the by-product of Western civilization.

Moreover, a 2014 research conducted by CLEEN Foundation intended to pave the way for a better understanding of Northern Nigerian radicalization by looking at the motivation of the youth to join Boko Haram. It found that 21% of respondents in Borno state regarded audio and video messages as being crucial

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7   Interview with a Community Leader in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, 21 June 2019.

mediums. In the opinion of the surveyed youth, it was the second most significant pathway for radicalization, only to have been overcome by roaming preachers with 35% (CLEEN Foundation, 2014). The recruitment of members in the most remote areas of the country with the lack of social media and Internet is facilitated by 'middle men', who function as mediators in sharing messages[8] (Cox, 2018). Although enlisting fighters, followers and supporters has always been highly ranked in Boko Haram's online strategy, it also appears to be evident that offline connections remain to be important in the group's recruitment.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Boko Haram uses social media to depict itself as the winning entity by representing strength, unity, and taking advantage of the anti-government sentiment in the country.

Due to the lack of economic, educational, and social opportunities, Nigerians are likely to be more desperate to seek unity. Consequently, their need for belonging is strengthened, which may be exploited by the terrorist organization. In analyzing the reasons why individuals join the ranks of Boko Haram, belonging to a group (26%) and peer pressure (22%) both appear to be significant (Salifu & Ewi, 2017). The latter's growing dominance is further supported by experts studying the interplay between participation, peer pressure, and group bonding. Based on the content of the 2015 Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), it seems that social connections *'play instrumental roles in the radicalization process by propagating the 'virtues' of the group and normalizing membership within it'* (Mercy Corps, 2016, 14.). Surprisingly, however, according to peacebuilders' perspective, members motivated by fear are significantly less numerous (2%). The results of a 2017 ISS quantitative survey point in the direction of loose connections between coercion and the group's recruitment (Salifu & Ewi, 2017).

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8   RAND Europe interview with Blaise Bebey Abong, policy official, 16 September 2017.

Figure 3: *Peacebuilders' perception of why people join Boko Haram*

Note. Salifu & Ewi, 2017, 5.

Not only desperation but widespread frustration with the state of political procedures, corruption, and nepotism was an ever-present feeling mainly among the youth that contributed to the increased membership of Boko Haram. Especially the north-eastern population of Nigeria felt neglected by the government as the latter did not provide assistance and essential services, such as food, medicine, and water. Moreover, there were barely any forums that would have given individuals a chance to complain about their unfair treatment. As a result, initially the atmosphere of acceptance surrounded Boko Haram since the terrorist organization was viewed as an alternative to what people perceived as an inefficient government. A woman from Borno stated that *'the community perception about [Boko Haram] was that…they are a new sect that is coming in peace because at the beginning they showed love and concern, and [they] provided things to needy people of the community'* (Mercy Corps, 2016, 14.). Besides, the group was considered an entity that might be able to pave the way for government change. More importantly, however, the terrorist organization was thought to be able to provide security, thereby it was also attractive in terms of recruitment.

The same anti-government sentiment is reverberated by the messages of Muhammad Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau, and less significantly Abu Qaqa, who alluded

to religious violence before the existence of the group in certain parts of Nigeria, including Langtang, Jos, Shendam, and Zangon Kataf (Mahmood, 2017). With the help of online messaging, Boko Haram was able to draw attention to what they felt was the unjust treatment of the followers of Islam as opposed to Christianity in the country. The terrorist organization confirmed its role in defending Nigerian Muslims in place of the government, which was seen as idle and incompetent. In 2012, for instance, Qaqa stated that '*the President had never visited any of the theatres where Muslims were massacred…the disposition and body language of the President clearly showed that he is the leader of Christians'* (Johnson & Awunor, 2012). Besides deepening the existing religious division in the country, the group's intention with these messages must have been the galvanization of support, which is likely connected to recruitment.

A recent review about the public messages of Boko Haram revealed that by 2016 the two major themes were 'claimed attacks' (50%) and 'strength' (50%) (Mahmood, 2017). While the former is rather linked to (although not limited to) propaganda, the latter can tie into recruitment by presenting the terrorist organization as the winning side. Following the bayʿah to ISIL in 2015, MOWAP was responsible for producing videos related to the claimed attacks of Boko Haram. Not only were these materials more visual and of higher quality, but they also put the emphasis on attesting to the group's strength and operational efficiency, which '*positively shaped youth perceptions of the group'*[9] (Cox, 2018, 22.). They commonly depicted the successful nature of Boko Haram's attacks, indicated by the corpses of Nigerian soldiers and the abundance of looted ammunition, weapons, and vehicles.

Figure 4: *Percentage of messages that contained major themes, by year*

Year/themes	Claimed attacks	Strength	Negotiations and conditions	Illegitimate government	Defender of Islam	Warnings and threats	Civilian targeting	Global jihad	Defining ideology	Justice and governance	Miscellaneous
2010	20%	20%	0%	20%	20%	0%	0%	60%	20%	0%	0%
2011	50%	7%	37%	13%	13%	37%	10%	13%	3%	0%	7%
2012	57%	6%	32%	11%	19%	51%	21%	4%	11%	0%	19%
2013	61%	44%	44%	0%	6%	33%	11%	22%	6%	0%	6%
2014	54%	8%	15%	23%	15%	31%	8%	31%	0%	38%	0%
2015	29%	36%	4%	4%	0%	21%	7%	14%	14%	14%	4%
2016	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%

Note. Mahmood, 2017, 9.

