Abstract
Aim: Border corruption is a distinctive form of corruption conducted by law enforcement officers. It happens at the border, in a specific area between nation-states, making its spatial characteristics particularly interesting. The organizational features related to the law enforcement agencies involved in border corruption, as well as the organizational environment and the social context within which it occurs, also make it different from other forms of corruption. Synthesizing the relevant interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to offer a general conceptual framework for border corruption. It discusses the unique characteristics of the phenomenon as well as the key factors enabling law enforcement corruption in border security agencies.
Methodology: Critical literature on border corruption was selected and integrated into a coherent framework.
Findings: Border corruption may involve different actors (individuals, firms, and informal groups) on the bribe-giver client side; each indicates a different type of corrupt transaction. Corruption at the border can be based on collusion, voluntary and mutually beneficial participation, or coercion, when one party is forced by the other to participate. The opportunity aspects enabling this corruption can be classified as macro, regional, and organizational level factors. The motivation of law enforcement officers to engage in border corruption can be explained by utilitarian, normative, and relational perspectives.
Value: Although border control agencies are especially prone to corruption, this type of corruption is relatively understudied in the academic literature. Revealing the key features and the phenomenon's main explanatory factors is crucial to fighting against it. This article provides an essential framework for scholars and practitioners to understand border corruption better.
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