9   RAND Europe interview with Blaise Bebey Abong, policy official, 16 September 2017.

Analyzing the social media messages of the terrorist organization can be instrumental in understanding how the demonstration of its strength and military might can convince potential recruits to join the group. A recurring theme in these videos is the display of Boko Haram's advanced armament, including *'armored personnel carriers, multi-purpose vans, AK47 and Pump Action riffles, heavy machine guns (HMGs), mortars, artillery shells, anti-aircraft guns, heat-seeking missiles, bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, hundreds of motorbikes, pick-up trucks and so on'* (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018, 329.). In January 2015, the terrorist group possessed more than 70.000 square miles, which approximately equals 20 percent of Nigeria (Schmitt, 2014), exercising control over areas such as Abadam, Gambaru, Konduga, Mafa, Mallam Fatori, Marte, Michika, and Monguno. In one of their videos (URL1), the terrorist organization's soldiers are chanting and marching around in a self-assured way, not expecting any signs of resistance from government forces. In another video (URL2), a wide array of military weapons is presented that is said to have been seized from the Monguno barrack. On top of that, references are made to the numerical superiority of the group's weaponry that could contribute to the successful outcome. Besides drawing attention to military capabilities, I would argue that the aims of these videos are both the persuasion of Nigerians to take sides with the 'strong' Boko Haram instead of the 'weak' government and the potential recruitment of desperate individuals who flock to strength.

Following the 2015 Baga massacre in another video (URL3), Shekau emphasized that with the newly-confiscated weapons from a neighboring military base, the terrorist organization possesses military superiority, which is adequate to annihilate Nigeria. Apart from the message, the appearance of Boko Haram's leader and officers is also worth analyzing as they are all wearing *'expensive-looking military khaki and three-color desert camouflage pattern of dark brown, mint green and beige desert fatigue uniforms'* (Ogbondah & Agbese, 2018, 331.). After conducting several successful operations in the northeastern region of the country, the terrorist group's online media messaging began to concentrate on the repeated nature of being able to strike government facilities. For instance, the New York Times reported that at least eighteen people were killed in suicide bomber attacks against the United Nations headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011 (Murray & Nossiter, 2011). Additionally, the terrorist organization attacked a military airbase of an international airport in Maiduguri on December 2, 2013. According to an Al Jazeera video (URL4) *'this attack [was] a serious blow to the military's effort to put an end to Boko Haram'* and it seemed to be justifiable as the airport was shut down for all civil flights for one and a half years. Besides suggesting that Boko Haram is likely to gain the upper hand

over the Nigerian government in the long term, I would reason that the objectives of these social media messages are the reconfirmation of the strength of the terrorist group in the eyes of its fighters, followers, and supporters and that not only can the Islamic sect provide security, but also status and unity, which can both tie into recruitment.

Conclusion

Analyzing the effectiveness of Boko Haram's online strategy in terms of its recruitment can be instrumental since the terrorist organization increasingly uses social media sites. I conclude that although it is less overt than of al-Shabaab or ISIL, for instance, Boko Haram's use of social media results in more effective recruitment due to the swift expansion of Internet access in Nigeria that led to the terrorist group's increasing ability to convey instant messages to large online audiences while also exercising control over their visual content. Another trend that can be observed concerning recruitment is the use of social media for radicalization, religious indoctrination, and sharing of Boko Haram's narrative. By giving purpose to individuals who usually lack adequate knowledge about Islam, the terrorist organization may find it easier to recruit, especially among the youth, who are quite savvy with social media sites. However, while online influences certainly play a crucial role in recruitment, they are typically coupled with offline physical connections, such as family members, friends, and business partners. 'Middle men' are taken advantage of with the intent of disseminating messages in rural parts of Nigeria with limited or no Internet access. Furthermore, the continuous dominance of Hausa is connected to the group's mostly local focus and ties into the recruitment of misinformed Nigerians. Additionally, by explaining and building on its believer-non-believer narrative, the terrorist organization wishes to bolster its membership as well. Lastly, Boko Haram uses social media to represent strength and unity by emphasizing the interplay between participation, peer pressure, and belonging to the terrorist organization, which can be an attractive option for individuals deprived of economic, educational, and social opportunities. Moreover, Boko Haram tries to depict itself as a strong provider of basic needs and security as opposed to the Nigerian government, which is considered weak, inadequate, and taking sides with the Christians of the country. The strength of the group is further amplified by the dominance of military capabilities with which they can allure desperate individuals.

Since 2016, Boko Haram has been comprised of two factions with both of them allegedly affiliated with ISIL. After the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant withdrew its recognition of Shekau in 2015, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was named as the new leader of the terrorist group (BBC, 2016). Despite the fact ISIL had issued a statement about the replacement of the former leader, Shekau continued operations and claimed he was still in charge of Boko Haram, accusing al-Barnawi of attempting a coup against him (The Sun, 2018). Following the splintering of the terrorist organization, Shekau's faction could rather be characterized by the preference of indiscriminate attacks on internally displaced people (IDPs), while al-Barnawi's faction seemed to favor more direct engagement with Nigerian security forces (Mahmood, 2017). Although Boko Haram cannot be considered as a unified group, the movement remains lethal and active; which are illustrated by sabotaging security convoys transporting IDPs back to their homes in September 2020 (The Guardian, 2020a), attacking farmers, fishermen, and loggers whom are accused of assisting the Nigerian army and pro-government soldiers (The Guardian, 2020b) and abducting schoolchildren in Katsina in December 2020 with the potential purpose of forcibly recruiting them later (BBC, 2020). I believe a long-term strategy aimed at weakening Boko Haram's dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa should be brought about through the development of education, poverty alleviation, and the provision of a wider range of possibilities to the Nigerian youth. If political instability and unsustainable economic growth remain, even after the potential toppling of Boko Haram, another militant movement is likely to fill the power vacuum in the region (Loimeier, 2012).

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Reference of the article according to APA regulation

Bence Lakatos

Investigation of Smart Tools in Order to Improve the Effectiveness of the Administration of Disaster Management I.

Abstract

The security of a well-functioning country requires an administrative and defence management system. The author presents the operation and activity system of the Hungarian disaster management organizational system, paying special attention to the examination of smart devices that improve the efficiency of public administration. The author demonstrates in his research that the use of smart devices and technologies contributes to the reduction of disaster risk, damage, and helps disaster prevention. Based on the applied research methods, the author proves that due to the identified problems, the increasing number of inspections and the growing information society expectations require us to use the tools and technologies of disaster management authorities to strengthen the safety factors.

Keywords: e-governance, disaster management, Industrial 4.0, IoT, efficiency

Introduction

For the security of a well-functioning country, it is essential to have a public administration with a defence administration within, in order to research developments and innovations aimed at continuously increasing its efficiency (Teknős, 2018, 242-243.). In the 21st century in Hungary the development of the country's ability to defend itself against external attacks became regulated in an advanced way as compared to the expectation of the age. While hundreds of years ago defence was based on combating military/armed attacks, today, in the 21st century, defence appears to be a much more comprehensive and complex concept. To develop effective protection, complex top-down structured organizational background and qualified personnel on different levels are required. The

current advanced information technology tools and IT background are needed as well. It is also necessary because disaster management is a national affair (Lakatos & Teknős, 2019, 167-180.).

Within the current disaster management organization system in Hungary, my research is focusing on the examination of 'smart' tools that improve the efficiency of the official administration of those carrying out official activities. The aim to substantiate my claim is as follows: effectiveness of the official administration of disaster management bodies and the level of security itself can be significantly increased by the applicable smart tools and technologies. This contributes to the prevention of damage, disaster risk and subsequent disasters (Endrődi & Teknős, 2014, 235.). To substantiate the above claim, given the quantity limitations of this article, I begin by historically reviewing the latest industrial revolution, the emergence and applicability of smart devices, their impact on public administration, legal provisions. Then I examine what could be done by these enhancements, IoT tools and software to create a more effective method in disaster management.

The Concept of Industry 4.0, Iot Technology and Smart City, Their Impact on E-Government

Since the existence of mankind, information itself has played a significant role in continuous development. Information that we collect, process, and later on transmit is essential to our existence. These forms, tools, and methods have undergone continuous development throughout history. In the history of mankind, a connection can be found between the fact that some eras' stronger and more advanced civilizations were able to play a decisive role in their era because they had more and better information than other civilizations and peoples. This means information is a power that provides the chance to always be one step forward. The basic forms of technical implementations of information management have been constantly evolving. Newer and newer procedures and technologies have been invented and applied for their own implementation. There is no accepted definition of information, but for the most part, information is considered to be data or news that has a relevance and a lack-of-knowledge-reducing function to solve a given issue. Information can also be seen as a set of facts, i.e., a reflection of reality (Munk, 2007, 9.). Increased efficiency through information has resulted in industrial revolutions that have had a major impact. These revolutions generated changes in the technological, social, economic and organizational set-up of a given historical period, as well as a significant

impact on spatial processes and regional development. In my opinion, the on-going industrial revolution, which began in the last decade and is unfolding in front of us, is based mainly on the knowledge-based use of information and its significant digitization. This process is considered to be the fourth stage of industrial development, which focuses on the rapid development and evolution of cyber-physical systems, which is Industry 4.0.

In order to maintain the continued leadership of the German industry, the government announced a significant industrial development (URL1), in which the first industrial digital development funds were laid in Hanover in 2011, designated Industrie 4.0, i.e. Industry 4.0 terminology (Kagermann, Wahlster & Helbring, 2013, 6.).

In 2016, the National Technology Platform published the definition of Industry 4.0, according to which *'The concept of Industry 4.0 refers to the fourth industrial revolution, which is based on cyber-physical systems. This means the previously non-existent integration of real and virtual reality, implements the organization and regulation of the entire value chain to a new level throughout the entire life cycle of products. The cycle follows increasingly individualized customer needs and extends from product conceptual design, through ordering, product development, manufacturing to delivery to the end user, and recycling to all stages of the process, including product-related services. The basis of all this is the real-time availability of all relevant information, which presupposes the networking of the objects in the value chain, as well as the ability to determine the optimal value flow from this data at any time. By connecting people, objects and systems, dynamic, real-time-optimized, self-organizing value-added networks beyond the enterprise framework are created that can be optimized according to various criteria (cost, availability, and resource utilization).'*

The goals of Industry 4.0 are also reflected in the activities of government and related administrative personae. Technological developments and the accelerating world require that the necessary regulatory decisions, inspections, and controls be even more reliable, faster, more accurate and more efficient. Therefore, it can be stated that public administration is also an integral part of the technological development sector of Industry 4.0, as it forms a kind of counterbalance to the civil sphere. In order to this, it creates security that is necessary to guarantee the search for continuous innovations and the effective application of existing ones. The impact of the above Industry 4.0 revolution is also affecting our own close living space, so technology, computing and info-communication tools can make our everyday lives more efficient, convenient and the tasks ahead more effective. The IPv4 version of Internet protocol allows the development of IoT technology, which will be explained later. These are the information and communication

technologies needed to create a smart home, city, and country. Networking, i.e., the possibility of technical devices to communicate via the Internet, as well as the development of sensors and the improvement of their communication skills also significantly increase the number of data and information that can be collected at the same time. Cloud-based services have been created and are receiving more and more emphasis for storing this amount of data, which, in addition to storing information and data, will also play a major role in their processing in the future. A single, generally accepted definition of a smart house, city and country has not yet been developed, but all definitions are based on the use of info-communication solutions. Smart homes must be part of smart cities. The digital city and country have to go through a three-step development process, to be able to talk about a digital city, an intelligent city, and a smart city. Sequence is a kind of development wave that can be increased by improving different levels of development and services. In order to achieve these, we can define special functions and elements for the smart city and country, which are necessary for their design. Thus, real-time data collection is needed with the help of sensors installed in both private and public areas. The analysis of the collected data is also essential, planning and forecasting are given priority. Control of urban utilities as infrastructures, emphasizing the role of critical infrastructure protection, providing smart urban applications. Developing tools for community participation, and providing high-speed internet access at a quality and price accessible to all. These are essential for the smart city and country to be built, and if provided at the same time, then we can talk about a smart city and a smart country.

Figure 1: *Smart city segments and possible areas for smart applications*

Note. Created by the author.

For the development of present, it is essential to fully digitize the arenas of the above smart devices. Many of the applications related to the smart city are already available, which have appeared in almost all areas of our daily lives. The figure above shows, by way of an example, that the smart urban applications can be relevant in all areas of life. Public administration is also one of the segments necessary for the completion of a smart city, which also includes disaster management.

It is the characteristic of our world in the 21st century that smart devices, emphasizing mobile devices, came first in info-communication technology. Their spread and development dictate a rapid trend, and this process, a wave of development, will intensify further.

The size and complexity of the Internet network is constantly increasing due to the number of millions and billions of sensors connected to the network. These sensors and devices form the culmination of the Internet of Things (IoT) as a concept. Wired technology is still 'only' one billion, while mobile technology is already connected to the network by seven billion people, not counting our many devices that can communicate with wired and wireless technology, which are also connected to the network and form an even larger set of information.

'IoT can be interpreted as a worldwide network of uniquely addressable devices, objects and objects with their own IP address, which uses TCP/IP as a communication addressing protocol. IoT is usually a network of various sensors and actuators. The sensors detect changes in the state of the environment due to physical, chemical, biological, etc. in their sensing range, and the actuators intervene in the operating processes on the basis of the detected and the evaluated data. The cloud-based computing technology described earlier is an extremely important part if IoT, as it allows the use of the computing resources needed for different activities.' (Haig, 2018, 97-98.).

It can be well seen from the above concept that the Internet of Things is ultimately the point of development of the Internet. It has become possible for the tools and objects used every day to be able to connect to the Internet and perform mutual information solutions.

The appearance of the IoT was necessary and its application at the individual level also appears in smart homes. It also plays a significant role in the feasibility of the smart city concept and based on the above we can see how many infrastructures and all sectors, particularly law enforcement, national defence, healthcare, critical infrastructures, industrial companies, public safety are needed to be sensored to make the concept a reality. A positive effect can also be achieved in public administration systems by using smart tools, so the efficiency of customer authority communication can be improved. These

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0-24-hour online administration interfaces can be provided from anywhere at any time, and also provide more application, system and device. By applying them, administrative activity, official administration, official procedure can be faster, more precise, and more efficient. The need and importance of public administration for development is also a priority for the European Union itself, as it is essential to improve digital cohesion in order to increase economic competitiveness. In addition to increasing competitiveness, it also brings social development and the state of social well-being. *'Closing the gap between the 27 Member States, widening administrative burdens in general, introducing efficient services and reforming the public sector and public administration in general are important elements of EU and national policies. These include Digital Agenda, the H2020 research programs for the E-Government Action Plan.'* (Nemeslaki, 2018. 2-5.).

Electronic, i.e., E-government, nowadays covers an increasingly used term, and even the foreign language equivalents of E-government and e-governance are used. Today, E-government itself has become an interdisciplinary field, as several disciplines deal with it, and the principles it targets connect the disciplines as a bridge. E-government could be characterized with a kind of approach and tool system aimed at modernizing state and local government administration.

What do we call E-government then? *'E-government means the knowledge-based transformation of the public sector relationship system and the streamlines, service-oriented reorganization through the public utilization of info-communication technology applications.'* (Budai, 2014, 13.). There are three basic elements in the definition that help to understand the concept of E-government. Thus, the knowledge-based transformation of the relationship system. In this case think of the information society, which is a kind of knowledge-based society, in which knowledge management and learning organization play a significant role. The second pillar is rationalized, serve-type reorganization, this definition can be paired with service-providing and efficient state, and public management approaches are also reflected in this definition. The third pillar is the public use of info-communication applications, which means nothing more than multi-channel, electronic and automated administration by the means available in the information society. The toolbox of E-government will be able to change and evolve at an accelerating pace, allowing for new, simpler planning, decision-making, organization, management, and control mechanisms through the reforms to be introduced. Without these, the administration will not be able to keep pace with the trend of social and economic modernization.

Figure 2: *Advantages and disadvantages of E-government*

Advantages:
+ increasing efficiency due to information sharing
+ government savings from paperless transactions
+ faster services
+ non-stop availability
+ self-service, comfort
+ reducing complexity
+ transparent government

Disadvantages:
- the information is difficult to find
- the personal interaction between the clien and the administrator is lost

Note. Created by the author.

The Appearance of E-Government in the Field of Disaster Management

E-government means more than the public administration websites on the Internet (Czékmann & Csáki-Hatalovics, 2019, 15-23.). The development of E-government has brought with it the fact that the technologies, processes and regulations and conditions governing the work of the organization used in the field of disaster management are undergoing a constant wave of change. The complexity of this transformation process requires knowledge-based operation, without which the process would be unthinkable. We think only of knowledge management as its purpose and knowledge to the right person at the right time, in the right way and form.

In the past few years, a rapid growth has begun due to the tendency to legislate in the European Union and the increasing pressure on the market as driving force. The wave of change in E-government has this brought significant changes for the disaster management as a special field of public administration. The changes include the replacement of the usual paper-based filing habits with electronic ones, the introduction of paperless administration for those obliged to communicate electronically. It also includes the possibility for natural persons to

choose the method of electronic communication during the proceedings. Data processing programs also provide a kind of electronic interface for the statistical processing of data. The development is visible, although not yet complete, as both the data required for data recording programs and the materials to be archived include many basic paper-based documents, the digitization of which enables other progresses of work to be performed on the electronic interface. Act CCXXII of 2015 on the general rules of electronic administration and trust services, in accordance with the provisions of the Act (URL2), the professional disaster management authorities will provide customers with the possibility of electronic administration from 1 January 2018. In my opinion, it is necessary for users, as customers, that E-government, including disaster management, strives to develop electronic administration interfaces which make customers satisfied with the simplicity and efficiency of the service management interface. Meaning if they are implemented on a very complex, impenetrable surface, the citizens may feel discouraged from E-government, which will lead to unsuccessful ways in achieving the goals of the information society itself. Based on the above, we can determine that the implementation of E-government in the field of disaster management organizations must be examined and ensured from two directions. One is of the units within the organization, i.e., through tools and programs that improve the effectiveness of the authority's work. The other is through communication between customers and disaster management, and through an efficient interface for administration.

Based on the fourth wave of the industrial revolution and the development trend of the information society, the professional disaster management departments use a number of electronic programs, software and tools in their work in order to make disaster prevention, protection and damage elimination as effective as possible. Although the performance of the IT tools used by the departments is in line with the development of the present age and the emerging tasks, certain circumstances. These circumstances include but are not limited to labour shortages, young staff, increasing number of facilities to be inspected for security, change in living conditions, being constantly updated for both software and hardware, in particular the increased resource requirements of constantly updates GIS databases. The electronic software and devices used must be stable and reliable as integrated info-communication tools. Of the IT tools and software used by many specialties and organizational units, the author presents only the description of the employees employed by the official departments in the course of their professional work.

The official departments of the branches and directorates manage the Official Data Reporting System, i.e., HADAR (Hatósági Adatszolgáltatási Rendszer),

with regard to inspections and related official procedures. The purpose of the system is to make the audits searchable in the system, to make it possible to trace the procedural actions kept in the case of each audit, as well as the deficiencies discovered in them and the sanctions applied to them. The system operated as part of the Online KAP system (Közös Alkalmazási Platform – Common Application Platform), which contains even more information, thus assisting the administration. The system also includes a map interface on which the exact location and name of the facility under control and the data of the headquarters and site can be recorded. The disadvantage of the map interface is that it is not able to communicate with the company register, which is considered to be public, from which it would be important for the facilities to transfer and record data even directly. In accordance with data protection legislation, data identifying natural and legal persons may also be included, which would also serve efficiency.

RoboCop NEO, as an integrated business and case processing electronic records management system, serves those performing official tasks to perform administrative tasks. The RZS Signer module is connected to the interface of the RoboCop NEO, with the help of which the system has become able to make a certified electronic copy of paper-based documents. This is necessary in the case of paper-based documents submitted during official work, as well as in the case of all recorded protocols, as this is also a program related to the E-government deployment method. The system of RoboCop NEO is used to file official cases by case type, and it also ensures that all incoming and outgoing documents in the case are recorded by sub-number for each main number. Official staff can see the procedural deadlines set according to the procedural rules for the given case type, the observance of which is a primary consideration. With regard to official matters, the on-site inspection and inspection reports are also uploaded here in a separate sub-section. The protocols are paper based, they are filled in manually at the inspection site and the digitalized using the RZS Signer module. Once official cases have been closed, archiving will take place and documents will remain digitally retrievable.

During the performance of its tasks, the authority also uses the Official Gate (Hatósági Kapu – HKP) system, which operates as part of the Central Electronic Service System, in order to maintain official contact with the parties specified in the legislation on electronic administration. Through this system, recipient organizations can receive their electronic messages in an authentic manner, and electronic messages sent by agencies can be sent to identified customers, such as citizens, agencies, and businesses, in the same way. The E-paper application is also connected to the system, which is also an authenticated messaging

application that can connect customers to the institutions connected to the service electronically via Internet connection. In order to use this service, the customer must have a customer gateway (ügyfélkapu). The two services and application described above are part of the office gateway and E-paper is part of the customer gateway. The task and purpose of the government's electronic identification system is to provide users with the opportunity to communicate with authorities providing electronic public administration and services after a controlled entry. The existence of these programs is also an important stage in the development of E-government and contributes to the digitalization of the official activities of disaster management authorities themselves.

With regard to official proceedings, the new Procedural Act is governed by Act CL of 2016 on General Administrative Procedure. Act introduced significant changes for non-compliant natural and legal persons, as, unlike the previous regulation, the National Tax and Customs Office was designated as the authority for uniform and general enforcement. The authorities initiating the implementation, such as the disaster management authorities, were able to start the procedure by filling in the appropriate form on the basis of the official/client gateway access through the General Form Filling Program (Általános Nyomtatványkitöltő Program – ÁNYK) set up for this purpose as a general form filling program. From January 2020, the National Tax and Customs Office launched 'VKAPU', its IT system for handling the submission of recovery requests, which will serve as the initiating interface for the enforcement instead of General Form Filling Program.

Use by disaster management users, facilitating use, and enforcing 'ÉTDR' (Építési hatósági engedélyezési eljárásokat Támogató elektronikus Dokumentációs Rendszer – Electronic Documentation System Supporting Building Authority Licensing Procedures) as a building requirement (Érces, Ambrusz, 2019, 45-83.). This system is the E-government service that allows for the electronic submission of applications and plans, as well as the electronic case management in the above-mentioned official authorization procedures. Electronic files received through both the 'ÉTDR' and the 'HKP' system, upon receipt, are subject to the provisions of Decree 335/2005 (XII. 29.) on the general requirements for the record management of authorities performing public tasks. From administrative point of view it is managed by the central organization of disaster management. Due to the emergence and develop processes of E-government, the IT systems supporting the work of the authorities have undergone a lot of development. In my opinion the above systems are adequate, but if they were further developed or supplemented, they could become even more efficient.

Possibilities of Application of Iot in the Field of Authority

I have brought up that a modern industrial revolution is going on around us and how important E-government is in building smart city, smart country concepts. I have introduced the concept of IoT, the Internet of Things, in which I have found that more and more of these tools are used by us and that their number and refinement are increasing significantly. In my opinion, the possibilities of using these devices in the course of disaster management authorities have significant potential. We can only think that these devices are always connected to a well-defined, i.e., physically appearing object, or that when the devices are connected to the Internet, they can form a network that can be accessed from anywhere. The network will thus apply not only to connecting people, but also to the structure of things and devices. The point, as defined, is to communicate with each other in the name of efficiency, speed, and expediency. The system-level installation of fire alarms, but in some cases fire extinguishers and other special fire protection devices (heat and smoke extraction equipment, fire protection closures, etc.), is becoming more and more typical nowadays, especially for newly built facilities. These devices are given smart features, so they have the possibility of communication faster and more precise. The disaster management authority has a significant role in prevention, as it acts as a specialist authority for the construction and commissioning procedures for these facilities. Then it can carry out its activities under continuous control and supervision.

In any case, the main aim should be to prevent a fire or other disaster, such as an outflow of hazardous substances, and to maximize the speed of signalling and intervention in the event of an accident. In order to achieve these goals, it is also necessary for the authority to use IoT devices as widely as possible. *'The capabilities of IoT technologies are perceived as the inputs to the smart disaster governance system, whereas disaster governance functionalities were marked as the system activities.'* (Shahat, Hyun, Yeom, 2020, 14.). It can also be made available through the integration of on-site security equipment, like the use of modern high-resolution and other cameras with special capabilities, such as heat detection, can also significantly improve the release of fire and hazardous material from technological devices in early detection (Szakál, Címer & Kátai-Urbán, Sárosi & Vass, 2020, 175.). Based on the algorithms running in the background, the cameras as IoT devices can be paired by the appropriate application to build a system with a sensitivity that exceeds the accuracy of the sensors. Continuous images provided by the cameras can give important information not only to those who may be on site or in remote monitoring centres, but also to disaster management personnel or the fire brigade itself after

transmission to protected systems. Even at the start of the march until arriving, with the help of live images from the camera system, the unit commander can prepare its team for effective intervention. With regard to the live viewing of the image of the camera systems installed in the facilities, there is access to a tablet available to the intervention staff on site, which would display all the fire and other safety devices related to the facility in addition to the camera system for remote control of the devices. It would be worthwhile to build most of this type of protection equipment in the future in a dual way, even on the basis of wireless technology. In these cases, the possibility of a significant heat effect of fire and damage by hazardous materials can be filtered out. The on-site use of the camera system, as well as the smartening of the built-in fire alarm and other safety devices can also facilitate the work of the authorities. Just think of connecting to the network of fire protection and safety devices with a tablet application for the inspection authority. Name, location, functionality of the device, the name of the person performing maintenance, the certificate of education, the time of maintenance and inspection could be included. An application that would be installed on today's smart phones and thus all the fire-fighting technical devices to be used in that facility in the event of a possible fire or spill of hazardous substances, such as a fire extinguisher, would also increase the activity of the authorities and the safety of the persons in the facility themselves. So, appliances, devices for fire ignition keys in place, security doors and closing valves of escapes would be marked. There would be no significant cost in smartening manual starters, fire extinguishers, safety devices, as it could be solved with a simple chip to send the location and name to the system.

The application could be useful, as these devices could be found even in smoke or in low light conditions. Another advantage of using this would be that thanks to the mobile's accurate positioning system, one could see where to go and how far the nearest device is. The application would help the escape of the person(s) trapped inside by mapping the shortest and safest escape route. The advantage of the app would be that it communicates, also giving voice instructions to help those who are disabled in some way, such as the blind or visually impaired. In addition, after opening the program, in case of a possible danger, the program sends information about their situation to the centre. This can be displayed on the means available to the intervention staff, so that they can identify the exact location of the person inside. In addition to smart phones, the application could be used on other devices that are now commonplace, such as smart jewellery and watches.

Thanks to the current level of Industry 4.0 and the significant digital technological advances it has brought with it, Virtual Reality (VR), Augmented Reality

(AR), Mixed Reality (MR), and Extended Reality (XR) have reached a high level of usability. The invention of technology is not new, as the creation of virtual reality dates back almost fifty years. The key point is the increase in the number of services and uses, as well as their widespread availability. In the case of these technologies, the role of 3D objects and artificial intelligence should be emphasized. Virtual Reality (VR) is an immersive experience also known as computer simulated reality. It refers to computer technologies that can be used to create realistic sounds, images, and other feelings for the users. They recreate, replicate the real environment, or create a non-existent imaginary world. With VR, users can immerse themselves in a completely virtual world. A true VR environment includes all five senses (taste, sight, smell, touch, sound), but this is not always possible to achieve.

  Augmented Reality (AR) is a live, direct, or indirect image of a physical, real-world environment whose elements are complemented by computer-generated sensory input, such as audio, video, graphics, or GPS data. (Sangmin, Soung & Lee, 2018, 8.) As AR exists at the top of our own world, it builds on the real world we see as a kind of layer. AR takes advantage of its existing reality and complements it by using some tools. Mobile phones and tablets are the most popular media of AR, with applications overlapping digital content into the environment through the camera. The collective concept of extended reality is XR, which includes all VR, AR, and MR technologies. Areas of application of the technology include but are not limited to critical infrastructure protection and disaster management at an organizational level. Extended reality can appear in the daily work of firefighters, for instance, by incorporating an AR device into the helmet, which provides the firefighter with information described in the previous chapter. Information could be the location of firefighting technical devices, utility openings and closures. It can serve as an effective complement to information about people inside, and intrusion point, and team communication tools. For disaster management authorities, VR and AR can appear at each stage, for instance, in the case of building permit procedure, the submitted plans can be digitally modelled using VR technology to walk around the facility both from outside and inside, room by room. Also, the place of the later-to-be-installed firefighting facilities becomes verifiable, thanks to virtual reality. When in use, AR technology can provide important information, as the location, technical and other information on the structure of the building as indicated in the documentation submitted during the previous permitting procedure may appear here. Walking around with XR can be more efficient and effective, as in this case a possible construction or establishment not according to the design documentation can be revealed immediately. The VR may assist less experiences regulatory

professionals in simulating the inspection before performing it on site of the inspected facility. With this, the location can be known from the office, and during this the fire protection history related to facility could also be seen. AR technology could facilitate fast and efficient work in all aspects. It would provide its users with additional information during inspections that van guarantee the process of a procedure, but most importantly the safety of the facility.

Conclusions

This article seeks to establish a basis on the above theoretical level. In this context, in my opinion, supplying firefighting technical equipment with a smart chip could replace paper-based inspection and maintenance documentation. Also, a review tool could easily check the official control authority using a tablet in a five- to ten-year horizon. The application of the info-communication tools and solutions described above in all areas of disaster management is expected to increase efficiency itself. Its measurement involves further development opportunities. In the case of public administration and disaster management itself, and in particular the research topic, further development of official work could be achieved by developing an official application described in a following article. It should be endowed with simple, fast, efficient, accurate, up-to-date and transparent features, as well as the technical properties of the tablet to be used for this application have to be met.

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OVERVIEW

Valér Dános – Csaba Szabó

The development of science is uninterrupted
Interview with Prof. Katalin Karikó, elaborator of the mRNA-mediated therapy

Abstract

Both Pfizer-BioNTech's and Moderna's corona virus vaccines have been developed on the basis of the mRNA-mediated therapy, discovered by Katalin Karikó, Hungarian-born professor and senior vice president of BioNTech and her co discover, Drew Weissman, professor of the University of Pennsylvania. The greatest scientific achievement of Katalin Karikó's research work over more than two decades is the elaboration of the mRNA-mediated method for therapeutic application. For Professor Karikó the special milestone was the moment when the first

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vaccine for COVID-19 was created based on this technology. Her breakthrough discovery has a potent scientific importance in vaccine research, as people are all around the world are hoping for the end of pandemic and lockdown restrictions with arrival of vaccines, wishing that life could finally return to normality. However, we have to remark that several questions emerge concerning the mechanism of action of this new type of vaccines, their side or long-term effects, as well as the duration of immunity or the risk of reinfection. These questions lead to uncertainty in connection with vaccination, therefore clear answers needed. In the fight against the virus, beside healthcare workers, military and police personnel belong to the category of highest risk of infection, therefore, it is crucial to achieve as high vaccination rates in their ranks as possible. To reach this goal, it is important to have authentic information about the vaccine and the indicators of the immune response. As, the unknown always creates fear and uncertainty we intend to put an end to such fears with the help of this interview with Katalin Karikó and to support hesitant colleagues' decision-making process to get themselves vaccinated. We asked Professor Katalin Karikó about vaccine research, the wide area of application of the mRNA-mediated therapy, about skepticism concerning vaccination and about her personal connections to police forces and to scientific research in the field of law enforcement. She was interviewed by Valér Dános and Csaba Szabó.

Keywords: mRNA, science, vaccine, COVID–19

Mrs. Professor, you have been searching mRNA for a long time, while other researchers have preferred gene therapy. The result of your researches – the mRNA-mediated therapy – is the basis of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine. When was the moment that you recognised that this technology might be suitable for a vaccine for coronavirus?
To understand this process, we have to go back a bit in time. In 1990 started the Human Genome Project (HGP) in the United States, when gene therapy methods were foregrounded. HGP was a large-size international research cooperation between 1990 and 2003, mapping the total human genome, identifying in this way our complete set of genes and mapping all genes. During this work, function of certain genes were getting known in more and more detail, and recognition of diseases due to these genetic errors were becoming evident. At this time all was about gene therapy. Other researchers and myself dealing with this special area, emphasized frequently that for treating most diseases, gene therapy is not needed. I have then declared dauntlessly and decisively that mRNA offers a much more effective therapeutic opportunity. For example, wound heal-

ing or bone remodelling can be potentiated by temporary proteins produced by the use of this technique. No consideration was then taken into account at that time, of this m RNA therapeutic possibility because gene therapy was dominant then, it was the decade of the human genome.

Besides, we have to consider that the technology needed for research became accessible in the second half of the eighties. The scientific journal Science introduced the title *'The Molecule of the Year'* in 1989 that was awarded the first time to Taq polymerase (Guyer & Koshland, 1989). It made possible the effective formation of appropriately formed DNA sections. The transcription from DNA to RNA was already known that time. Important development was achieved also with the inclusion of nucleic acid into cells as liposomal transfection (lipofection) that was introduced in 1987. It is well perceptible, how much happened at the end of the eighties, practically a scientific revolution was evolving.

The stagnation of the gene technology can be connected to 1999, when Jesse Gelsinger, a voluntary suffering from OTCD disease, was treated with gene therapy method at the Pennsylvania University in Philadelphia. The researchers of the university checked the opportunities how to correct the OTC gene. They tried to achieve production of the deficient enzyme due to the disease to avoid the accumulation of ammonia, responsible for the symptoms. During the therapy, the patient was injected the correct OTC gene built into an adenovirus-vector. The virus (modified to be harmless) infected the liver cells of the patient, getting in this way to the appropriate place and inserted the gene into the chromosomal DNA of the liver cells. Unfortunately, Jesse Gelsinger died four days after the gene therapy (URL1).

The first steps for vaccination with mRNA were made by French researchers in 1993, packed into lipid for prevention of flue infection (Martinon and colleagues, 1993). In the course of my researches, I have experienced the first surprise when the examinations proved that the injected RNA triggered an inflammation process in the body. We may ask how RNA can cause an inflammation although it is present in all our cells. The answer is that RNA in our cells is created in the cell nucleus, while in case of RNA therapy or vaccination it is introduced into the cell from outside. In this sense, when RNA is located outside the cell membrane, i.e., outside the cell, it poses a real danger, as it may signal the presence of a virus, or it can also emerge from a damaged cell. The body then tries to fight and protect against this danger.

In the course of my research, I began to think further about how to ensure that RNA delivered from the outside does not cause an inflammatory response. That is when I realized what different changes can be successful. The solution was the modification of a nucleoside - an mRNA building block. We then experimentally

confirmed that after the modification, the modified mRNA introduced from the outside no longer causes inflammation in the body. It was also important to solve another problem: during the production of mRNA, many by-products can be produced, also triggering inflammatory processes, and their identification and removal by a purification process had a crucial importance for applicability. The cleaned and modified mRNA could be transferred into the cell without unexpected, harmful consequences. The technology developed in this way has been tested in the development of vaccines against various viruses since 2017, including Zika virus and influenza virus. Our results indicated that the application of the elaborated method can fight successfully against other viruses, as well.

What is the difference between the mRNA-mediated vaccine and earlier vaccines in your opinion?
For the production of traditional vaccines, protein fragments produced via recombinant DNA technique of attenuated or killed pathogens or strains responsible for the infection have been used. In case of the vaccine developed by us, the mRNA coding the spike protein found on the surface of the coronavirus is vaccinated. The delivered mRNA produces then in our cells the protein and responding to that will develop the suitable protection for our organism. In this way we can obtain the production of the specific antibody that will protect us in case of an infection. The effective immune reaction in case of the mRNA-mediated vaccine is combined with an outstanding safety profile and a flexibility of the change in genetic information. On the contrary, in case of a vaccine containing an attenuated pathogen, which is capable of division, antibodies are produced also against particles almost unnecessary for prevention. Knowing the genetic material of the virus and the way of infection it is possible to select the part of the virus that could be the target of protection and antibody production of the body. The modelling of the appropriate part of the pathogen by the mRNA technology can be planned rapidly and so the human organism will act specifically against this part of the virus.

In which other areas can the mRNA technology patented in 2005 be effectively used? Can this vaccine remain effective against mutations of coronavirus, too?
Among pharmaceutical companies, AstraZeneca was the first to use the mRNA-based technology in human trials. The first trial was conducted enrolling cardiac patients, where the goal was to improve the condition of patients with myocardial infarction by neoangiogenesis. In another study they applied mRNA-mediated therapy for diabetes patients to heal dermal ulcerations by facilitating tissue regeneration. Other pharmaceutical companies have clinical trials in progress

for vaccines against several pathogens and for treatment of deficiency diseases or neoplastic diseases.

In case of infections the mRNA technology is applicable not only for vaccination, but it also can deliver information on antibodies to be produced. When we inject antibody-coding mRNA, 2-3 hours later an amount of protein will be present, i.e in which case an antibody may be produced which provides protection against certain pathogens in humans. The aim of these researches is to develop a special mRNA for persons working in the frontline in case of infections, e.g., policemen, so they can be protected within a few hours against that pathogen. For the treatment of malignant tumour diseases, a similar principle is used, by delivering mRNA coding antibodies. These kinds of research have been conducted since the beginning of year 2000. The great difficulty here is, that the detailed identification of the given medical condition takes a long process. Clinical researches are also in progress for patients with cancer disease, applying this method into the tumour itself. This means in case of tumours, e.g., melanoma, that mRNA can be injected directly into the tumour tissue. It is important to use modified mRNA, otherwise we can get a different immune response, different effect and result. In case of tumours, you have to deal with numerous mutations that make selection of the appropriate antibody more difficult. mRNA-mediated therapy can be used in many specialities and in many researches, I mentioned only the main research areas previously.

In my opinion, in connection with coronavirus mutations the vaccine, developed in common work of Pfizer and BioNTech, most probably will provide protection against more virulent versions of the new coronavirus, as well. It is important to emphasize, that the vaccine needs further development to apply it against newer mutations, when needed. Of course, further research is needed to clarify the question.

How does the scientific society evaluate the importance and effectivity of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine? Did not you meet professional envy?
The importance and effectivity of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine is – in my opinion – appropriately recognised by the scientific society, achievements are accepted, although there are always sceptics and others calling for fraud. That is true that I am quite resistant against professional envy. I have always visualised what I can do to help science and development. As people cannot be changed, I never deal with the question what others do in the wrong way. What really matters is what I can do to solve a task. Further I will continue my work further in this way. The most important thing is that problems due to professional envy should not infect the way I think. A kind colleague of mine said that you might

meet such opinions at work, but these are only noises and you should not pay attention to them. Otherwise, we are unable to concentrate on our own work. You can image that you cannot go ahead if you constantly listen to not supportive and criticising voices, due to envy.

What do you work on nowadays, Mrs.Professor?
At the present, my main research area is in connection with antibodies, among them we work on several projects in cooperation. I would stress out our common work with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, where we develop effective vaccines in an innovative way to be able to help those who mostly need them (URL3). These researches aim prevention and treatment of most dangerous infectious diseases, our result may offer a solution for them.

What is your message for your Hungarian compatriots, how should they position themselves towards vaccines? And what is your message for vaccine deniers?
Years, even decades were sacrificed every day of our lives together with my fellow researchers to be able to offer an effective answer on the emerged problems We have worked together with colleagues, coming from several countries, for our common goal. Every piece of relevant information was made public to resolve all doubts, doubting voices and thoughts of people. If after that doubts are still remaining, nothing can be done about it. Unfortunately, there are determined people, believing in something that cannot be changed. But on the other side, there are people more open for answers given by science. I believe that in science the opinion of others is important, too. We look at the same problem, but we formulate different opinions regarding the solution. Scientific progress requires professional criticism of others to be heard, as it might be right and then we realize that the specific experiments do not corroborate our hypotheses. We have to be open to receive criticism. In science constructive criticism brings results, which make it more crystal clear, and thus is capable of further development and progress. I would be glad if people in Hungary could hear each other's supportive criticism, because whoever is on one side of a debate often listens and hears the opinion and position of that side. Openness and forming appropriate dialogues are important. Nowadays these attributes are lacking in people. My message to my Hungarian compatriots is to pay attention to what others say and to take care of each other. It is a very typical form of behaviour that while the other is talking, many people start thinking about how to refute what the other is saying. In the development of science constructive professional criticism is relevant. Constructive criticism is the most important for development of science, as it can guide us towards solutions and results.

It is a common interest of the society to get as many people as possible inoculated by the vaccine. In your opinion, might it be possible to force inoculation by law enforcement measures?

In my opinion, nobody in the world should be forced to accept vaccination, neither in Hungary nor in the United States. However, persons who are not vaccinated may be excluded from participation in community life. I am thinking here as an example of the importance of going to school, where it is an essential aspect and a public interest that children receive age-compulsory vaccinations. These vaccinations are required by the state. Children who do not have mandatory vaccinations are not allowed to attend school. On the other hand, shedding light on the issue, two negative coronavirus tests are currently required for travel. I see an opportunity in reducing the power of those who refuse a vaccine, with the help of regulations, which would motivate them to take their own decision of getting vaccinated.

Do you have any family, professional, friendly contacts to police or to law enforcement researches?

My cousin and her husband were police officers in Hungary but that was long time ago and they have not talked very much about their works. I have heard much more from a member of my present research group, Mr. Jonas Reinholz, researcher of BioNTech, who made examinations led by Andreas Hellmann in the topic of trace analysis at the German Federal Criminal Police Office and at the German Forensic Scientific Institute (URL2). The reason of my openness for the criminal branch is that my daughter has a master diploma in criminology.

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Online links in this interview

URL1: *The Death of Jesse Gelsinger, 20 Years Later*. https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/the-death-of-jesse-gelsinger-20-years-later

URL2: *CaDNAP group*. https://cadnap.org/cadnap-group/

URL3: *Combat infectious diseases*. https://www.gatesfoundation.org/

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